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Abstract
Human-caused climate change and deep disparities in human development imperil a
prosperous and just future for our planet and the people who live on it. Transforming our
society to mitigate global warming offers an opportunity to rebuild energy systems to the
benefit of those who are harmed by global inequality today. I examine this opportunity
through the lens of two sustainable energy technologies: bioenergy and miniature
electricity grids (minigrids).
Bioenergy requires land to produce biomass and is inextricably connected to the
surrounding environment, agricultural livelihoods, and food system. I apply data science
tools to study aspects of land use and food security that may intersect with increasing
bioenergy production. I assess the potential to use over one billion hectares of grazing
land more intensively with an empirical yield gap analysis technique called climate
binning. To clarify how agricultural and socioeconomic characteristics relate to national
food security, I study the relative importance of several drivers using simple linear
regressions with cross validation and random sampling techniques.
Minigrids can supply clean, reliable electricity to un- and under-served communities, but
small and hard-to-predict customer loads hamper their financial viability. To improve
predictions of daily electricity demand of prospective customers, I test a data-driven
approach using customer demographic surveys and machine learning models. I also
investigate opportunities to grow loads by stimulating income-generating uses of minigrid
electricity in twelve Nigerian agricultural value chains.
I conclude by emphasizing the fundamental complementarity of energy and agriculture
as change levers for human development, especially in rural communities with low
energy access and high poverty. I also provide recommendations to support the effective
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use of energy to solve pressing agricultural problems and drive multiplicative human
development benefits.
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1 Introduction
Climate change and inveterate poverty are two pressing and interconnected challenges
facing society. The earth is warming because of increasing radiative forcing by
greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in the atmosphere, and significant reductions in GHG
emissions are required to stabilize the climate. The global economy will transform in the
coming decades — either preemptively or coerced by the physics of the greenhouse gas
effect. At the same time, rampant inequality across geographies, genders, races, and
social classes divides the lucky from the unlucky as billions are projected to fall short of
the UN Sustainable Development goals for 2030.
The climate challenge is often framed as the imperative to prevent anthropomorphic
emissions from changing the biosphere and jeopardizing human prosperity. Developing
nations today have the lowest per-capita greenhouse gas emissions (Aldy et al., 2016),
but in some development scenarios population growth and increasing energy
consumption are poised to rapidly increase their contributions to warming (KC & Lutz,
2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017). In this view of the challenge, developing nations are
often considered ticking carbon time bombs that need defusing — and fast (Diffenbaugh,
2013).
However, the climate challenge can be reframed as an opportunity to harness global
economic change to the benefit of people who have been excluded from global
prosperity during previous industrial revolutions. It is possible to imagine human
development pathways that reduce inequality while embracing carbon budget
constraints. Developing nations can lead the clean energy transition and in many ways
are already doing so (Cortez, Leal, et al., 2018; IEA, 2019a). Sustainable energy
development paths can outdo fossil-fueled development paths, evading the “natural
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resource curse” (Badeeb et al., 2017) and equitably distributing the benefits of clean
energy and climate resilience (Roy et al., 2018).
This dissertation studies this opportunity through the lens of two sustainable energy
technologies: bioenergy and miniature electricity grids (i.e., “minigrids”). Section 1
presents the goals of this thesis and contextualizes the goals by reviewing the recent
literature on the climate and human development challenges. Sections 2 and 3 present
research contributions that apply engineering and data science tools to fill key
knowledge gaps inhibiting deployment of bioenergy and solar-hybrid minigrids,
respectively. Section 4 draws from this work and the human development literature to
highlight the potential of coordinated investments in energy and agriculture to drive
multiplicative sustainable development benefits.

2

1.1 Thesis Goals
1. Apply engineering and data science tools to fill key knowledge gaps inhibiting
deployment of carbon-neutral bioenergy and solar-hybrid minigrids for human
development
a. Bioenergy
i. Assess the intensification potential of global pasture land stocks,
which may be used to raise biomass production without clearing
new land
ii. Identify key drivers of cross-national food security, and analyze
the relative contributions of agricultural and socioeconomic factors
b. Minigrids
i. Improve rural minigrid economics through more accurate
predictions of prospective customer electricity use
ii. Evaluate opportunities to use minigrid electricity for incomegenerating activities in agriculture
2. Synthesize learnings from bioenergy and minigrid work to guide agriculture and
energy investments towards multiplicative human development benefits

3

1.2 Background: dual challenges of climate change and unequal human
development
1.2.1

The climate challenge

Anthropogenic greenhouse gasses (GHGs) are increasing the energy absorbed by the
earth, warming the planet, raising sea levels, shrinking the cryosphere, acidifying the
oceans, intensifying storms, and otherwise altering the climate system to which life has
adapted over millennia (IPCC, 2014). 2010–2019 was the warmest decade on record as
mole fractions of CO2, CH4, and N2O reached 147%, 159% and 123% of pre-industrial
levels (WMO, 2020). The economic costs of business-as-usual warming are staggering,
though estimates range widely according to the underlying methodology. One study
estimates that the >2.0°C warming implied by the 2018 UN national-level mitigation
commitments would reduce per capita economic output 15–25% relative to a world that
did not warm beyond 2000–2010 levels (Burke et al., 2018). The IPCC’s Special Report
on Global Warming of 1.5°C projects clear benefits to limiting warming to 1.5°C versus
the 2.0°C target set by the Paris Climate Accord (IPCC, 2018). The Report also finds
that limiting global temperature increase to just another 0.5°C is physically possible but
would require historic transformation of human society: in modelling pathways with
limited or no overshoot of 1.5°C warming, net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by
~45% from 2010 levels by 2030, reaching net zero by 2050. Net emissions (55.3
GtCO2e in 2018 [UNEP, 2019]) are the product of activity (lighting, driving, flying,
building, deforesting, farming) and intensity (GHG emitted per mile, kilowatt-hour, acre,
building, meal). Thus, the product of GHG activity and intensity must be reduced across
sectors.
In the past half-century, increased affluence and consumption raised resource use and
pollutant emissions quicker than technological improvements could reduce them
4

(Wiedmann et al., 2020). Historically, gross domestic product and useful exergy have
been tightly coupled, and the resource intensity of economic activity has only decreased
to the extent that the conversion of primary energy to exergy has improved (Haberl et al.,
2020). This reality may pose a fundamental limit on the ability for technological
improvement of GHG intensity alone to achieve sustainability.
However, directly controlling macroeconomic activity remains a dubious lever for
mitigating climate change. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a bleak case study of the
effect of eliminating emissions through unconsented slowing of economic activity. In
early 2020, governments around the world enacted confinement policies to slow the
spread of contagion, and by April daily global CO 2 emissions decreased by 17%
compared with the mean 2019 levels (Le Quéré et al., 2020). The associated annual
decrease in emissions (estimated at -4.2 to -7.5%) is roughly comparable to the rates of
decrease required each year to meet the 1.5°C target (UNEP, 2019). The “degrowth”
theory posits that intentional reductions in production should be central to climate
change mitigation (Kallis, 2018), although the depression wrought by the COVID-19
pandemic highlighted the unpopularity and inequality of rapid deceleration of the
economy. Others propose that gross domestic product growth will naturally taper as
labor forces stabilize and the returns on innovation and reallocation of resources
diminish (Banerjee & Duflo, 2019; Vollrath, 2020). Whether GDP growth is exogenous or
endogenous is a decades-old debate among economists (e.g., Bernanke et al., 2002),
making the activity part of the emissions equation difficult — if not impossible — to
control at a macroeconomic scale.
Individual people can play a role by reducing emissions from their consumption of
energy, food, transportation, and other goods and services. For North Americans and
Europeans who emit 13.4 and 7.5 metrics tons of CO 2 equivalent per year, respectively,
5

there is significant room to reduce emissions through changes in consumption of
transportation, food, and housing (Ivanova et al., 2020). In contrast, Africans and Middle
Easterners average only 1.7 tCO2 per capita per year, and many lack basic services
such as electricity and clean cooking (id). For both groups, the aim is to achieve climate
stabilization not through deprivation, but rather by meeting essential needs with less
climate impact. The “avoid–shift–improve” framework articulated by Creutzig et al.
(2018) provides an approach to reducing the environmental impacts of consumption. For
example, in the case of the transport sector, policies may intervene by first avoiding the
need to travel (e.g., telecommuting or better urban planning), then shifting travel to a
less emissions-intensive mode (e.g., walking, public transport), and finally improving the
technology utilized (e.g., replacing fossil-fueled cars with electric vehicles). Policies and
changing social norms driven by this principle can reduce the resource intensity of a
fulfilled life by consuming better, but less (D. W. O’Neill et al., 2018).
In addition to aligning consumption with planetary resource constraints, achieving carbon
neutrality in energy systems is indispensable to climate stabilization. Combustion of
fossil fuels for heat, power and transport accounts for about half of the radiative forcing
contributing to global warming (Lovins et al., 2019). Thus, reducing the GHG intensity of
energy use is paramount.
Mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5 °C broadly agree that the energy transition
must curtail energy demand growth, reduce the emissions intensity of energy supply by
phasing out fossil fuels, and scale carbon dioxide removal to create negative emissions
(IPCC, 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018; Luderer et al., 2016). The extent to which each of
these mitigation modalities contributes to meeting our carbon budget varies across
modelled energy transition scenarios, which present multiple “technologically salient
options” for limiting warming (Rogelj et al., 2018, p. 311). For example, the global Low
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Energy Demand (LED) scenario holds global 2050 energy demand to 245 EJ, allowing a
downsized energy system to supply services and meet 1.5 °C climate targets without
relying on negative emissions technologies (Grubler et al., 2018). The LED mitigation
pathway assumes significant improvements in end-use energy efficiency, which increase
energy productivity (i.e., GDP per unit of primary energy) by 4.8% per year. Energy
efficiency is an extremely large energy “resource” in its own right, delivering three fourths
of the total decarbonization observed from 2010 to 2016, and productivity gains of up to
7% per year are possible using only mature technology (Lovins, 1979, 2018; RMI,
2019a). In the LED scenario, increasing energy efficiency and changing end-use
technologies drive pervasive electrification and adoption of distributed energy resources.
This in turn drives low-carbon resources and non-biomass renewables to 80% and 55%
of primary energy market share, respectively. In 2017, only 19% of primary energy was
from low-carbon resources, with non-biomass renewables (mostly nuclear and hydro)
comprising 9% of total primary energy supply (IEA, 2019c).
The path we ultimately take towards climate stabilization will depend on uncertain trends
in economic growth, public sentiment, technology cost reductions, consumer behavior,
population growth, policy design, and myriad other factors (L. Clarke et al., 2014; KC &
Lutz, 2017; Leimbach et al., 2017; Mundaca et al., 2019; B. C. O’Neill et al., 2017; Riahi
et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2018; Weindl et al., 2017). All mitigation pathways will
require massive reallocation of public and private capital investment (Mann et al., 2020;
Mitchell et al., 2020). Six integrated assessment models (IAMs) meeting 1.5°C targets
predict annual investments between 1.6–3.8 trillion 2010 US dollars on the supply-side
alone, accompanied by divestment from fossil fuel extraction and fossil electricity
production (McCollum et al., 2018). The International Renewable Energy Agency’s
REmap scenario calculates a required cumulative investment of 110 trillion 2015 US
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dollars between 2016–2050 to increase renewable energy deployment, raise energy
efficiency, and electrify energy services such as transportation and heat (IRENA, 2019).
REmap also estimates that for every dollar invested in transforming the global energy
system, there would be a $3–7 savings from reduced subsidies and avoided
externalities.
Some of these shifts are already underway. Thanks to increasingly favorable economics
for renewable energy and battery storage, the power sector is rapidly installing lowcarbon electricity capacity — 200 GW in 2019 (REN21, 2020). Also in 2019, $282 billion
of investment in renewable energy capacity drove wind, solar, biomass and waste,
geothermal and small hydro to 78% of the net gigawatts of generating capacity added
around the globe (McCrone et al., 2020). Another analysis shows that an optimized
combination of wind, solar, battery storage, efficiency, and demand flexibility could costcompetitively match the grid services of every proposed gas-fired generation project in
the United States (Teplin et al., 2019). This imperils investments in natural gas
pipelines, which could face an 85% reduction of expected fuel use from new gas-fired
generation by 2035 (Dyson et al., 2019).
Energy use in buildings, industry and transport is changing less quickly than for the
power sector. Buildings use more than 75% of total final energy demand for heating and
cooling, which remain heavily dependent on fossil-fuels despite the opportunity to
profitably cut building energy use in half by investments in electrification, integrative
design, and energy efficiency (Lovins & Rocky Mountain Institute, 2013; Petersen et al.,
2019; RMI, 2019b). Industry, which accounts for 40% of annual global GHGe, produces
a complex mixture of embedded emissions in materials extraction, processing, and
transportation (Koch Blank et al., 2019). Achieving climate neutrality in industry will
require technical and policy innovations that suit the varied needs of sub-sectors:
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improved energy efficiency through heat recovery, longevity in steel and concrete to
reduce future demand, and use of alternative energy carriers for high-temperature heat
(Rissman et al., 2020). Globally, transport accounts for approximately one third of total
final energy consumption, but only 3.3% was met by renewable energy in 2019 (REN21,
2020). Section 2.1.1 describes the role of bioenergy in decarbonizing transport in further
detail.
In summary, meeting human needs while maintaining carbon neutrality will require
transformation of our society, economy, infrastructure, and institutions (UNEP, 2019).
Such transitions are “unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of
speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation
options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options” (IPCC, 2018, p. 15).

1.2.2

The human development challenge

Alongside the climate challenge, rampant inequality across geographies, genders, races,
and social classes divides the lucky from the unlucky as billions are projected to fall
short of the UN Sustainable Development goals for 2030 (UN, 2019). These inequalities
exist between countries: Somalian children are 60 times more likely to die before age
five than Icelandic children (UN IGME, 2019). These inequalities exist within countries: in
Nigeria, people in the least educated local government area average seven fewer years
of education than those in the most educated district (BMGF, 2019). Recent data
indicate that more than two billion people lack regular access to safe, nutritious, and
sufficient food (FAO, 2019c), and in 2018 an estimated 821 million people were not able
to acquire enough food to meet minimum dietary energy requirements (FAO, 2018b).
Globally, the top 5% of energy consumers use more Joules than the bottom 50%, as
wealthier people utilize luxury services with high energy intensities (e.g., air travel) while
poorer people lack the minimum level of energy consumption required for modern life
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(Oswald et al., 2020). 789 million do not have access to electricity (IEA et al., 2020) and
one in two people lack access modern energy cooking services (ESMAP, 2020b).
Although inequalities exist everywhere, extreme poverty is disproportionately SubSaharan African and rural. The global extreme poverty rate in rural areas is more than 3
times that of urban areas (UN, 2019), and 83% of multidimensionally poor people live in
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (MPI 2019). Forecasts for 2030 predict that 7–8% of
the global population will live on less than $1.90 or less per day (in 2011 dollars) if
economic growth continues according to World Bank forecasts and is distributed per the
status quo (Lakner et al., 2020). 85% of these will be Sub-Saharan Africans, where
roughly one in three people will still have annual incomes below ~$700 (id). In 2018,
nearly half of Africans had no access to electricity, while 80% of Sub-Saharan African
companies experienced frequent electricity disruptions (IEA, 2019a).
These regions are precisely the ones most exposed to climate risk, and with the least
margin to adapt. Despite contributing <3% of historic emissions (Ritchie, 2019), subSaharan Africa is already experiencing more frequent and intense climate extremes from
1°C of warming (Taylor et al., 2017) along with climate-driven crop losses (Sultan et al.,
2019). Burke and Tanutama (2019) find that warming since 2000 has already reduced
aggregate economic output by 5% in tropical countries. Studies further anticipate higher
temperature increases in Africa than the global mean (Weber et al., 2018), which would
contribute to erratic precipitation patterns (Diedhiou et al., 2018), uncertain crop yields
(Palazzo et al., 2017; Sultan et al., 2019), and an increasing chance of infectious
disease outbreaks (Serdeczny et al., 2017) among other risks (IPCC, 2018, Chapter 3).
In addition to the climate risks being severe, poor communities and families are more
vulnerable because they have less capacity and resources to adapt (Acevedo & IMF,
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2019; UNDP, 2019). Thus climate change is expected to act as a “poverty multiplier”,
making poor people poorer (Hallegatte & Rozenberg, 2017).
Disparities in capability (health, food security, education, energy) are at the heart of
human development because they fundamentally limit a person’s freedom to choose
what to be and do (A. Sen, 1992). These capabilities cannot be reduced purely to
income poverty, although progress in human development fundamentally “involves the
capacity to generate income and translate it into capabilities” (UNDP, 2019, p. 68).
In the past few decades, economic growth and human development efforts have
reduced gaps in many basic capabilities necessary for survival. For example, the global
extreme poverty rate dropped from 36 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2018 (World Bank,
2018b). Primary school enrollment is now nearly ubiquitous, with secondary school
enrollment also making progress, despite wide inequalities in school quality and access
to higher education (UNESCO, 2020). The global maternal and infant mortality rates
have been cut in half since 1990 (UNICEF, 2014). But disparities continue, and are even
growing, among the enhanced capabilities that are necessary for people to have
freedom and agency over their lives in the coming decades (e.g. access to quality
healthcare, higher education, internet) (UNDP, 2019). Further, growth in GDP — and the
development spillovers that come with it — already appears to be slowing in many
places. As economies reduce inefficiencies and misallocation of capital (Banerjee et al.,
2003), much of the lowest hanging fruit will eventually be “picked”, and the marginal
returns from shifting investment to more profitable or competitive firms diminished. Even
in October 2018, the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook signaled a
tapering of the post-recession expansion (IMF, 2018). These trends were exacerbated
by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has pushed millions back under the extreme poverty
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line, where some are projected to stay for more than another decade (World Bank,
2020).
As Nobel laureates and development economists Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee
write, aggregate economic growth cannot be the target or solution to human
development challenges (Banerjee & Duflo, 2020). In their view, without “a magic potion
for development, the best way to profoundly transform millions of lives is not to try in vain
to boost growth. It is to focus squarely on the thing that growth is supposed to improve:
the well-being of the poor.”
The United Nations Development Program proposes a two-pronged approach to link
expansion and distribution of both capabilities and income (UNDP, 2019, Chapter 7).
The integrated approach has two complementary aims: 1) increase income by improving
equity and efficiency in markets and increasing productivity; and 2) directly expanding
the capabilities that allow people to realize their potential, such as access to energy,
lifelong learning, healthcare, and social inclusion. This approach acknowledges that no
one policy or social enterprise can accomplish all aims at once, but also encourages a
multidimensional mindset that seeks to increase incomes by eliminating inequalities in
capabilities, rather than exacerbating inequalities in the name of economic growth. In
fact, modelling by the World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group has
shown that reducing each country’s income inequality (i.e., Gini index) by 1% per year
has a larger impact on global poverty than increasing each country’s annual growth by
1% (Lakner et al., 2020).
Some successful interventions target a specific capability that is lacking or unevenly
distributed. For example, a cash transfer program in Malawi incentivizing school
enrollment for young girls significantly reduced HIV prevalence, pregnancy, and early
marriage while improving language test scores (Baird et al., 2019). This program
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produced sustained improvements in education and fertility outcomes, which can also
translate to higher earning potential later in life. In the public health sector, researchproven interventions that distributed insecticide-treated bed nets free of charge (Cohen
& Dupas, 2010) played a prominent role in reducing malaria incidence in sub-Saharan
Africa by 40% between 2000 and 2015 (Bhatt et al., 2015). Reducing the malaria burden
then contributed to progress in other Sustainable Development Goals, as healthier
workforces are more productive, healthier students are better learners and free from
caring for sickened family members, and so on (WHO, 2019).
Other development programs directly target incomes. A person’s market income mostly
comes from work, in which earnings are a function of A) the assets and capabilities
possessed, B) the intensity of the use of these assets, C) the market’s valuation of the
work, and D) the prices of the goods and services they consume (López-Calva &
Rodríguez-Castelán, 2016). Evidence from Latin America suggests that increased labor
income was the most important contributor among sixteen countries that substantially
reduced moderate poverty from 2000 to 2010 (J. P. Azevedo et al., 2013; Lustig et al.,
2013). Meanwhile, income transfers played a large role in reducing rates of extreme
poverty (id).
Work that is stable, dignified, fairly compensated, and that enhances workers’
capabilities is thus indispensable to holistic human development (UNDP, 2015). Today,
not all people can access these jobs. Globally, 61% of workers are informally employed,
making them less likely than formally employed people to receive reliable incomes, and
be covered by workers’ rights and social protection policies (ILO, 2018a). Approximately
85% of African workers are informally employed, and 58% work in low-productivity jobs
such as smallholder agriculture (ILO, 2018b). On average, formal workers are wealthier,
more educated, more productive, and more resilient to financial shocks (UNDP, 2019).
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Gender gaps contribute to further inequity in access to paid employment jobs. Globally,
70% of women report that they would prefer to work at paid jobs, yet women are 15
times more likely than men to be unpaid care workers (ILO & Gallup, 2017).
The 2015 UNDP Human Development Report advocates for an employment-led growth
strategy that prioritizes the creation of jobs by strengthening small and medium-sized
businesses by linking them to larger firms with available capital, upgrading workers’ skills
over their careers, focusing on sectors where the poor live and work, directing
investments to sectors that will create jobs, and improving access to finance through
credit guarantees and low interest rates (UNDP, 2015).
The 17 UN SDGs span the breadth of human development ambition, seeking progress
in everything from poverty, food security, and education to healthy ecosystems and a
stable climate. Achieving these goals will require an estimated $5–7 trillion of investment
per year, requiring a step change in public and private investments (UNCTAD, 2014). As
of 2019, there was still a $2.5 trillion gap in SDG sector investments in developing
countries alone, (UNCTAD, 2019). But once these development dollars are ready to
spend, what should they do?
The literature reviewed here is supportive of human development interventions that
support sustainable work that provides higher incomes, preferably through a mechanism
that simultaneously enhances the capabilities of workers and communities. Investments
in renewable energy, including bioenergy and distributed energy resources such as
minigrids, have the potential to provide these both benefits while also reducing GHG
emissions. Sections 2 and 3 of this dissertation fill knowledge gaps hampering
deployment of these technologies. Section 4 concludes by presenting the opportunity to
synchronize these technologies with agriculture for still more human development gains.
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2 Bioenergy

2.1 Bioenergy literature review and background
2.1.1

The role of bioenergy in a stable climate future

Bioenergy is energy generated from organic material, including liquid transportation fuel,
electricity and heat from combusting solid biomass, biogas, or gasification products; and
traditional biomass uses such as low-efficiency burning of wood, agricultural residues, or
animal waste for cooking, lighting, or space heating (Chum et al., 2011). In 2018,
bioenergy was the largest source of renewable energy in use, accounting for nearly 10%
of global total primary energy supply (roughly half of which was traditional biomass use)
(IRENA, 2020b).
Biomass-derived liquid fuels can be divided into two tiers based on technological
maturity. “First generation” (1G) biofuels — including bioethanol made from sugar or
starch, and biodiesel from organic fats and oils — are mature technologies operating at
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billion-gallon-per-year scales and are often price competitive with petroleum products
even without a cost on carbon (IEA, 2019b). The “second generation” (2G) of biofuels
technology converts inedible cellulosic biomass (e.g., switchgrass, agricultural waste) or
municipal waste into biofuels (R. A. Lee & Lavoie, 2013). Despite the promise of
converting these low-cost feedstocks into fuels, 2G technology is not currently cost
competitive with petroleum, and further cost reductions are required to enable
commercial deployment at scale (Lynd, 2017).
New processing paradigms that reduce the cost of converting cellulosic biomass to fuel
can dramatically improve the business case for 2G ethanol. One such innovative
paradigm is consolidated bioprocessing using thermophilic bacteria combined with
cotreatment (CBP-CT) (Balch et al., 2020; Lynd, Guss, et al., 2017). In technoeconomic
models of 2G biofuel facilities that incorporated the anticipated benefits of CBP-CT
designs alongside general process design improvements, the payback period for an
advanced facility was estimated to be 8x lower than a base case design using prevalent
industry practices (Lynd, Liang, et al., 2017). Once 2G ethanol is produced, it can be
“upgraded” to fungible hydrocarbon fuels (e.g., sustainable aviation fuel) that can
displace fossil fuels in existing airplanes, trucks, and ships. Hannon et al. (2020) present
a single-step catalytic process that can perform this upgrading on “wet” ethanol (40%
water by weight) at costs comparable to those of producing anhydrous ethanol. They
calculate that with existing production incentives, the projected minimum blendstock
selling price is competitive with oil at $60 per barrel. The combination of cheap 2G
ethanol and efficient upgrading processes offers a viable path to carbon-neutral or
carbon-negative heavy transport but will require further investment in technological
research and development as well as deployment in niche markets where learning by
doing can occur. For example, CBP-CT may offer early value in processing cellulosic
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side streams in existing biofuel production facilities, such as corn fiber (Beri et al., 2020)
from US corn ethanol plants, or sugarcane bagasse from Brazilian sugar mills or
biorefineries, among others (Liang, 2018, Chapters 6–7).
Most scenarios that limit global temperature rise to 2°C or below rely on bioenergy to
help reduce net GHG emissions from hard-to-abate sectors such as shipping, aviation,
and heavy industry (B. E. Dale et al., 2014). For example, IRENA’s Transforming Energy
Scenario keeps expected temperature rise well below 2°C, relying on modern bioenergy
for 23% of total primary energy supply in 2050, and including 652 billion liters of liquid
biofuel production per year (roughly five times 2017 production) (IRENA, 2020a). In a
comparison of six IAMs under assumptions from five SSPs that limit warming to 1.5°C,
bioenergy is used in large amounts across all simulations, with total primary bioenergy
ranging from 38–112 EJ per year (Rogelj et al., 2018). All of these simulations also relied
to some degree on negative emissions by BECCS to reach their target concentrations of
atmospheric CO2: BECCS contributed to a total of 150–1,200 GtCO2 removal in the
twenty-first century in the sustainability pathway (SSP1) (id). Even in the Low Energy
Demand (LED) scenario — which assumes elimination of traditional biomass use and no
BECCS — biomass still contributes to nearly 20% of total final energy, with biofuels
playing an especially prominent role as a liquid energy carrier (Grubler et al., 2018).
The transportation sector, which used roughly one third of global final energy in 2017,
relies heavily on petroleum products: nearly 97% of all transportation energy came from
non-renewable sources in 2019 (REN21, 2020). Fulton et al. (2015) estimate that 80% of
2050 transportation fuel demand will be for dense liquid fuels, even with aggressive
action to reduce travel, shift to mass transport, improve efficiency, and increase adoption
of electric and hydrogen light duty vehicles. Biofuels are the only renewable liquid
energy carrier that can ‘drop in’ to existing cars, trucks, airplanes, and ships.
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Additionally, capture and storage of biogenic CO2 from fermentations at existing
biorefineries is a rare example of near-term low-cost opportunity for negative emissions.
At 216 existing US biorefineries, an estimated 27 million tons of CO 2 per year can be
captured, compressed, and dehydrated for pipeline transport at a cost less than $0.05
per 1 gallon of ethanol (Sanchez et al., 2018).
The greenhouse gas emission balance of a bioenergy project depends upon complex
carbon fluxes between the landscape, the bioenergy feedstock, feedstock transportation,
processing, and end product use (Larson, 2006). Further, the choice of life cycle
analysis methodology used to assess the climate impact can significantly influence
climate impact assessments (Mayer et al., 2020). For example, results range widely with
assumptions regarding the time horizon used to assess global warming potential of
emissions, or the assumed “carbon debt” accrued by clearing land prior to bioenergy
crop cultivation (Brandão et al., 2019). Field et al. (2020) recently analyzed ecosystem
and supply chain carbon balances for cellulosic ethanol production with carbon capture
and storage. They found that transitioning existing crop land or pasture land to
switchgrass used for biofuel production resulted in per-hectare mitigation potential
comparable to reforestation. Design decisions to use pasture land instead of forest,
improved biofuel production technology, and carbon capture and sequestration each
increased total mitigation by roughly 10–15 Mg CO2e per hectare per year,
outperforming reforestation in terms of climate mitigation potential. Although net
greenhouse gas emission mitigation cannot be assumed for every bioenergy application,
these results show that bioenergy systems can be designed to contribute significantly to
climate change mitigation.
In summary, bioenergy is required for rapid decarbonization of the energy system, and
its intrinsic connections to surrounding land, ecosystems, and human society make it
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promising (yet complex) to manage for positive social and climate impacts. Reid, Ali, and
Field (2020) suggest that bioenergy will serve as an important bridge fuel in the “decisive
decades” from the 2020s to 2050s, but that land use constraints and progress in
alternative technologies should consign bioenergy to a diminishing role in the longer
term. Regardless, biofuels have a universally acknowledged role to play in achieving
1.5°C or 2°C climate goals in the near term, which prompts further study of how growing
production might affect land, food, and human development.

2.1.2

Bioenergy and sustainable development

Bioenergy production requires biomass, and biomass production requires land. Society
also depends on land to produce food, feed, and fiber, and biomass also provides
heating and cooking fuel in some contexts. In communities with agricultural economies,
land use and biomass production are also deeply connected with employment and
economic development. These facts create a series of complex interactions between
bioenergy systems, society, and the environment (Chum et al., 2011; Creutzig et al.,
2015; V. H. Dale et al., 2015). Bioenergy advocates see these linkages as opportunities
to create beneficial outcomes through well-governed projects, while critics see potential
pitfalls and risks that are less evident for other renewable energy sources (Rosillo-Calle,
2018). The impacts of deploying bioenergy depend on the specifics of the bioenergy
system, the surrounding context, and on the scale of the intervention (P. Smith et al.,
2014), which makes it difficult for researchers and policymakers to study and create
policies that apply across projects . A systematic literature review by Robledo-Abad et al.
(2017) found that the scientific evidence base for policymaking on bioenergy and
sustainable development was hard to apply because, although studies were spread out
across very different contexts, most studies did not report the context conditions or
baselines required to attribute impact to bioenergy interventions. Yet, the planet’s carbon
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debt continues to accrue, and bioenergy must expand in the face of these uncertainties if
climate goals are to be met (IEA, 2017).
The Brazilian experience with sugarcane ethanol gives evidence of the human
development benefits that can accompany bioenergy expansion. In 1975, the federal
government of Brazil established the National Alcohol Program (Proálcool), which
leveraged an established sugar industry to boost bioethanol production (Cortez,
Nogueira, et al., 2018). In the first 30 years of the program, Brazilian farmers and
refineries progressed rapidly along the ethanol learning curve, increasing per-hectare
sugarcane yields by 85% and raising national sugar and ethanol production by roughly
3.5x and 22x, respectively (Goldemberg et al., 2004). These technological improvements
came alongside supportive policies that guaranteed a market for ethanol, provided lowcost loans to ethanol distilleries, regulated ethanol prices to maintain consumer appeal,
and established sugar production quotas with export controls (Hira & de Oliveira, 2009).
The socioeconomic benefits of the Brazilian sugarcane industry have been documented
by numerous studies. Regardless of the conversion technology in use, the economic
development impacts are concentrated in the cultivation of sugarcane feedstock itself
(Cardoso et al., 2018; A. Souza et al., 2018). Moraes et al. (2015) found that, compared
to other Brazilian agricultural sector workers, sugarcane sector workers were more than
twice as likely to be formally employed and earned 45% more in wages. Further, the
children of these sugarcane workers were more likely to attain education levels that
allowed them to work outside of the agricultural sector. Martinelli et al. (2011) studied the
state of São Paulo, the leading sugar producing state in the country, and concluded that
municipalities with a strong sugar and ethanol industry had a statistically significant
advantage in social metrics such as the Human Development Index compared to
municipalities without a sugar mill or with more focus on cattle than sugar production.
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Building and operating sugar mills and ethanol plants increases local value addition,
which boosts gross domestic capita and tax revenues in the host municipality as well as
in neighboring municipalities (Moraes et al., 2016). Input-output modeling has calculated
that for each US dollar increase in ethanol demand, Brazilian economic activity
increases by $1.50–3.00 (Watanabe et al., 2016).
Over the same time period, the industry has been criticized for consolidating power over
land and processing capacity (Lehtonen, 2011), air pollution by cane burning prior to
harvest (França et al., 2012), and notoriously difficult labor for field workers who
manually harvest the cane (Luz et al., 2012). It is important to note that the government
and industry are learning from some past mistakes. New practices to reduce pre-harvest
residue burning, lower synthetic fertilizer input, and limit expansion to sensitive land via
Agroecological Zoning are being adopted to limit negative environmental impacts
(Bordonal et al., 2018). Although the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol industry is a prominent
example, many of these same development benefits and risks apply to other agribusiness sectors with a strong value-add component (Martinelli et al., 2010).
Three recent studies forecast the climate and socio-environmental benefits of expanding
the Brazilian ethanol industry in the future. Brinkman et al. (2018) modeled the effect of
doubling sugarcane ethanol production by 2030, projecting a 2.6 billion USD growth in
national GDP over a reference scenario, adding roughly 50,000 addition full time
equivalents of employment, with most jobs generated in lower income classes. Jaiswal
et al. (2017) find that expanding sugarcane only to agroecologically-suitable, privatelyheld pastures could supply production of an average of 3.91 million barrels of oil
equivalents per day, which corresponds to roughly 5% of global 2014 crude oil
consumption. A separate land use change study on Brazilian pastures suggests that this
conversion to sugarcane improves performance per a sustainability index by 78% in
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south-central Brazil (Oliveira et al., 2019). Finally, Moreira et al. (2020) estimate that
adding a maize rotation on land in west central Brazil that previously grew only soybean
could produce 1.2 million tons of dry maize per year, supplying a 500 million liter per
year facility that produces maize ethanol at roughly 90% GHGe savings compared to
gasoline. An input-output model based on this scenario estimates that roughly 340 jobs
would be created at the new ethanol plant, and the expansion of maize cultivation would
create an additional 2,000 full time equivalents of employment in the agriculture sector.
South-south transfer of Brazil’s sugarcane industry to other tropical developing nations
has been suggested as a means for promoting sustainable development (Cortez, Leal,
et al., 2018). Sugarcane ethanol advocates see opportunity in many African nations due
to their significant quantities of good or prime sugarcane land, and, in some cases,
preestablished sugar industries (M. M. R. Moreira et al., 2018). Rural communities may
benefit from these programs via farmer education, inclusion in a stable supply chain, and
access to clean power and cooking fuel from the bioethanol plant (IRENA, 2016a; J. G.
D. B. Leite et al., 2016).
Sugar outgrowing schemes that recruit local farmers to cultivate sugarcane for sale to
the mill have shown promising impacts on income poverty and gender equality (Adams
et al., 2019; Herrmann et al., 2018; Herrmann & Grote, 2015). Institutional arrangements
between the sugarcane buyers (usually the mill) and sugarcane growers (from plantation
workers to independent outgrowers) weigh heavily on the socio-environmental impacts
of sugarcane investments. These arrangements with local farmers involve tradeoffs
between the share of ownership (and thus risk) that local farmers take in cultivating the
crop, the amount of autonomy that local farmers have to make management decisions,
the collective bargaining power that outgrowers have, and the way that preexisting social
inequalities are lessened or exacerbated by the sugarcane industry players who are
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choosing who to enroll in their programs (Maltitz et al., 2019). The socio-environmental
impacts of sugarcane developments in sub-Saharan Africa to date have included
positive and negative outcomes, depending on the design and enforcement of policy by
local government, the quality of the project site and farm management, and design of
outgrower programs (Hess et al., 2016). The architecture of institutional arrangements
between offtakers and outgrowers also affects who ultimately controls land and water
resources (German et al., 2020; Manda et al., 2018). The dynamic between powerful
sugar companies and poor farmers has led some to raise the specter of neo-colonialism,
although empirical evidence of negative impacts is not always provided (Martiniello,
2020; Mwanika et al., 2020; Sonneveld, 2012). A crucial component of functioning
relationships between offtakers and outgrowers is a clear understanding and negotiation
of terms of the arrangement (e.g., transparency on sugarcane pricing, land use rights,
the roles and responsibilities of each actor in production, et cetera) (J. G. Leite et al.,
2020).
The rise and fall of oilseed plant Jatropha curcas is perhaps the most prominent
example of a biofuel development project over-promising and under-delivering. The plant
was hailed in the early 00’s as a miracle biodiesel feedstock suitable for production on
marginal lands with limited agricultural inputs, but nearly all Jatropha investments failed
in spectacular fashion as actual oilseed yields fell far below anticipated production,
among other issues (Ahmed et al., 2017; Maltitz et al., 2014). The aftermath of the
Jatropha hype is rife with poor outcomes in environmental sustainability, rural
livelihoods, food security, and return on investment (Antwi-Bediako et al., 2019).
There are numerous other forms and uses of bioenergy around the globe, each with
their own unique opportunities, barriers, and shortcomings. Thailand, for instance,
produces 1G ethanol from molasses and cassava to reduce fuel imports (Leal et al.,
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2015). The extant production of corn ethanol in the United States is the world’s largest
biofuel market, though greenhouse gas benefits vary widely across production facilities
(Wang et al., 2007). In the European Union, biogas and woody biomass fire many
combined heat and power plants, sometimes as part of district heating schemes (IEA
Bioenergy, 2020; Karlsson et al., 2016). Palm oil biodiesel, which is predominately
produced in Southeast Asia, has expanded despite questionable impacts on local
livelihoods, deforestation, and net greenhouse gas emissions (Carlson et al., 2012;
Margono et al., 2014; Meijide et al., 2020; Obidzinski et al., 2012). Cogeneration, in
which biomass sidestreams in food or biofuel processing facilities are combusted for
heat and power, is a common practice in many contexts, including sugar mills in Brazil
(7% of national electricity supply), Mauritius (13% of national supply), and Uganda (5%
of national capacity) (Leal et al., 2015; Lynd et al., 2020). There are further examples of
small-scale bioenergy in developing contexts — including gasification-fired minigrids
(Chambon et al., 2020), small biogas (Kinyua et al., 2016), ethanol micro-distilleries
(Muniz Kubota et al., 2017), and the like — which have not demonstrated potential to
scale beyond niche applications. A more detailed description of these other bioenergy
processes is beyond the scope of this literature review.

2.1.3

Bioenergy and land use

Ice-free land supplies food, feed, fiber, timber, energy, and ecosystem services in
addition to playing an important role in the climate system. Land is simultaneously a
source and sink of CO2: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities
accounted for roughly 23% of total net anthropogenic emissions of GHGs from 2007–
2016, while land-related interventions such as regenerative farming or afforestation have
large carbon sequestration potential (Canadell & Schulze, 2014; IPCC, 2019). As
population and global temperature rise, increasing demands for land-based products
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must be satisfied within climate boundary conditions while preserving the ecosystem
services upon which we depend (Costanza et al., 2014; Godfray et al., 2010).
As discussed above, there is a strong consensus that bioenergy production must grow to
meet any 1.5°C or 2°C warming target. The quantity of land required depends on the
plants used as the bioenergy crop, their production per unit of land area, and the
efficiency with which the feedstocks can be converted into energy (V. H. Dale et al.,
2011). Estimates of the amount of land required for bioenergy crop expansion thus vary
greatly. The first 50 EJ of biofuel demand — which could fulfill roughly half of global
transport demand that is hard to decarbonize by other means (Fulton et al., 2015) —
could be supplied by low-productivity feedstock (5 odt/ha) grown on 550 million hectares,
or by highly productive energy cane (65 odt/ha) on only 45 million hectares (Lynd, 2018).
The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018) reviews many pathways
limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and presents a wide range of land
conversion to energy crop cultivation (0–600 million hectares).
If expansion of the agricultural land base is required, integrative management
approaches can guide extensification to mitigate impacts and find whole systems
solutions. For example, expansion of sugarcane onto Brazilian landscapes without
regulation of land use change can result in significant clearing of natural vegetation and
poor emissions outcomes (51% savings over gasoline), but a combination of measures
to limit land use change can prevent almost all loss of natural vegetation (van der Hilst et
al., 2018). The data also show that, since 1994, land used for animal products drove 11
times more land use change than did bioenergy (Alexander et al., 2015). This implies
that changes in human diets and in agricultural systems are also important levers in land
use change, to be considered in parallel with bioenergy growth. Bajželj et al. (2014)
show that “Healthy Diets” scenarios that replace some livestock products with protein
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from pulses and staples reduce the land area necessary for pasture by ~25% while
meeting dietary and cultural preferences.
It is also possible to increase total production without using more land. Sustainable
intensification of agricultural systems can raise the yield per unit of land area, thus
creating the opportunity to hold production constant while diverting cleared land for other
uses such as bioenergy feedstock production or conservation (Woods et al., 2015). Land
use can be intensified by adopting best practices in fertilization, irrigation, seed
selection, crop rotation, soil management, and others, while honoring environmental,
social, and economic goals (Tilman et al., 2011). For example, Waha et al. (2020) find
that introducing multiple cropping on areas currently growing only one crop per year
could sustainably increase global harvested areas by 87–395 million hectares.
One metric for assessing the potential for sustainable intensification is the yield gap: the
difference between the current yield achieved on a parcel of land (e.g., tons per hectare)
and its maximally attainable yield (Mueller et al., 2012). Yield gap assessment has been
used to estimate the potential to sustainably intensify production on global arable crop
systems (e.g., maize, rice, wheat, etc.) (Foley et al., 2011; Pradhan et al., 2015; van
Ittersum et al., 2013).
Pasture land occupies 3.9 billion hectares and accounts for over 80% of agricultural
land, yet grazed pasture only provides an estimated 1% of global dietary energy
consumption and 3% of global dietary protein (Herrero et al., 2015; Woods et al., 2015).
Given the massive extent of global pastures and the low intensity with which they appear
to be used, the potential to improve food production, support economic development, or
‘spare land’ for other uses is of keen interest. Recent studies support the hypothesis that
global pasture output could be sustainably increased by improved herd management,
nutrient management, pasture restoration, and integrated crop-livestock approaches
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(Henderson et al., 2016; Tarawali et al., 2011; Thornton, 2010). In addition, many
pastures occupy grasslands that could be managed for perennial bioenergy crop
production (e.g., switchgrass) with direct benefits in soil carbon and biodiversity, among
other ecosystem services (Albanito et al., 2016; Werling et al., 2014; Whitaker et al.,
2018). Yet, the sustainable intensification potential of global pasture lands has not yet
been evaluated.
Answering two questions can clarify the potential contribution of global pasture land to a
sustainable future: 1) what is the potential for sustainable intensification of livestock
production on pasture, and 2) how suitable are these lands for bioenergy (or other) crop
expansion (Campbell et al., 2018)?

2.1.4

Bioenergy and food security

Increasing food security is universally recognized as essential to improving human wellbeing and is among the most important challenges facing humankind (Godfray et al.,
2010; UN, 2015). An average of 11% of the global population was undernourished from
2017–2019, including 23% of sub-Saharan Africans, while 26% of the globe experienced
moderate or severe food insecurity (FAO, 2019c). Food security is much more than
avoiding severe food deprivation or starvation, as indicated by the 1996 World Food
Summit definition: “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). Four dimensions of food
security were identified at the same meeting: physical availability of food; economic and
physical access to food; food utilization; and stability of the other three dimensions over
time.
Because bioenergy feedstock and food production both require land, it is natural to
consider how these two land uses may interact and influence the food security pillars
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(Pete Smith et al., 2010). The “food versus fuel” debate pits the two land uses against
one another (Rosillo-Calle & Johnson, 2010). In the late ‘00’s, concern about probiofuels policies in the US, Brazil and Europe coincided with grain price spikes that
alarmed many (Thompson, 2012) and led to a spate of critical cartoons and pithily-titled
anti-biofuels articles (e.g., “How biofuels could starve the poor”, Runge & Senauer,
2007). These arguments and images have reinforced negative public perception of
biofuels (Sleenhoff et al., 2015) despite a lack of evidence that biofuels are consistently
raising food prices or harming food security (Persson, 2015; Rosillo-Calle, 2018). The
Brazilian experience again demonstrates that biofuel expansion is not inevitably
accompanied by a rise in food insecurity at the national level. From 1990 to 2015
sugarcane bioethanol increased more than two-fold and population increased by a third,
yet the prevalence of undernourishment fell, average supplies of dietary energy and
protein rose, and Brazil became a net cereal exporter (Leite et al., 2018). Case studies
have shown that previous biofuel projects have both at times improved food security
(e.g., Herrmann et al., 2018), and at times worsened it (e.g., Hervas & Isakson, 2020;
Mwavu et al., 2018). Dogmatic pro-biofuels or anti-biofuels viewpoints can impede
collaborative development of ethics-driven approaches to biofuel deployment, in which
stakeholders design and apply best practices that reduce risks to food security (Kline et
al., 2017). One hypothesis is that bioenergy projects can improve food security of local
actors by introducing a steady crop offtake market and increasing rural incomes
(Osseweijer et al., 2015).
Interventions — including biofuels projects — seeking to improve food security outcomes
in their operating context require 1) a general understanding of which factors are
important, and 2) a specific understanding of local circumstances, which may differ from
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the general case. This poses the research questions, what drives food security, and how
might bioenergy production affect these drivers?
Numerous factors have been found to contribute to food insecurity at the local level,
including low household income, lack of access to credit, land grabbing, weak
agricultural markets, low crop yields, disempowerment of women, lack of off-farm
income, climate and environmental stressors, and political unrest, among others (Annim
& Frempong, 2018; Frelat et al., 2016; Garrett & Ruel, 1999; Geary, 2012; Hesselberg &
Yaro, 2006; Lemke et al., 2003; McArthur & McCord, 2017; Misselhorn, 2005; Thurow &
Kilman, 2010). Several global scale studies have addressed the agricultural and policy
advances required to feed growing populations in changing climates (Cassman &
Harwood, 1995; Fischer et al., 2014; Lobell et al., 2008; Rumpel et al., 2018; Tilman et
al., 2011; West et al., 2014). Without clear consensus on the factors that are most
important to food security, the focus of many rural development programs has defaulted
to increasing food availability and on-farm income through incremental agricultural
intensification (Schreinemachers, 2006; Vanlauwe et al., 2014).
The most effective solutions to complex problems like food insecurity use leverage to
change the few things that change everything else (Ingram, 2011; Stroh, 2015). The
breadth of the research cited above is evidence that it is difficult to identify which
combination of levers to pull. An empirical analysis of national-level drivers could be
used to weigh the relative importance of several factors on long-run food security.
However, the above-cited body of literature contains few high-level analyses of the
relative contribution of agricultural and socioeconomic drivers, and no analyses that
explicitly consider the robustness of results to changes in the food security metric, the
data used as model input, and modelling decisions affecting variable selection and data
preprocessing.
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Abstract
To meet rising demands for agricultural products, existing agricultural lands must either
produce more or expand in area. Yield gaps (YGs) – the difference between current and
potential yield of agricultural systems – indicate the ability to increase output while
holding land area constant. Here, we assess YGs in global grazed-only permanent
pasture lands using a climate binning approach. We create a snapshot of circa 2000
empirical yields for meat and milk production from cattle, sheep and goats by sorting
pastures into climate bins defined by total annual precipitation and growing degree days.
We then estimate YGs from intra-bin yield comparisons. We evaluate YG patterns
across three FAO definitions of grazed livestock agroecosystems (arid, humid, and
temperate), and groups of animal production systems that vary in animal types and
animal products. For all subcategories of grazed-only permanent pasture assessed, we
find potential to increase productivity several-fold over current levels. However, because
productivity of grazed pasture systems is generally low, even large relative increases in
yield translated to small absolute gains in global protein production. In our dataset, milkfocused production systems were found to be seven times as productive as meatfocused production systems regardless of animal type, while cattle were four times as
productive as sheep and goats regardless of animal output type. Sustainable
intensification of pasture is most promising for local development, where large relative
increases in production can substantially increase incomes or ‘spare’ large amounts of
land for other uses. Our results motivate the need for further studies to target
agroecological and economic limitations on productivity to improve YG estimates and
identify sustainable pathways towards intensification.
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Introduction
Land use is inextricably tied to the production of food, fiber, and bioenergy. As the earth
becomes more populous, wealthy, and warm, the demand for each of these products
continues to increase (Godfray et al., 2010; International Energy Agency, 2017).
Sustainable intensification — producing more goods per unit land while respecting
environmental, economic, and social constraints — is thus instrumental to meeting rising
demands (Garnett et al., 2013).
Livestock is estimated to utilize 3.9 billion hectares, or 80% of global agricultural land
(Herrero et al., 2015). Though grazing-based livestock systems occupy 2.2 billion
hectares of this land area, they contribute to just 1% of global dietary energy and 3% of
global dietary protein (Herrero et al., 2015; Woods et al., 2015). To the extent that
existing pastures can be used more intensively, such changes could improve food
production, support economic development, or ‘spare land’ to diversify land use and
cover in existing agricultural landscapes (e.g. for food, bioenergy, conservation). Use of
grassland ecosystems for pasturing animals is globally ubiquitous and often a critical
resource to already-vulnerable populations (Sloat et al., 2018). Grazing is also an
important driver in global patterns of desertification, woody encroachment, deforestation,
and land degradation (Asner et al., 2004; Godde et al., 2017; Suttie et al., 2005).
However, the sustainable intensification potential of these extensive lands has not yet
been evaluated globally.
A metric for evaluating the potential for sustainable intensification is the difference
between actual and potential yield, also called the “yield gap” (van Ittersum et al., 2013).
One way to assess yield gaps is using a climate binning method to analyze empirical
yield data (Licker et al., 2010). In this approach, the range of measured yields are
assumed to represent the range of what is realistically (and currently) achievable under
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a given set of climate conditions and production practices. Lands that may be
geographically disparate are grouped with their climatic peers using bins defined by two
fundamental drivers of plant growth: temperature and precipitation (Knapp & Smith,
2001; Prentice et al., 1992). This “levelling [of] the climatic playing field” (Licker et al.,
2010, p. 772) enables meaningful comparisons of empirical yields after controlling for
basic climate differences. Intra-bin differences in production per unit area and time are
thus due to factors other than the climate binning variables, notably including
management.
Yield gap assessment has been used to estimate sustainable intensification potential of
global arable crop systems (Anderson et al., 2016; Foley et al., 2011; Mueller et al.,
2012). The technique has not yet been applied to global pasture systems.
Recent studies support the hypothesis that global pasture output could be sustainably
increased (i.e. yield gaps could be mitigated) via improved herd management, nutrient
management, pasture restoration and integrated crop-livestock approaches (Henderson
et al., 2016; Landers, 2007; Landers et al., 2005; Rota & Sperandini, 2010; Tarawali et
al., 2011; The World Bank, 2012; Thornton, 2010). Closing yield gaps requires
understanding the scale of intensification potential, and how it varies across climate
regimes and production systems.
We use climate binning to produce global-scale estimates of yield gaps on pasture. We
develop our analytical framework for permanent pasture in grazed-only livestock
systems as identified by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
(Robinson et al., 2011). We evaluate global land areas grouped by livestock grazing
agroecosystem types defined by the FAO, as an added measure to control for variation
in climate factors beyond precipitation and growing degree days. We focus on the
widespread and globally-relevant animal production system types of milk and meat from
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cattle, sheep and goats. We quantify the potential for increased production in terms of
meat and milk protein at varying levels of yield gap closure. We perform these
calculations globally, and analyze the differences in production potential among
agroecosystems. Yield gaps and production potentials are also compared among
pastures with different combinations of meat, milk, cattle, sheep, and goat production.

Materials and methods
Global meat and milk productivity on grazed-only permanent pasture land
We analyze grazed-only permanent pasture systems, drawing on geospatial data for
permanent pasture from Ramankutty et al. (2008) and geospatial data for grazed-only
livestock production from Herrero et al. (2013). In alignment with both studies, their
sources, and other studies using the same geospatial datasets (e.g., Fetzel, Havlik,
Herrero & Erb, 2017), we focus on pasture within the grazed livestock agroecosystems
defined by the FAO (Robinson et al., 2011).
Permanent pasture is defined as “land used permanently (5 years or more) for
herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or naturally growing” (Ramankutty et al. 2008,
p. 5). Though supplemented-feed and mixed crop-livestock systems account for a large
fraction of animal production worldwide (Herrero et al., 2013), we focus on grazed-only
permanent pasture because heterogeneity in management and definition of these other
livestock systems complicates accounting of production. Techniques such as stochastic
frontier analysis have been used to calculate mixed system yield gaps (Henderson et al.,
2016), but datasets are not yet sufficiently detailed to support such approaches at the
global scale. Focusing on grazed-only livestock production in permanent pasture allows
us to consider the yield gap of an extensive agricultural land use within the scope of
available data. Appendix S1 in Supporting Information describes our analytical process
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combining datasets from Ramankutty et al. (2008) and Herrero et al. (2013) to generate
global maps of meat and milk protein productivity from cattle, sheep, and goats in land
grid cells containing ‘significant’ amounts of permanent grazed pasture land on which
animal productivity was observed circa 2000 (Figure 2.2.1). Use of the term ‘significant’
here is explained in Appendix S1. For the remainder of the text we will refer to the land
areas analyzed as ‘grazed-only permanent pasture’.

Applying FAO definitions for grazed-only livestock agroecosystem types
The FAO’s grazed livestock agroecosystems are subdivided into arid, humid and
temperate climate zones (Figure S1.3). Table 2.2.1 defines each agroecosystem type
and lists their respective total grazed-only permanent pasture area and protein
production. We present yield gap results by individual livestock grazing (LG)
agroecosystem type (LGH–humid, LGT–temperate, LGA–Arid), and also across all
grazed only livestock production systems (LG all). This enables exploration of patterns,
ranges, and variability in yield gap estimates grouped by these agroecosystem types.
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Figure 2.2.1. Snapshot (5’ x 5’ spatial resolution) of livestock distribution and productivity on grazed-only
permanent pasture circa 2000. (a) land areas designated permanent pasture by Ramankutty et al. (2008),
with observed animal occupancy by Wint & Robinson (2007), colored by FAO agroecosystem type as in
Robinson et al. (2011) and (b) meat and milk protein productivity in kg km-2 y-1 on these lands. Names for
livestock grazing (LG) agroecosystems are subdivided by climate zone (LGH–humid, LGT–temperate, LGA–
Arid). Appendix S1 describes in detail how these rasters were created.
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Table 2.2.1. Grazed-only livestock production system types considered in yield gap assessment, with
associated total global land areas in grazed-only permanent pasture, and total protein production of meat
and milk from cows, sheep and goats. For a logic tree describing FAO’s method to define these types, see
Figure S1.3.

Name

LG all

FAO grazed livestock production system

Total pasture

class

area (106 km2)

Total protein
production
(106 kg y-1)

10.95

2,475

6.76

1,008

0.744

539

3.46

927

All livestock grazing in permanent pasture
lands

LGA

Arid and semi-arid livestock grazing where
length of growing period<180 days

LGH

Humid and semi-humid livestock grazing
where length of growing period >180 days

LGT

Temperate and highland tropical livestock
grazing where 5<average temperature<20
°C, or 1 month or more where average
temperature is <5 °C at sea level

Defining climate bins
Climate binning groups agricultural lands by climate characteristics, theoretically
removing or greatly reducing climate as a factor for intra-bin variability in productivity. A
detailed description of the methodology can be found in Mueller et al. (2012).
Growing degree-days (GDD, base temperature 0°C) and total annual precipitation (TAP)
were used to define “climate space” as a 10 x 10 matrix of unique climate bins (Figure
2.2.2, inset). Climate data layers were generated from 5’ x 5’ datasets of monthly mean
temperature and total annual precipitation from WorldClim (Hijmans et al., 2005).
Pasture land was sorted into 100 climate bins of equal pasture area. While the equal-
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pasture-area stipulation creates bins with unequal ranges of climate parameters, it
ensures an even distribution of pasture lands across climate space and facilitates direct
comparison between bins.
Figure 2.2.2 presents the geospatial distribution of these 100 bins among all pasturecontaining grid cells included in this study (LG all).

Figure 2.2.2. 5’ x 5’ geospatial distribution of grazed-only permanent pasture lands in climate bins defined by
annual cumulative growing degree-days (GDD) and total annual precipitation (TAP) (inset), with each
climate bin containing equal pasture land area.

Calculating yield gap and intensification potential
Within climate bins, the yield gap is the difference between current (circa 2000)
productivity and best-in-class observed productivity (Y 95b, defined below). Summed over
a group of grid cells, the yield gap can then be interpreted as the increase in production
that could occur if pastures within each climate bin were managed to match the
productivity of high-performing climate peers, either through more intensive grazing,
changes in the fodder or ruminant species mix, or changing the allocation between meat
and milk production, among other strategies.
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Yield gap analyses are sensitive to the value selected as the maximum attainable
productivity. Pasture yield gap assessment must consider maximum attainable
productivity resulting from the combined influence of grass productivity and the types
and outputs of the grazed animals, with extreme ranges reported in literature. For
example, one field trial of intensive grazing for bovine dairy without supplemental feed
reported productivities of 388–494 kg protein ha-1 y-1, which equates to 38,000–49,400
kg protein km-2 y-1 (Macdonald et al., 2008). Another study reported the land needed per
kg of protein from extensive pasture as 1430–2100 m2, equating to ~476-699 kg protein
km-2 y-1, or ~100 times lower than the Macdonald et al. (2008) field trial (Flachowsky et
al., 2017). Even lower yields are possible in arid or degraded land areas with low grass
productivity.
Within climate bins, some top producers may represent what is achievable given optimal
and sustainable management conditions. Conversely, the highest producers may not be
representative of what is possible or sustainable within grazed-only systems and can
skew the yield gap by setting the bar higher than is realistically attainable. Given
uncertainties in our underlying datasets (discussed in detail Appendix S1) it is not
possible to identify which producers are representative of best practices and which are
not. Thus, we chose to be conservative in our analyses and reduce the effect of the
highest producers on yield gap calculations by setting a maximum attainable (best-inclass) productivity (Y95b) to the 95th percentile yield in each climate bin. A similar
approach was used in Mueller et al. (2012). In our study, this approach resulted in Y95b
values ranging from 9.9 to 2044.2 kg protein km-2 y-1. The upper end of this range is
commensurate with the range of dairy protein productivity levels reported on intensivelymanaged grazed pasture in field trials, but below that of systems using substantial
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amounts of supplemented feed (Baudracco et al., 2011; Flachowsky et al., 2017; Patton
et al., 2016).
The yield gap per grid cell (GMi, kgprotein km-2 y-1) and the aggregate yield gap (GMr,
kgprotein y-1) are calculated per Equations 1-2.
𝑀𝑌95𝑏 − 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑀𝑌95𝑏 > 𝑌𝑖
0, 𝑀𝑌95𝑏 < 𝑌𝑖

(1)

𝐺𝑀𝑖 = {

(2)

𝐺𝑀𝑟 = ∑𝑖 ∈ 𝑟 𝐴𝑝𝑖 𝐺𝑀𝑖

where 𝑌𝑖 is kilograms of protein generated per square kilometer of grazed-only
permanent pasture per year (calculated in Appendix S1, eq S2, in kgprotein kmpasture-2 y-1),
M is the fraction of maximum observed yield used to define a minimum yield in each
bin, r is the category of aggregation (e.g. agroecosystem), and 𝐴𝑝𝑖 is the pasture area
per grid cell i (calculated in Appendix S1, eq S1, in km pasture-2). We evaluate yield gaps at
levels of M representing a range of gap closure scenarios to explore theoretical
performance improvements, recognizing that the highest levels of intensification often
cannot be achieved without grassland degradation or economically irrational investment
(Godde et al., 2017). Intensification potential is the ratio of current to maximum
attainable productivity (Y95b). Calculations for intensification potential at the grid cell (I Mi)
and aggregate (IMr) levels are shown in Equations 3–4.

(3)

𝐼𝑀𝑖 =

(4)

𝐼𝑀𝑟 =

𝑀 𝑌95𝑏
𝑌𝑖
∑𝑖 ∈ 𝑟 𝑀 𝑌95𝑏 𝐴𝑝𝑖
∑𝑖 ∈ 𝑟 𝑌𝑖 𝐴𝑝𝑖

Grouping livestock production systems by milk versus meat and cattle
versus shoats
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We conducted yield gap and intensification potential analyses for subsets of the
productivity data representing different within-cell ranges of 1) the proportion of milk
(versus meat) in total protein output, and 2) the proportion of cattle (versus shoats) in
total protein output. The aim was to partially control for the effect of these varying
livestock production systems within each grid cell by subsetting these systems into
ranges corresponding to roughly equal populations of grid cells and area. By reducing
the range of variation for meat versus milk, as well as for cattle versus shoats, we can
examine patterns of changes in protein productivity and intensification potential across
underlying types of livestock production systems (See Appendix S2).
For convenience, the list of variable names and definitions can be found in Appendix S3.

Results
Overall global yield gaps for livestock grazed-only systems
Pasture productivity profiles tend to be convex, with most grazed-only production within
a climate bin at low levels relative to the highest performers (Figure 2.2.3a). The same is
true when looking cumulatively across climate bins (Figure 2.2.3b). Pasture productivity
also varies across climate space, with consistently low productivity in the hottest regions
across ranked area percentiles (thin bands of red, maroon, Figure 2.2.3b) compared to
middle and low temperature ranges (widening bands in yellow, purple, Figure 2.2.3b).
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Figure 2.2.3. Productivity across climate space for ‘LG all’, using climate bins defined by total annual
precipitation (TAP) and annual growing degree days (GDD) as shown in Figure 2.2.2 inset. (a) 10x10 matrix
of relative productivity profiles for each climate bin, with each pasture grid cell normalized according to the
95th percentile observed performance in each bin (Y 95b) (y-axes) and ranked on a percentile basis within
each climate bin (x-axes). (b) Cumulative productivity across climate bins showing performance of each
climate bin at each ranked area percentile. As in 3a, observed yields are normalized such that the top
percentile corresponds to Y95b.

The geospatial distribution of yield gaps for all livestock grazed-only systems is
presented in Figure 2.2.4a. The yield gap is reported as the percent of achieved protein
productivity (kg km-2 y-1) relative to the climate-adjusted maximum attainable (best-inclass) protein yield (Y95b). Protein productivity is based on total reported output of protein
by milk and meat. Median and mean performance levels are only 12.1% and 19.7% of
the maximum attainable yield, respectively.
Figure 2.2.4b shows the absolute level of productivity improvement achievable when
performance of all livestock grazed-only systems are raised to best-in-class yields
(namely, 100% closure of the gap between reported yield and the estimated maximum
attainable (best-in-class) yield). On average, total protein output would increase by 300
kg km-2 y-1 (or only 3 kg ha-1) if full gap closure were to occur. A comparison of Figure
2.2.4a and Figure 2.2.4b shows that the large potentials for relative improvement implied
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by lower yield gap percentages often do not translate into large absolute gains in food
protein output.

Figure 2.2.4. Yield gaps for all pasture lands considered in this study (LG all, 5’x 5’ spatial resolution),
considering total protein from meat and milk produced by cattle, sheep or goats. (a) Yield gap expressed as
the percent of achieved yield relative to the climate-adjusted maximum (Y95b). (b) Absolute protein
productivity gain (in kg km-2 y-1) at the grid cell level when pasture lands are raised to 100% of their climateadjusted maximum observed productivity (M=1).
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The effects of agroecosystem on intensification potential
If performance across the entire grazed-only livestock system dataset were adjusted to
achieve 90% closure of the gap between reported and maximum attainable yield in each
grid cell, global output would increase by a factor of 4.57 (LG all, Figure 2.2.5a). These
results suggest that, overall, livestock grazed-only systems are performing well below
their potential. LGA pastures had a very high intensification potential of 6.16 for 90%
yield gap closure (Figure 2.2.5a). In contrast, LGH and LGT were more similar in their
intensification potentials (3.41 and 3.34 for 90% yield gap closure, Figure 2.2.5a). Milk
contributions to protein showed more bimodal distributions in LGH and LGT, while in LG
all and LGA these distributions were more randomly spread (Figure 2.2.5b). A
comparison of the ranked area productivity profiles for the current (0% gap closure)
scenario in Figure 2.2.5c shows that absolute productivity in arid ecosystems (LGA) is
substantially lower than the productivities observed for the temperate ecosystems (LGT).
Likewise, the humid agroecosystems (LGH), characterized by a warmer climate
(compared to LGT) and longer growing periods (compared to LGA), have the highest
productivity.
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Figure 2.2.5. The effect of agroecosystem class on intensification potential and productivity. a) intensification
potential for different scenarios of yield gap closure, b) contribution of milk to overall protein production
within each grid cell c) current (circa 2000) productivity values as a function of ranked area percentile.

Effects of variation in animal production systems
Global distributions for relative contributions of milk versus meat (Figure 2.2.6a) and
cattle versus shoat (Figure 2.2.6b) show large areas of similar coloration, suggesting
strong regionalization of animal production systems. Grouping within-grid cell variations
in the fraction of milk (vs meat) in total output and the fraction of cattle (vs shoats)
products in total output into roughly equal populations of pasture land area resulted in
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cutoffs of 0–30%, 30–50%, 50–70%, and 70%–100% contributions to protein output from
milk, and 0–21%, 21–73%, 73–96%, and 96%–100% contributions to protein output from
cattle. Pasture systems were relatively evenly distributed between meat-focused and
milk-focused systems. In contrast, all-cattle systems (96–100% bovines) are much more
common than systems focused only on sheep or goats.

Figure 2.2.6. Global distribution of grazed-only permanent pasture land by within grid-cell variation in
percent milk (a) and percent cattle (b) contributions to total protein productivity circa 2000.
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We observed positive linear relationships between protein productivity and increasing
percentages of milk and cattle (Figure 2.2.7). The extrapolated linear regression values
at 0 and 100% protein output from milk suggest that 100% meat systems are seven-fold
less than the productivity of 100% milk systems (Figure 2.2.7a). The extrapolated linear
regression values at 0 and 100% protein output from cattle suggest that 100% shoat
systems are four times less productive than 100% cattle systems (Figure 2.2.7b). Higher
levels of milk output (i.e. 50–70%, and 70–100%) and cattle stocking correspond to
steeper and more convex productivity profiles (Fig S2.1c, S2.2c). Intensification
potentials varied among all groupings of meat vs milk and cattle vs shoats, at 90% yield
gap closure ranging between 3.45 and 4.36 (Fig S2.1a, S2.2a).
Appendix S2 presents the full summary of current production, yield gaps, intensification
potential, and total land area by each agroecosystem and within-cell ranges of milk
versus meat output and cattle versus shoats discussed above.
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Figure 2.2.7. Linear relationship of mean protein productivity in grazed-only permanent pastures grouped by
roughly equal populations of grid cells and area for percent of protein output from milk (a), and for percent of
protein output from cattle (b). The mean and standard error (red bars) of each group are plotted, as is a line
of best fit with 95% confidence intervals and R2. Percent milk groupings are: 0–30%, 30–50%, 50–70%, and
70–100%, while percent cattle groupings are: 0–21%, 21–73%, 73–96%, and 96–100%). Error bars
represent two times the weighted standard error of the means.
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Discussion
Our results show that the relative potential for sustainable intensification of global
grazed-only permanent pasture lands is high, while the absolute potential to increase
protein production in these land areas remains low compared to estimates of production
increases with yield gap closure in cropped systems. On all global grazed-only
permanent pasture lands, closing yield gaps to 90% of maximum attainable (best-inclass) yields would increase productivity by nearly five times. Within agroecosystem
types and groupings of milk vs meat and cattle vs shoat proportions, intensification
potentials remain high, with all closures of yield gaps to 90% of maximum attainable
(best-in-class) yields increasing productivity by a range of two to four times. However,
the absolute increases in food production with even high levels of yield gap closure
remain low relative to crop yield gaps, which in contrast tend to have lower intensification
potentials but much higher potential to increase absolute food production.
For instance, we estimate that intensification of all global grazed-only permanent pasture
lands to an unlikely yield gap closure of 100% would increase total protein output by 3 kg
ha-1 y-1, on average. This is slightly less than 2 months of protein requirement for a 65 kg
healthy adult, per a recommended 0.83 g protein day -1 per kg weight for a healthy adult
(World Health Organization et al., 2007). We estimate that 90% yield gap closure on LG
all lands would increase global protein production by 8.8 x 10 6 metric tons. In contrast, in
rainfed crop agriculture just 34% yield gap closure using expansion of ‘sustainable
irrigation’ in 4.53 × 106 km2 of cultivated lands was estimated to yield 82 × 106 metric
tons of protein per year (Rosa et al., 2018). This translates to 180 kg protein ha-1 yr-1,
which would meet over 9 years of protein requirements for a 65 kg adult.
However, based on our results, sustainable intensification of global grazed-only
permanent pasture lands is a strong candidate for benefiting regional and local
49

economic development and food security. Livestock are economically and socially
significant, contributing to the livelihoods of more than one billion people, 550 million of
which live on less than $1.25 per day (Robinson et al., 2011). Large relative increases in
pasture output could significantly improve incomes (Godber & Wall, 2014; O’Mara,
2012). We estimate that the output of grazed pastures in already-more-productive
temperate and humid grazed agroecosystems can be increased by two to three times
over production levels observed circa 2000. In our analysis, evidence for seven-fold
higher productivity in milk- versus meat-dominant animal production, and four-fold higher
productivity in cattle- versus shoat-dominant animal production supports the potential for
multiplicative increases in productivity, if barriers to transformative change can be
overcome. Evidence for strong regionalization of animal production systems further
suggests that such initiatives should target barriers to change most applicable to regionspecific drivers of animal production, which may emerge from local socio-economic and
cultural factors, or larger scale policies and governance, among others.
Within grazed agroecosystems, our highest estimates for intensification potential were in
arid and semi-arid permanent pasture, with results suggesting a six-fold difference
between current production and the production that would be observed if 90% yield gap
closure was achieved. However, sustainably achieving such dramatic increases is likely
unrealistic in most areas. Arid pasture lands are sensitive ecosystems where resource
scarcity requires more specialized adaptation to achieve yields above a very low
baseline (e.g. practices described in Bösing et al., 2014; Jakoby et al., 2015; Murillo et
al., 2016). Our results could suggest that, though some grazed-only permanent pastures
in arid agroecosystems achieve higher yields through successful climate-specialized
management strategies, most yields fall well below those of the high performers. Higher
variability in the distribution of milk to meat in arid and semi-arid areas may further
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indicate climate-related specialization, as well as likely contribute to an amplification in
estimates of intensification potential. We hypothesize that lower relative intensification
potentials in humid and temperate grazed agroecosystems indicate more forgiving
environments to sub-optimal management strategies, as compared to arid and semiarid, where the difference between low and high productivity was more extreme.
Because of agroecosystem sensitivities and low productivity, arid and semi-arid pasture
lands are not generally suggested as primary targets for sustainable intensification.
Many arid and semi-arid rangelands are already grazing a large percentage of available
NPP, making them particularly susceptible to degradation by overgrazing (Fetzel et al.,
2017). They are also sensitive to interannual precipitation variability, which will be
worsened by climate change (Sloat et al., 2018). However, arid and semi-arid pasture
lands remain an extensive component of global agricultural lands (54% of grazed-only
permanent pasture in this study). Some management changes may improve livestock
product yields without overstepping environmental limits: for example bridging dormant
forage growth periods with supplemental feed (Murillo et al., 2016). As another example,
drier pasture lands could be a target for sustainable intensification with the expansion of
bioenergy crops (Campbell et al., 2018; Jaiswal et al., 2017, 2019), as our results show
achieving even small increases in productivity could ‘spare’ large areas of land. In this
context, one option for consideration is agave, which has emerged as a bioenergy
feedstock candidate due to its high resilience to water shortages inherited from
Crassulacean Acid Metabolism (CAM) (Garcia-Moya et al., 2011). Agave shows
potential for integration in multi-animal grazing, which does not require monocropping or
land use competition with grazing systems (Sánchez, 1995). While sustainable
intensification of drier pasture lands is not easily achieved, nor will it make large
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increases to global food production, it is a clear priority from the standpoint of improving
livelihoods in large areas of easily degraded global lands.
More generally, using grazing land more intensively can help meet growing market
demands for livestock products while sparing land for other important uses, including
conservation and reforestation (Havlík et al., 2014; Strassburg et al., 2014). For many
pastures, mobilizing intensification potential may mean transitioning away from grazedonly systems and into mixed crop-livestock (Weindl et al., 2015) or supplemented-feed
operations (Murillo et al., 2016). Evidence supports the potential for realizing large
increases in pasture productivity. In Brazil, the largest producer of pastured beef
worldwide, animal output per hectare of pasture increased 3.5-fold between 1985 and
2006, resulting in significant land-saving (Martha Jr. et al., 2012). Another analysis of six
intensification initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon showed productivity gains of 30–490%
while complying with Brazilian Forest Code (zu Ermgassen et al., 2018).
Our analyses are a first step in understanding the application of yield gap assessment in
global livestock systems but were constructed to accommodate the many uncertainties
in and limitations of best-available data for global grazed-only permanent pasture (see
Appendix S1). At the time of publication, the data provide a snapshot of livestock and
livestock production 20 years in the past. The paucity of global livestock data is widely
regarded as a bottleneck to understanding these complex production systems (Erb et al.,
2016; Fetzel et al., 2017; Kuemmerle et al., 2013; Phelps & Kaplan, 2017; Robinson et
al., 2014; See et al., 2015).
By using climate binning and subsetting yield gap results by FAO agroecosystem types,
we controlled for some climate effects. We also subdivide these results into production
system groups ranging from ‘mostly meat’ to ‘mostly milk’, and ‘mostly sheep/goats’ to
‘mostly cattle’ to control for some variability in animal production systems. But we make
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no assessment of the sustainability of circa 2000 practices of high or low performers.
Barring the publication of spatially and temporally detailed data on livestock
management practices, a logical next step would be to incorporate ecological limits to
the net primary productivity of grazing lands, e.g., Fetzel et al. (2017). If such modeling
were done in a manner that reflected dynamic interactions between soils, plants, and the
climate, pasture productivity estimates could also incorporate aspects of soil factors and
climate variability that may be locally important in determining intensification potential.
When it comes to intensification strategies, the details matter, and higher resolution
global data are needed to target their deployment in grazed systems. Some pastures are
best-used as intensified mixed systems, while other rangelands could serve as carbon
sinks if managed and compensated for ecosystem services (Gerssen-Gondelach et al.,
2017; Herrero et al., 2009). For grazed pastures, actualization of yield gap potential will
likely require pasture management changes such as new forage plant varieties, disease
control, fertilizer and pH adjustment, higher stocking rates, or supplemented feeds.
Fetzel et al. (2017) show that although 40% of global natural grasslands could be grazed
more intensively, the availability of seasonality-limited NPP varies significantly across
agroecosystems. Additionally, the implementation of intensification strategies will require
context-specific support to smallholders (e.g. market access, extension services,
insurance) (McDermott et al., 2010). Efforts to promote sustainable intensification in
pasture lands, for example through policy or economic incentives, should consider more
current and region-specific assessments of pasture-based livestock production. The
precision provided by these focused analyses and local stakeholder engagement is
needed to understand limits on underperforming pasture systems and successfully close
yield gaps on the ground.
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Abstract
The second UN Sustainable Development Goal establishes food security as a priority for
governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs. These institutions track nationallevel food security performance with an array of metrics and weigh intervention options
considering the leverage of many possible drivers. We studied the relationships between
several candidate drivers and two response variables based on prominent measures of
national food security: the 2019 Global Food Security Index (GFSI) and the Food
Insecurity Experience Scale’s (FIES) estimate of the percentage of a nation’s population
experiencing food security or mild food insecurity (FI <mod). We compared the
contributions of explanatory variables in regressions predicting both response variables,
and we further tested the stability of our results to changes in explanatory variable
selection and in the countries included in regression model training and testing. At the
cross-national level, the quantity and quality of a nation’s agricultural land were not
predictive of either food security metric. We found mixed evidence that per-capita cereal
production, per-hectare cereal yield, an aggregate governance metric, logistics
performance, and extent of paid employment work were predictive of national food
security. Household spending as measured by per-capita final consumption expenditure
(HFCE) was consistently the strongest driver among those studied, alone explaining a
median of 92% and 70% of variation (based on out-of-sample R2) in GFSI and FI<mod,
respectively. The relative strength of HFCE as a predictor was observed for both
response variables and was independent of the countries used for model training, the
transformations applied to the explanatory variables prior to model training, and the
variable selection technique used to specify multivariate regressions. The results of this
cross-national analysis reinforce previous research supportive of a causal mechanism
where, in the absence of exceptional local factors, an increase in income drives increase
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in food security. However, the strength of this effect varies depending on the countries
included in regression model fitting. We demonstrate that using multiple response
metrics, repeated random sampling of input data, and iterative variable selection
facilitates a convergence of evidence approach to analyzing food security drivers.

Introduction
Recent data indicate that more than two billion people lack regular access to safe,
nutritious, and sufficient food (FAO, 2019c), and an estimated 821 million people are not
able to acquire enough food to meet minimum dietary energy requirements (FAO,
2018b). The second United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 2) aims to
eradicate hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030, yet hunger is slowly rising after
decades of decline (UN, 2019).
Food insecurity is a complex problem, manifesting as obesity and malnutrition in addition
to extreme hunger and starvation (Candel, 2014). A widely used definition from the FAO
states that “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). This definition has been
critiqued and refined (Barrett, 2010; Coates, 2013; Dilley & Boudreau, 2001; PinstrupAndersen, 2009; Tendall et al., 2015), and many food security measurement
methodologies have been developed (Cafiero, 2016; Carletto et al., 2013; EIU, 2019;
IPC Global Partners, 2019; Jones et al., 2013; Leroy et al., 2015; Russell et al., 2018).
The Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) measures food insecurity through the lens
of a survey respondent’s “lived experience” of food access (Cafiero, 2016). The scale
builds on experience-based assessment tools, which revealed the managed process by
which a person typically confronts food insecurity (Ballard et al., 2013; Radimer et al.,
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1990). The FIES is globally calibrated to ensure cross-country comparability and has
emerged as a leading indicator of food insecurity (Saint Ville et al., 2019). The official
SDG indicator framework designates the FIES-based estimate of the prevalence of
moderate or severe food insecurity in a nation’s population as SDG Indicator 2.1.2
(UNSD, 2020).
The Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is a composite indicator that monitors nationallevel food security and has been tabulated since 2012 (EIU, 2019). The GFSI is built
upon 34 unique indicators spanning three conceptual pillars of food security: 1affordability, 2- availability, and 3- quality and safety (Izraelov & Silber, 2019). National
GFSI scores are calculated by weighting these indicators according to an expert panel
weighting matrix. Unlike the FIES, which directly measures individuals’ experiences, the
GFSI is country-centered and considers food security according to the national capacity
to promote food affordability, availability and quality/safety (Thomas et al., 2017). The
GFSI is a blend of indicators that may themselves be considered determinants of food
security (e.g., gross domestic product per capita, funding of food safety net programs) or
metrics of food security (e.g., dietary energy adequacy, micronutrient availability). The
GFSI uses a variety of national-level data to address the question: how food secure is a
given country relative to others?
Robust definitions and measures also enable study of the drivers of food security. The
FIES scores of individual survey respondents have served as the response variable for
several analyses. Smith, Rabbitt, and Coleman-Jensen (2017) used multilevel linear
probability models across 134 countries to find that FIES assessments of household
food insecurity were most strongly related to low education levels, weak social networks,
low social capital, low household income, and unemployment. In a separate paper,
Smith, Kassa, and Winters (2017) used similar models across Latin American and
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Caribbean countries to find that low levels of education, limited social capital, and living
in a country with low gross domestic product per capita were associated with the most
severe food insecurity per FIES scores. Park et al. (2019) used the Gallup World Poll
data to predict the FIES scores for elderly populations using explanatory variables
naturally available in the survey responses, including economic and demographic factors
in addition to several composite indices (e.g., Community Basics Index). Omidvar et al.
(2019) used household-level FIES data to analyze socio-demographic correlates of food
insecurity among Middle Eastern and North African countries.
In addition to assessing GFSI’s composition and validity (Chen et al., 2019; Izraelov &
Silber, 2019; Maricic et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2017), researchers have employed the
index for national and cross-country assessments (Cai et al., 2020, 2020; Chaudhary et
al., 2018; EIU, 2016; Molotoks et al., 2017). Yunusa, Zerihun, and Gibberd (2018) used
the GFSI as a response variable in a cross-country analysis that finds that population
and water resource availability were poor predictors of national food security.
Richterman et al. (2019) used the GFSI to identify an inverse relationship between the
cholera incidence rate and national food security among 30 countries.
Other cross-national analyses have used the Global Hunger Index, child stunting rates,
and the prevalence of undernourishment as response variables. Laborde et al. (2016)
examined trends between the Global Hunger Index and a set of long-term food security
drivers by describing the food system as a system of equations. Their study concludes
that income is a very strong driver, but also that the effect of a policy targeting a given
driver can vary greatly depending on the context of the households, regions, or nations
involved. The 2018 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report examined
the influence of climate variability and extremes on the national prevalence of
undernourishment using change point analysis, finding that climate shocks drove food
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crises, especially in countries where a high proportion of the population depends on
agricultural livelihoods (FAO, 2018b). The 2019 State of Food Security and Nutrition in
the World report studied the cross-country effects of economic slowdowns, finding that
an economic downturn was associated with a 5% increase in the national prevalence of
undernourishment among 130 countries between 2011 and 2017 (FAO, 2019c). Other
cross-country studies examined child stunting rates, which, though related to national
food security, is specifically the result of poor nutrition and health early in life (Milman et
al., 2005). Headey (2013) analyzed the effect of within-country changes in general
developmental factors on child stunting rates, finding evidence that economic growth
typically leads to reduction in stunting, but weaker evidence that agricultural growth
plays a special role. Smith and Haddad (2015) studied determinants of cross-country
reductions in stunting from 1970–2010, finding income growth and strong governance to
be key basic determinants of improvements in child undernutrition, while safe water
access, sanitation, women’s education, gender equality, and the quantity and quality of
food available were underlying determinants.
The above studies of food security drivers typically use only one measure of food
security or nutrition as the response variable. However, it is well-recognized that no
single metric can capture all dimensions of food security, and thus complete
assessments of food security use a “convergence of evidence approach” across several
metrics (Ballard et al., 2013; Coates, 2013; Jones et al., 2013; Pérez-Escamilla et al.,
2017). Following this logic, it is useful to examine the drivers of food security using more
than one metric in order to make more robust conclusions about the relative
contributions of different explanatory variables. How do the results of cross-country food
security models vary when the variable used to define national food security is changed?
Further, how do these models respond to changes in data availability (i.e., the countries

59

included in input data) and model formulation (i.e., the explanatory variables selected)?
Here, we analyze the importance of several explanatory variables in regressions
predicting food security at the national level based on both GFSI and FIES metrics. By
conducting the analysis in parallel for each response variable, we compare results from
two fundamentally different approaches to assessing food security. We further test the
stability of our results to changes in explanatory variable selection and the countries
included in regression model training and testing using stepwise forward variable
selection and bootstrap sampling, respectively.

Data
This section provides additional background on the data used in this study and our
rationale for the selection of explanatory variables. The full dataset is available for
download in Online Resource 1, which also includes metadata on the definitions,
sources, data years, and units of all variables.

Response variables: national food security metrics
Food Insecurity Experience Scale
The Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) measures the access dimension of food
insecurity through the lens of a person’s lived experience (Cafiero, 2016). Food
insecurity is commonly experienced as a continuum, where mild food insecurity is first
felt as a worry about how to procure food because of a lack of resources, progressing to
compromise on the quality and variety of food, then reduction in the quantity of food,
before skipping meals and experiencing hunger associated with severe food insecurity
(Coates et al., 2006). The FIES Survey Module uses eight yes/no questions to assess
the respondents’ place on this continuum in the past 12 months (Ballard et al., 2013).
Table A2.1 presents the questions in the survey module (Online Resource 2). The
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questions are ordered such that answering “yes” corresponds to increasing levels of
food insecurity as the module progresses. From these ordered responses, the Rasch
model is used to estimate the level of food insecurity experienced by the respondent
(Nord, 2014). The FIES Survey Module is administered to nationally representative
samples of the adult population, and national-level results are calibrated to a global
reference scale to ensure cross-country comparability (Cafiero et al., 2018).
FIES respondents can be classified as experiencing a) food security or mild food
insecurity, b) moderate or severe food insecurity, and c) severe food insecurity (UNSD,
2020). The moderate food security threshold is set by the 5 th FIES Survey Module item,
which asks if the respondent has eaten less than he/she thought he/she should because
of a lack of money or other resources. The severe food insecurity threshold is set by the
8th item, which asks if the respondent has gone an entire day without eating for lack of
money or other resources. Once national FIES measures have been calibrated to the
global scale, the prevalence of these levels of food insecurity in the national population
is estimated by probabilistically assigning respondents to each class as described in the
official SDG Indicator 2.1.2 metadata (UNSD, 2020).
Response variable: FI<mod
SDG Indicator 2.1.2, denoted by FI mod+sev, is defined as the percentage of people who
live in households classified by the FIES as moderately or severely food insecure (FAO,
2018a). It follows that the percentage of the population who experience either food
security or mild food insecurity, FI <mod, can be defined as 𝐹𝐼<𝑚𝑜𝑑 = 1 − 𝐹𝐼𝑚𝑜𝑑+𝑠𝑒𝑣 . We
used the percentage of the national population in the FI<mod class as a response variable
in our analysis to facilitate comparison with the Global Food Security Index, which
increases with increasing food security performance.
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Global Food Security Index
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is a composite
index that provides a common, cross-national basis for assessing food security (EIU,
2016, 2019). The 2019 GFSI uses 34 unique indicators to cover broad aspects of food
security, from average food supply, to diet diversification, to presence of a formal
grocery sector, et cetera. The indicators are organized into three categories
(Affordability, Availability, and Quality/Safety). Table A2.2 presents the GFSI
components and their weights (Online Resource 2). To calculate the index, all GFSI
input data are scaled to a value between zero and 100. After scaling, the three category
scores are calculated as the weighted means of the indicators, and the overall GFSI
score is calculated as the weighted mean of the category scores. We utilize the default
indicator weighting matrix recommended by a peer panel of experts on food and
agricultural policy. We do not adjust these default results with the optional Natural
Resources and Resilience risk adjustment factor offered by the 2019 GFSI model.
Although the expert indicator weights are subjective by nature, three independent recent
studies have largely concluded that this index formulation is reasonable for use in
assessing cross-national differences in food security (Chen et al., 2019; Izraelov &
Silber, 2019; Thomas et al., 2017).

Explanatory variables: country characteristics
A complex causal chain determines each person’s food security, which may be defined
according to the 1996 World Food Summit definition: physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet dietary needs and food preferences (FAO,
1996). The classic UNICEF framework for child undernutrition classified causes as
“basic”, “underlying”, or “immediate” by their order in the causal chain (UNICEF, 1990).
For example, disease or inadequate dietary intake may be the immediate cause of
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undernutrition, but these may be the result of underlying household food insecurity,
which is ultimately caused by broader inadequacies in resources (e.g., employment,
technology) and other stressors (e.g., political unrest).
These basic determinants in the causal chain are also components of a multipart food
system, which is described by the conceptual framework posed by the Global Panel on
Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition’s (GPAFSN) 2016 report (GPAFSN, 2016, p.
27). In the GPAFSN framework, dietary quality is most proximally dependent on
consumer purchasing power, but the way that income is spent depends on the broader
“food environments” that determine which foods are physically accessible, as well as the
price and nutritiousness of those foods. Food environments are also dependent on the
food supply system, which includes an agricultural production subsystem, as well as
subsystems that transform, store, transport and sell food products.
For this cross-country analysis, we select explanatory variables at the most “basic” level
of the UNICEF causative framework, and which map to components of the GPAFSN’s
food systems framework. Conceptually, our explanatory variables describe key aspects
of the food system, starting with basic agricultural resources (quality and quantity of
agricultural land) utilized by the agricultural production subsystem to produce food, then
including the governance and logistics performance which may affect the distribution of
domestic and imported food within the food environment, and finally considering the
income allowing the purchase of available food by consumers.
Table 2.3.1 lists each of the selected explanatory variables with their units and provides
some summary statistics. Figure A2.1 presents scatterplots between each response
variable and each explanatory variable (Online Resource 2).
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Table 2.3.1. The explanatory and response variables used in this cross-national analysis of food security.

Category
Agricultural
Land

Agricultural
Production

Governanc
e and
Logistics

Household
Income

Response
Variables

Variable
Arable land
(ha/capita)a
Mean Crop Suitability
Indexb
Cereals production
(metric tons/capita)c
Cereal yield
(kg/ha harvested land)d
Mean Worldwide
Governance Indicatore
Logistics Performance
Indexf
(1=low to 5=high)
HFCE PPP
(2011 intl. $/capita)g
Prevalence of paid
employment (% of total
employment)h
FI<mod
(% of national population)i
Global Food Security Indexj

Mean

Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation

0.29

0.35

0.03

1.90

30.20

14.29

0.52

64.84

0.48

0.48

0.02

1.97

4,254

2,334

401

9,051

0.28

0.94

-1.14

1.84

3.16

0.60

2.05

4.20

13,537

10,052

853

42,648

63.04

26.94

5.65

93.78

72.20

25.35

9.20

97.20

66.46

13.13

39.00

84.00

Note: The full dataset (n = 65 countries) is available for download in Online Resource 1, which
also includes detailed metadata. References: a(FAO, 2020a), b(Velthuizen, 2007), c(FAO, 2020b),
d

(FAO, 2020c), e(Kaufmann et al., 2010), f(World Bank, 2018a), g(World Bank, 2019), h(ILO,

2020), i(FAO, 2018a), j(EIU, 2019).

We chose the mean Crop Suitability Index (CSI) and hectares of arable land per capita
as measures of agricultural land quality and quantity, respectively. We use the version of
the CSI that assesses the suitability of a nation’s land area for cultivating rain-fed cereals
using low levels of agricultural inputs (Velthuizen, 2007). Arable land includes area
classified by the FAO as under temporary crops, temporary meadows for mowing or for
pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow (FAO,
2020a).
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We chose the per-capita cereal production and per-hectare cereal yield as indicators of
in-country agricultural production. Cereal crops include wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats,
rye, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, and mixed grains. Cereal production is measured as
metric tons of cereal crops harvested for dry grain per capita per year (FAO, 2020b).
Cereal yield is measured as kilograms of cereals harvested for dry grain per hectare of
harvested land (FAO, 2020c).
We chose the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Logistics Performance Index
as measures of governance and logistics performance, respectively. The WGI include
composite indicators that measure perceptions of governance quality in six dimensions:
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism,
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The six WGI indicators are reported in units of a standard
normal distribution (i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5), and we use the mean of
these indicators for each country as the explanatory variable in our study. The Logistics
Performance Index (LPI), is a qualitative evaluation of trade and transport-related
infrastructure based on survey responses by on-the-ground freight and trade operators
(Arvis, Jean-François et al., 2014).
Per-capita household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) reflects the real market
value of goods and services purchased by households or by nonprofit institutions serving
households. To enable cross-national comparability, we use a measure of HFCE that
has been adjusted for purchasing power parity and converted to constant 2017
international dollars (World Bank, 2019). HFCE estimates the annual consumption of an
average individual, and it relates to consumer income in our conceptual framework.
HFCE values are based on household consumption surveys which include imputed
expenditures for own-consumption and owner-occupier rents (Lequiller & Blades, 2014).
65

These “own-consumption” expenditures include the products of subsistence agriculture,
which are assigned a market value based on the farm gate prices that smallholders
would have received if they had sold their produce (McCarthy, 2013). Valuating the
outputs of informal economies in a cross-country-comparable manner remains
challenging for national accountants (Charmes, 2012). Despite these uncertainties, we
consider HFCE an estimate of the total consumption of goods and services of an
average consumer, including the procurement of food by buying or growing.
The prevalence of formal employment indicates the percent of total employment made
up of wage and salaried workers who hold “paid employment jobs” (ILO, 2020). Workers
with paid employment jobs are generally considered less vulnerable than own-account
and contributing family workers (Gammarano, 2018).
We do not claim that these explanatory variables include all characteristics relevant to
national food security. Nor does securing access to food guarantee a high-quality diet for
all people: utilizing food for healthy diets also relies on consumer behavior and
education, among other factors (HLPE, 2017). We do claim that the selected explanatory
variables include several basic drivers that help determine the extent of food access
within a national food system. We analyze how these characteristics can explain crossnational differences in food security.
Correlation between explanatory variables
Multicollinearity between explanatory variables is common and can cause regression
models’ coefficients and predictive capability to be highly sensitive to changes in model
specification and input data sample (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). Figure A2.2 presents the
correlation matrix for all explanatory variables. Many are correlated with one another.
We use bootstrapping and variable subset selection techniques to present our results as
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distributions of model performance and coefficients across many regression model fits.
The sensitivity of the results is thus presented directly in the data for the reader’s own
interpretation.

Methods
This section describes our approach to multivariable regression using the variables
described above in Data, including data preprocessing, bootstrap sampling, and
stepwise forward variable selection.

Multivariable linear regression
Data preprocessing
To ensure comparability between regression results on both GFSI and FI <mod, we limited
our analysis to 65 countries for which all response variable data are available. While
utilizing all available countries for both metrics would increase sample size, it would also
allow differences in the underlying samples to bias results. GFSI’s data coverage
prioritizes large countries to capture the largest possible percentage of global population,
while the FIES results can be reported by any country who undertakes the survey
module.
Prior to regression, we applied a Box-Cox transformation to rescale non-normal
explanatory variables to make them more similar to a normal distribution (Box & Cox,
1964). Supplementary Note 1 in Online Resource 2 provides further explanation of the
Box-Cox transformation applied to the input data. Finally, to promote comparability of
regression coefficients between the explanatory variables in each model, we
transformed the explanatory variables so that they were centered and scaled to a
standard deviation of one and a mean of zero. The response variables were not
transformed in any way.
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While preparing the analysis, we also tested the effect of changing these approaches to
dataset selection (i.e., all available data versus only countries with both response
variables available) and explanatory variable transformations (i.e., Box-Cox versus
targeted logarithmic transforms of a few variables). Figure 2.3.5 shows that the
performance of all univariate models was consistent for all four combinations of these
modelling decisions.

Linear regression on bootstrap samples
We used ordinary least squares linear regression to quantitatively evaluate the
relationships between combinations of explanatory variables and the response variables.
As described above, data were available for 65 countries. Because of the small number
of observations, it is useful to determine how sensitive our results are to the
inclusion/exclusion of nations in the dataset used for model fitting (i.e., to test the
generalizability of the models). Rather than performing just one regression for each
combination of response and explanatory variables, we use bootstrapping (i.e., sampling
with replacement) to train and test regression models on multiple subsets of the input
dataset.
Figure 2.3.1 illustrates the bootstrap sampling process used to fit and test each
regression model. Starting with the original input dataset, we created 100 bootstrap
samples by performing random sampling with replacement (Hastie et al., 2009). Each
sample was comprised of a training set, which was used for model fitting, and a test set,
which was used to evaluate model performance (out-of-sample R2). The training set was
created by drawing random samples with replacement until the training set was the
same size as the original input dataset (65 countries). Because sampling was conducted
with replacement, the resulting training set contained some replicates of the original
countries. The countries that were left out of the training set served as the test set for
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that bootstrap sample. This procedure ensures that training and test sets are disjoint.
The mean test set size was 23.7±2.4.

Figure 2.3.1. Flow diagram of bootstrap sampling process, starting with the full 65-country dataset, and
ending with an estimate of the median out-of-sample R2 calculated over all sets of model results. To ensure
a fair comparison across model formulations, the same set of 100 bootstrap samples was utilized to test all
model formulations generated by stepwise forward variable selection

As visualized in Figure 2.3.1, the out-of-sample R2 is calculated using only the actual and
predicted response variable values in the test set. Thus, the out-of-sample R2 can be
considered the proportion of variance in the response variable that is explained by the
regression model for countries the model did not “see” during fitting. This approach
applies equally to models using any number of explanatory variables (i.e., including the
univariate models in Figure 2.3.4 and the multivariate models in Figure 2.3.6). The
bootstrap sampling process is repeated 100 times, generating a set of 100 R 2 values
across all iterations of sampling and training-testing.

Model formulation and stepwise forward variable selection
The model formulations for the linear regressions that were fit to these bootstrap
samples can be generically written for the ith response variable and jth set of explanatory
variables as
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𝒀𝒊 = 𝑿𝒋 𝜷𝒊𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒋
where 𝒀 is the vector of food security scores for response variable 𝑖, 𝑿𝒋 is the matrix of
input data for explanatory variable subset 𝑗, 𝜷𝒊𝒋 is a vector of coefficient estimates, and
𝜺𝒊𝒋 is a vector of error terms corresponding to response variable 𝑖 and explanatory
variable set 𝑗. The model is fit by minimizing the sum of squared residuals, as per the
ordinary least squares regression approach.
Our use of bootstrap sampling shows how results change with variation in the countries
used to train regression models. It is similarly useful to analyze how regression models
perform when using different subsets of explanatory variables. Explanatory variable
subset selection techniques can be used to identify the model formulations that achieve
best out-of-sample model performance (for example, by avoiding overfitting to training
data). Comparing results across the many regression models generated during subset
selection also enhances interpretability.
We tested two approaches to explanatory variable selection: exhaustive best subset
selection, and stepwise forward selection (Hastie et al., 2009). The exhaustive best
subset selection approach tested all possible combinations of explanatory variables,
fitting 510 different model formulations between the two response and eight explanatory
variables. The stepwise forward approach used a “greedy” algorithm that started with the
best univariate model and iteratively added the explanatory variable that most improved
the out-of-sample model performance at each step. Figure A2.3 shows that both
approaches to variable selection produced nearly identical model performance for each
number of explanatory variables, for each of the two response variables (Online
Resource 2). We chose to present only the stepwise forward variable selection results
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here because the incremental nature of the algorithm highlights the value of adding each
new explanatory variable to the model.

Statistical tools
We used the R language in the RStudio environment (R Core Team, 2020). Data
visualization and manipulation were conducted with the tidyverse ecosystem of
packages (Wickham, Averick, et al., 2019). Regressions were performed with the
tidymodels ecosystem of packages (Kuhn & Wickham, 2020).

Results
This study analyzed the relationships between two measures of national food security
and a dataset of explanatory variables that characterizes 65 nations in terms of
agricultural land quality and quantity, agricultural production, governance and
infrastructure, and household income. We used linear regression models to quantify the
contribution of each explanatory variable to the variation in both metrics. We further
examine the stability of our results by repeating the regressions on varying input data
sets to create a distribution of model fits and performance. This section compares the
two response variables and presents the regression results.

Comparing GFSI and FI<mod
Figure 2.3.2 maps the countries used in this study and summarizes response variable
scores by region. The 65 nations included in the analysis accounted for approximately
56% of global population and 84% of global gross domestic product in 2019. India and
Brazil are among the largest countries without publicly-available data on FI mod+sev which
are excluded from this analysis (FAO, 2018a). The Middle East and North Africa region
is exceptionally sparsely covered. Despite the gaps, these data span many food security
contexts.
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Figure 2.3.2. Regional summary of response metrics. (a) Map of countries for which both response variables
are available. (b) Boxplots summarizing response variable scores by region, with y-axes in units of the
respective response variables (i.e. GFSI scores and the percent of population experiencing food security or
mild food insecurity [FI<mod]). For all boxplots presented in this study, the middle line, box hinges, and
whiskers of the boxplot show the median, interquartile range (IQR), and the range of values up to 1.5*IQR
more extreme than the box hinges, respectively. Here, each boxplot is overlaid by the data points it
summarizes.

For both GFSI and FI<mod, North America, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia and
Pacific regions lead in food security performance. A second tier is comprised of Latin
American and Caribbean countries, along with a Northern African nation (Egypt) and two
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South Asian countries (Nepal and Bangladesh). Sub-Saharan African countries show the
worst regional performance on both response metrics.
Figure 2.3.3 shows a strong positive correlation between countries’ GFSI and FI <mod
scores. For both metrics, the spread in national food security is tight for a cluster of highperforming nations, and much wider in the middle and lower parts of the scale. Except
for Nigeria and Burkina Faso, Sub-Saharan African nations lie on or below the trendline,
indicating FI<mod performance that is lower than what the GFSI scores alone might
indicate. That is, for most Sub-Saharan African countries in this study, the prevalence of
people reporting an experience of moderate or severe food insecurity in the past 12
months is higher than the rate that a model using GFSI’s macro-level indicators would
suggest. This same deviation from the trendline is observed to a milder extent for most
Latin American and Caribbean nations.

Regression modelling
We quantitatively evaluated the relationship between the response variables and the
explanatory variables using multivariable linear regression as described above in
Methods. The underlying methodological differences in the response metrics inform the
interpretation of regression results. Regressions on FI <mod show how explanatory
variables predict the prevalence of food security (or mild food insecurity) in a population.
Regressions on GFSI show how explanatory variables relate to the Index’s framework
for assessing national food security.
Because we used bootstrap sampling to run each model on 100 random training and
testing datasets, all model performance and coefficient results are presented as
distributions of outcomes across the 100 model fits.
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Figure 2.3.3. Correlation between GFSI and FI<mod response metrics. A linear trendline is plotted with a 95%
confidence interval shown in grey. The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient is included at the
bottom-right of the plot. The p-value is the result of a t-test on the coefficient with the null hypothesis that
there is zero correlation between the two variables. Each point is colored by region and labeled with the ISO
3166 three letter country code (ISO, 1999).

Figure 2.3.4 presents the out-of-sample R2 results for univariate regression models.
Each boxplot summarizes model performance across 100 iterations in which a onepredictor model is fit on a training set of 65 countries (including replicates) and then
tested on a testing set comprised of all countries not used in training. For instance, when
a model with only HFCE as an explanatory variable was used to predict FI <mod for 100
different sets of out-of-sample countries, the coefficient of determination ranged from
0.42 to 0.89, with a median of 0.70. Models predicting FI <mod are generally less accurate
than models predicting GFSI.
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Figure 2.3.4. Boxplots summarizing the out-of-sample model performance of all possible univariate linear
regression models. Each model was trained and tested over 100 bootstrap samples. The boxplot series are
ordered ascendingly by the median out-of-sample R2 for each response variable.

The univariate model results align roughly with the thematic categories we used to select
explanatory variables. Considering these categories one at a time, variables related to
the quality and quantity of agricultural land were not predictive of either food security
metric. Variables related to agricultural production — per-capita cereal production and
cereal yield — were the second-lowest performing category. However, cereal yield was
a significantly better predictor than gross production for both response variables,
attributing more importance to land use efficiency than tonnage grown per capita. WGI
and LPI, which comprise the governance and logistics category, show mixed results.
When predicting FI<mod, the median R2 for the WGI-only model is 0.46, which is below
that of cereal yield (0.58). For GFSI, however, the WGI-only model performs about as
well as LPI and the percentage of workers in paid employment jobs (median R 2 ~ 0.8).
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Predictions by a univariate model using household final consumption expenditure per
capita (HFCE) outperformed all other univariate models for both response variables,
capturing a median of 92% of the variation in 2019 GFSI scores and 70% of the variation
in FI<mod. We note that some of HFCE’s predictive power for GFSI comes from the
inclusion of GDP per capita as one of the indicators in the index (about 9% of the total
score, per Table A2.2). HFCE represents the market value of all goods and services
purchased by households, which corresponds to a portion of gross domestic product.
Rather than to attempt to disentangle the effect of HFCE on both sides of the equation,
we acknowledge this complication here and avoid relying solely on GFSI when making
conclusions. We do note that R2 results were negligibly changed even when GDP per
capita was eliminated from the GFSI formulation. FI <mod is independent and is not based
on macro-level indicators, making it an important complement to GFSI in this study.
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Figure 2.3.5. Median out-of-sample R2 for univariate regression models using four sets of modelling
assumptions. The first letter of the method tag corresponds to the input data utilized for regression: “O”
indicates that all available data were used when fitting each regression model (i.e., 91 countries for FI <mod
and 112 countries for GFSI), “I” indicates that only countries with both response variables available were
used (i.e., the same 65 countries for both response variables). The second letter corresponds to the
transform applied to non-linear explanatory variables. “B” indicates that a Box-Cox transformation was
applied as described in Supplementary Note 1. “L” indicates a targeted approach where a natural logarithm
was applied to HFCE and cereal production per capita to linearize these variables with respect to the
response.

Figure 2.3.5 shows that these univariate model results are resilient to changes in 1) the
countries that are included in the dataset, and 2) the transformation used to scale
explanatory variables prior to model fitting. Across all explanatory and response variable
combinations, the median out-of-sample R2 varies by less than 0.09 as these two
modelling assumptions are changed.

77

Figure 2.3.6. Out-of-sample R2 results at each stage of stepwise forward explanatory variable selection. The
x-axis denotes the explanatory variables included in the regression, where A is arable land per capita, C is
the mean Crop Suitability Index, P is cereals production per capita, Y is cereal yield, S is HFCE per capita, E
is the percentage of workers in paid employment jobs, L is the Logistics Performance Index, and W is the
mean Worldwide Governance Indicator score.

Figure 2.3.6 summarizes the model performance of each stage of stepwise forward
explanatory variable selection. For each response variable, the leftmost boxplot shows
the R2 performance for the best one-variable model. From left-to-right, the proceeding
boxplots show how performance changes when a new variable is added to the model.
Both stepwise forward selections begin with HFCE as the first variable. HFCE captures
nearly all the information required to predict GFSI: a model with only HFCE (median R 2 =
0.92) is negligibly improved by adding variables. HFCE also predicts FI <mod well (median
R2 = 0.70 for the leftmost model), but the out-of-sample performance of the regression
model improves with inclusion of cereal yield, cereal production and the quantity of
arable land per capita (median R2 = 0.77). Addition of further variables — including
logistics index, mean CSI score, mean WGI score, and percentage of workers in paid
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employment jobs — decreased the ability of the model to predict the FI <mod for countries
outside of the training sample. This is evidence of overfitting, as increasing model
complexity worsened predictions on test set countries.
Figure A2.3 shows that these results hold even if exhaustive best subsets variable
selection is used to specify the multivariate regressions instead of the stepwise forward
variable selection approach presented in the main text.
Figure 2.3.7 shows the distribution of regression coefficient estimates generated over
100 bootstrap samples. For each response variable, we include the coefficient estimate
results for models using all explanatory variables, and for the 4-variable model selected
by stepwise forward variable selection. Each ridge shows how regression coefficients
vary as the countries used for model training change across bootstrap samples. In the
full model including all explanatory variables, coefficient estimates range widely,
sometimes changing in sign from fit to fit. Many of the widest-ranging coefficients have a
median p-value above 0.2, indicating very low statistical significance of the estimate.
Across both response metrics and all regression formulae, HFCE is the only explanatory
variable with a consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, the
expected boost in national food security from an increase in HFCE varies across
bootstrap samples. Some model fits suggest that a one standard deviation increase in
Box-Cox transformed HFCE translates to a 30% increase in FI <mod. For others, the same
increase in HFCE is estimated to have a much smaller effect. This suggests that the
magnitude of influence of per-capita consumer spending on national food security
depends in part on the countries being considered, and the causal models of food
insecurity at work within them.
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Figure 2.3.7. Ridge plots summarizing multivariable regression coefficient estimates across 100 bootstrap
samples for four model formulations. Results from regression models using all eight explanatory variables
are included, as are results from using the combination of explanatory variables in the 4-variable model
selected by stepwise forward variable selection. Each ridge is a smoothed histogram (kernel density
estimate) of the 100 regression coefficients generated for an explanatory variable over 100 model fits, and
the vertical line within each distribution indicates the median coefficient estimate. Thus, the y-axes of each
distribution are in units of probability density. The distributions are colored based on the median p-value
observed over the bootstrap runs. The annotations in the bottom-right of the plots state the explanatory
variables used in the regression, and the median out-of-sample R2 for the model runs. The explanatory
variables are coded such that A is arable land per capita, C is the mean Crop Suitability Index, P is cereals
production per capita, Y is cereal yield, S is HFCE per capita, E is the percentage of workers in paid
employment jobs, L is the Logistics Performance Index, and W is the mean Worldwide Governance Indicator
score.
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For both response metrics, the 4-variable model using forward variable selection tended
to conserve at least one explanatory variable related to cereal yield or production.
However, the four models in Figure 2.3.7 do not agree on which of these two factors is
more useful to the model, nor on the sign, magnitude, or significance of their coefficient
estimates.
Both 4-variable models retained one measure of agricultural land quantity or quality, but
with consistently negative coefficients. This indicates that, when comparing two
countries, if all else is held equal, countries with more or better-quality agricultural land
are on average the less food secure of the pair. The four models in Figure 2.3.7 disagree
on the sign, magnitude, and significance of coefficients for LPI, WGI and the percent of
workers in paid employment jobs.
As a supplementary analysis, we also calculated SHapley Additive explanation (SHAP)
values, which indicate the additive contribution of each explanatory variable to each
model prediction. Table A2.3 presents absolute SHAP values for all explanatory
variables, showing that HFCE has the highest average absolute contribution to each
model prediction for both response variables. Figure A2.4 visualizes the raw SHAP
values for every model prediction, showing regional patterns: low HFCE by Sub-Saharan
African countries have a strongly negative contribution to the expected value of both
GFSI and FI<mod.

Discussion
This study analyzes cross-national food security performance using two prominent
metrics: the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), and the Global Food Security
Index (GFSI). The FIES is a “bottom-up” survey-based method that measures
respondents’ lived experience of food insecurity, and it is used to produce globally-
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calibrated estimates of the prevalence of moderate and severe food insecurity (Cafiero,
2016; Cafiero et al., 2018). Our FIES-based response variable, FI <mod, estimates the
percentage of a nation’s population who have not eaten less than they should for lack of
money or other resources in the past 12 months. The GFSI is a “top-down” index that
relies on a suite of macro-level indicators combined with an expert-suggested weighting
matrix to score countries based on the affordability, availability, and quality and safety of
their food systems (EIU, 2019). We caution that favorable national FIES and GFSI
scores do not guarantee that the average citizen has a holistically healthy diet
(GPAFSN, 2016; Pérez-Escamilla et al., 2017). The FIES primarily assesses the
“access” dimension of food security (Cafiero, 2016), and the GFSI is not sensitive to all
aspects of a healthy individual diet (e.g., specific nutrient deficiencies) (Izraelov & Silber,
2019; Thomas et al., 2017).
Precisely because of their methodological differences, the GFSI and FIES can serve as
complementary metrics in a two-pronged approach to considering national-level food
security. On its own, the GFSI is a subjective measure of national capacity for food
security. However, its correlation with the FIES-based measure (Figure 2.3.3) gives
some assurance that these macro-level indicators are not completely out of touch with
the lived experiences of citizens. Likewise, the FIES is well-equipped to measure food
insecurity, but ill-equipped to explain it. Countries with identical prevalence of mild,
moderate, or severe food insecurity may face very different challenges. The GFSI offers
34 indicators that can be used in parallel to diagnose and alleviate barriers to food
affordability, availability, and quality/safety. For example, FIES results indicate that
roughly 50% of people living in both Honduras and Ghana are experiencing moderate or
severe food insecurity. GFSI results for these countries reveal that many Ghanaians lack
food safety for want of potable water and electricity. Honduras, meanwhile, performs
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better on food safety but significantly worse on measures of governance affecting
national food availability.
We also used multivariable linear regression to assess the response variables’
relationships to explanatory variables characterizing nations’ agricultural land,
agricultural production, governance and infrastructure, and household incomes. Model
performance and coefficient estimates varied over a range of training datasets produced
by bootstrap sampling, showing the sensitivity of these cross-country regressions to the
subset of nations used for model fitting. For example, the FI <mod model with highest
median out-of-sample R2 (0.77), explained a minimum of 55% of variance in the out-ofsample predictions for one set of countries, but a maximum of 92% for another.
Compared to FI<mod, GFSI was much easier to predict with the small set of macro-level
explanatory variables used in this study, showing higher and more consistent out-ofsample R2 performance across bootstrap samples. In one sense, this is unsurprising: our
explanatory variables are similar in scope to macro-level GFSI indicators. However, this
behavior is not necessarily obvious given the strong correlation between the two
response metrics themselves. Despite this correlation, the prediction error is much
higher and more variable for the FIES-based metric.
Across all model runs and bootstrap samples, HFCE was a strong predictor of both
national food security metrics. HFCE estimates average consumer spending on durable
goods (e.g., vehicles), non-durable goods (e.g., food), housing, and services.
Importantly, HFCE estimates account for the value of farmers’ consumption of their own
produce based on farm gate prices (McCarthy, 2013). Among univariate models, HFCE
was the best single predictor of GFSI and FI <mod (Figure 2.3.4). This result proved
resilient to changes in the countries included in the input dataset and in the
transformations applied to explanatory variables before model fitting (Figure 2.3.5).
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Adding more explanatory variables to the model in iterations of stepwise forward
selection only modestly improved the model’s out-of-sample R2 (Figure 2.3.6). HFCE’s
regression coefficient was the only one with consistent positive sign and statistical
significance across many combinations of response metrics, model specifications, and
bootstrap samples (Figure 2.3.7).
The quantity and quality of nation’s agricultural land were not alone predictive of either
food security metric. The best-performing models during stepwise forward variable
selection did retain either arable land per capita or mean CSI as a predictor. However,
the coefficient estimates for these variables were consistently negative across model
runs, indicating that when all else is held equal, countries with more or better agricultural
land resources tended to also have lower national food security.
We find mixed evidence that the per-capita cereal production and per-hectare cereal
yield were predictive of national food security. In stepwise forward variable selection,
these were the first two variables added to HFCE to improve FI <mod predictions (Figure
2.3.6), though coefficient estimates were smaller in magnitude and less consistently
significant than for HFCE (Figure 2.3.7).
The results of this cross-national analysis reinforce previous research supportive of a
causal mechanism where an increase in income drives increase in food security. At the
household level, lower incomes are consistently related to worse FIES food insecurity
scores (Park et al., 2019; M. D. Smith, Kassa, et al., 2017; M. D. Smith, Rabbitt, et al.,
2017). At the national level, economic growth has been identified as a key driver of
reductions in child stunting (Headey, 2013; Ruel & Alderman, 2013; L. C. Smith &
Haddad, 2015). However, as our variation in results across bootstraps shows, the
strength of the relationship between HFCE and the two national food security metrics
varies based on the countries included in the training data. Aggregate economic growth
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does not always lead to reduction in poverty, nor do increased incomes eliminate all
malnutrition (FAO, 2019c). Persistent income inequalities also cut off segments of the
population from the benefits of aggregate economic growth and the infrastructure and
services that come with it (e.g., quality health care, sanitation, and reliable power).
The strong relationship between national food security and HFCE shown here together
with the universally low HFCE of subsistence farmers underscores the vulnerability of
subsistence farmers to food insecurity. Subsistence farming is intrinsically variable both
seasonally and interannually, and excess production from years with high yields is often
unable to compensate for lean years because of storage losses, market failures, or lack
of access to banking (Chambers et al., 1981; Thurow & Kilman, 2010). Environmental
variability, exacerbated by climate change, poses a heightened risk for these farmers,
whose food consumption and local agricultural production are tightly coupled (Davis et
al., 2020). Further, many smallholders simply do not own enough land to meet their food
availability needs (Frelat et al., 2016) or to raise their consumption above the HCFE
threshold for achieving higher food security performance. For instance, in our dataset,
no country with HFCE below $5,000 per capita per year had a prevalence of food
security or mild food insecurity above 80% per FIES surveys.
The literature has identified on- and off-farm options for improving earnings, raising
HFCE, and boosting food security. Agricultural development can increase on-farm
income and food security when productivity increases are paired with functional crop
markets, storage options (Tahirou Abdoulaye et al., 2018; Burney et al., 2010; McArthur
& McCord, 2017; Webb & Block, 2012). However, without these supporting factors,
some research finds that marginal increases in smallholder agricultural production or
subsidies on agricultural inputs do not always improve food security or income (Harris &
Orr, 2014; Schreinemachers, 2006; Walls et al., 2018). Beyond the farm gate, one study
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of over 13,000 sub-Saharan African farm households finds that off-farm income is an
important income “stabilizer” that improves food availability (Frelat et al., 2016). Bezu,
Barrett, and Holden (2012) specifically find that Ethiopian households’ consumption
expenditures grow alongside off-farm income, and a wide body of literature has shown
that off-farm jobs are key enablers of poverty reduction in rural areas (Djurfeldt &
Djurfeldt, 2013; Haggblade et al., 2010; Otsuka & Yamano, 2006).
These observations from the literature, combined with our finding that HFCE is a primary
driver of cross-national food security, support the proposition that the most effective
strategies to improve food security will include measures to increase citizens’ capacity
for consumption, whether via agricultural earnings or off-farm income.
We examined the patterns in our small dataset using simple linear regression and data
science techniques. Our cross-sectional data can only be used to indicate “long run”
differences in food security, which are the result of complex relationships between
social, economic, and agricultural factors, among others (Headey, 2013). Future studies
may leverage larger datasets including more countries and explanatory variables, along
with econometric techniques that regress on panel data, employ instrumental variables,
control for country fixed effects, et cetera, that may allow the analysis to make stronger
causal claims (e.g., Headey, 2013; L. C. Smith & Haddad, 2015, 2000). Finally, we show
that model performance was significantly affected by aspects of the study that are
typically left to the modeler’s judgement: the choice of the response variable, the input
dataset, and the model formulation (i.e., the explanatory variables selected). Rather than
making just one justifiable selection of these parameters, we explicitly showed the
sensitivity of our results to different combinations of decisions. Future studies may also
consider employing our techniques to show this variation, including the use of multiple
response variables, and the use of random sampling to portray regression results as
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distributions rather than single numbers which may in reality be subject to wide
fluctuation with changes to the input data.

Conclusion
Despite substantial differences in methodologies and theoretical bases, the Global Food
Security Index and the Food Insecurity Experience Scale metric (FI <mod) were strongly
correlated in our 65-country dataset. In regression models using explanatory variables to
predict nations’ food security scores, per-capita household final consumption
expenditure consistently explained more variance in food security scores than other
drivers. The quantity and quality of nation’s agricultural land were not predictive of either
food security metric. These findings were independent of modelling assumptions
regarding the countries included in the input dataset, the subset of countries used for
model training, the transformations applied to the explanatory variables prior to model
training, and the variable selection technique used to specify multivariate regressions.
We found mixed evidence that per-capita cereal production, per-hectare cereal yield, an
aggregate governance metric, logistics performance, and the prevalence of paid
employment work were predictive of national food security. The results of this crossnational analysis reinforce previous research supportive of a causal mechanism where,
in the absence of exceptional local factors, an increase in income drives increase in food
security. Initiatives that seek to improve national food security by focusing on other
drivers without a clear path to improving incomes are less likely to achieve the desired
effect. We conclude that the GFSI and FIES are complementary metrics, best used in
tandem to monitor and explain national food security performance. Future studies may
expand on these findings and techniques using more countries and a wider array of
explanatory variables.
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3 Minigrids in sub-Saharan Africa

Mokoloki Minigrid, Ogun State, Nigeria. Photo by Nayo Tropical Technologies.

3.1 Minigrid literature review and background
Electricity access is a development priority because it supports both key human
development capabilities and potential to power “productive uses” that generate income
and employment. Energy services such as clean cooking, electric lighting, and
refrigeration are necessary ingredients for modern life, and steep development gains are
observed for the first few megawatt hours of annual consumption as power is directed
towards basic needs (Goldemberg et al., 1985).
Despite significant gains in access in previous decades, 789 million people lacked any
access to electricity in 2018 and at current progress rates 620 million people will remain
without access by 2030 (IEA et al., 2020). Today, 70% of people without access live in
sub-Saharan Africa, and 85% live in a rural area (id). A further 1.5 billion people are
connected to “broken” electricity grids that deliver sporadic power amidst thousands of
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hours of blackouts per year (Lam et al., 2019). Many of these underserved consumers
rely on diesel and gasoline backup generators, which together comprise a fleet of 350–
500 GW of heavily polluting capacity running at an average of $0.30/kWh for fuel alone
(id).
Electricity demand from customers living in countries with limited or inconsistent
electricity service is expected to increase substantially in the future. The International
Energy Agency’s Africa Energy Outlook’s (2019a) base case scenario forecasts more
than a doubling in electricity demand (from 700 TWh/yr to 1,600 TWh/yr) in sub-Saharan
Africa by 2040, driven especially by residential demand growth. The report’s Africa Case
scenario — in which economic expansion is accompanied by full achievement of SDGs
by 2030 — forecasts a quadrupling in electricity demand (to 2,300 TWh/yr).
A cascade of power sector reforms in developing countries has shifted the burden of
electrification from centralized, state-owned utilities to privatized power sectors with
competitive electricity markets (Byrne & Mun, 2003). Privatized, centralized power grids,
however, do not naturally pursue rural or underserved customers that are perceived as
economically unattractive, and public and philanthropic dollars have not been sufficient
to drive the electricity access required to meet human development goals (Monroy &
Hernández, 2005). Achieving electricity access goals will thus require private sector
participation, motivated by returns in a mostly-rural market segment, using innovative
business models and ever-cheaper renewables to cost effectively serve customers
(Williams, 2017).
Meeting rising electricity demand from new, existing, and underserved customers will
require a blend of centralized on-grid electricity, autonomous community minigrids, and
distributed household-level generation supply options (Tenenbaum et al., 2014).
Centralized power generation does not reach many rural communities, which may be
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located far from existing power lines in areas with little supporting infrastructure, and
whose residents are often economically and politically disempowered. But rapidly falling
costs of photovoltaic and energy storage assets, combined with high-efficiency
appliances (e.g., LED lighting), and digital control systems have enabled the creation of
distributed energy resources (DERs) that can meet customers’ electricity needs at a
fraction of the per-project capital investment required for centralized generation and
distribution, and at a competitive levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) (Alstone et al.,
2015). These DER electricity access solutions include standalone pico-power (0.1–10
W) and solar home systems (SHSs, 10–103 W) as well as minigrids (103–106 W) (id).
Connecting customers to these clean and resilient systems can “leapfrog”
predominately-fossil-fueled generation systems and reduce GHG emissions significantly
compared to an alternative where these loads are instead served by diesel generators
(Moner-Girona et al., 2018). Hundreds of peer-reviewed papers have studied the mix of
grid extension, minigrids and standalone solar systems that achieves universal access at
lowest cost (reviewed by Trotter et al., 2017). Governments and other stakeholders can
use planning tools such as the Global Electrification Platform to select the appropriate
DERs for each community in their area.i
A household’s quality of electricity access can be described on a continuum, as
articulated by the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program’s
(ESMAP) Multi-Tier Framework (ESMAP, 2015). Watt-scale systems can provide
important low-energy services like lighting and phone charging (ESMAP Tiers 1–2).
Electric task lighting extends the useful hours of nighttime with no negative health
impacts, and at costs hundreds to thousands of times cheaper than kerosene or other
alternatives (ESMAP, 2015; Lam et al., 2012). Roughly one in two Africans also need

i

The Global Electrification Platform tool can be accessed at https://electrifynow.energydata.info/
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regular charging access for at least one mobile phone (Calderon et al., 2019), which
have become indispensable gateways to information, communication, and banking
services (Pew Research Center, 2019). Small standalone systems can affordably power
these use cases. The global association for the off-grid solar energy industry (GOGLA)
projects that as of June 2020, 59 million and 12 million people were accessing Tier 1
and Tier 2 levels of energy services, respectively, thanks to small standalone systems
sold by their members (GOGLA, 2020). But many appliances require more power than
most standalone systems supply, such as refrigerators, and televisions, and the electric
motors used for many income-generating activities (Booth et al., 2018). In the absence
of sufficient electricity supply, those who can afford them still use fossil fueled generators
and prime movers to meet these needs (ESMAP, 2015).
Minigrids are small (usually < 1 MW) electricity networks that can provide grid-equivalent
service (up to ESMAP Tier 5) to off-grid or underserved grid-connected communities
(Carlin et al., 2017). The solar-diesel hybrid design model is the most prevalent system
configuration being installed today (SEforALL, 2020b), generating most kilowatt hours
from solar photovoltaics, storing the energy in batteries (typically lead-acid) and utilizing
a diesel generator as a peaking resource to reduce the solar and battery assets required
to serve customer loads at 100% reliability (Al-Hammad et al., 2015; Lambert et al.,
2006). These minigrid designs can be built today using only mature technologies,
although innovation in generation, controls, energy storage, and demand response may
improve future systems (IRENA, 2016b).
Autonomous minigrids can be located within communities for which connection to the
centralized grid would require costly transmission and distribution infrastructure to
transmit power (Szabó et al., 2011). Minigrids are also well-suited for serving customers
living “under the grid” (i.e., connected to the central grid yet receiving unreliable service)
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by bypassing overburdened utility infrastructure, potentially reducing utilities’ losses
while profitably serving clusters of homes and businesses (Graber et al., 2018). ESMAP
estimates that $28 billion of cumulative global investment has connected 47 million
people to 19,000 minigrids to date, but also projects that minigrids will need to serve ten
times that number in order to achieve universal access by 2030 (ESMAP, 2019). This
market has an estimated $3.3 billion annual profit potential for minigrid investors, yet
private investment is hard for developers to access, and the World Bank alone still
accounts for an average of 25% of total minigrid investment in its client countries (id).
Despite the promise of minigrids as an electrification solution and business opportunity,
the sector has not yet reached the point where it can scale without subsidized support
(SEforALL, 2020b). Investors see the minigrid market as risky, making capital
investments rare and debt prohibitively expensive (Carlin et al., 2017). Specifically,
potential investors worry that poor residential customers will not buy enough power to
pay back the cost to connect them, or that theft or unwillingness to pay will prevent
collection of payment (Williams et al., 2015). In absence of clear policies governing
service territories, there is also a risk that the heavily-subsidized central grid will
encroach on the minigrid service territory and undercut tariffs before the end of the
project life (Marandu & Luteganya, 2005; Yakubu et al., 2018a). Additionally, minigrid
companies spend an average of more than one year per site complying with regulatory
processes, according to one survey of 28 developers in 12 African countries (AMDA,
2020). Projects also face risks related to fuel prices, foreign exchange rates, and the
magnitude and price elasticity of customer demand for electricity (Williams et al., 2018).
Alongside efforts that familiarize investors with minigrid risks and introduce supportive
policies, minigrid lifecycle costs must fall significantly to improve the business case and
unlock private financing.
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Minigrids are relatively expensive on an LCOE basis, around $0.50–0.60/kWh today, but
with projected potential to fall to ~$0.20/kWh through improvements in minigrid hardware
costs, customer demand stimulation, system planning, regulatory efficiency, and
financing costs (Agenbroad et al., 2018; ESMAP, 2019). Several of these cost reduction
avenues fall outside of the control of any one project. The costs of key components such
as solar panels, batteries, inverters, and smart meters are falling thanks to innovation
and economies of scale, decreasing capital costs from $8,000/kWfirmii in 2010 to
$3,900/kWfirm in 2018 (ESMAP 2019). Industry advocates such as the African Minigrid
Developers Association are working for supportive policies and regulations alongside
nonprofits and rural electrification agencies.
On the ground, minigrid projects live or die on customer electricity consumption, which is
often their sole source of revenue. For every hybrid minigrid that is designed and built,
the sizing of solar, battery and back-up generator resources has been optimized to serve
an expected customer load curve, which describes the magnitude of system electricity
demand and how it fluctuates over time. For example, for a system with a sizeable PV
array, this load curve would ideally show high utilization of cheap daytime solar that is
being generated at low operational expense, and would rely on the diesel backup
generator to meet only occasional peak loads at higher operational expense (Agenbroad
et al., 2018). When actual load curves deviate from the volume and timing of sales that
are expected by the minigrid design, profitability suffers (Hazelton et al., 2014). In
addition, although some communities may have potential to grow in their electricity
consumption after connection, minigrid customer loads tend to be low in practice, and
productive uses of electricity are not growing organically (AMDA, 2020).

ii

Firm power output refers to the peak load that can be served at any time throughout the minigrid
system life.
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The minigrid sector is grappling with two key questions related to uncertain and
suboptimal loads. First, how can minigrid developers calibrate their designs to realistic
expectations of customer load? Second, how can end users’ demand be stimulated such
to generate income for customers and ensure loads are large and stable enough to
justify the 24/7 high-capacity power that minigrids can provide?
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Abstract:
Minigrids are the lowest-cost solutions for electrifying many homes and businesses in
rural communities with low energy access. Estimates of the electricity demand of
unelectrified customers are a crucial input to selecting minigrid sites, projecting revenue,
and sizing system components to provide adequate capacity while minimizing capital
costs. Typical customer survey-based demand estimates for these communities —
where there are no historical data — are not reliable, typically overpredicting demand.
Here, we test a data-driven approach to demand prediction using survey and smart
meter data from 1,378 Tanzanian minigrid customers. We found that models
incorporating customer survey data into their predictions consistently out-performed a
baseline model that did not. Our best-performing model, the LASSO, predicted daily
electricity demand with a median absolute error of 66% and 37% for individual
connections and minigrid sites, respectively. Quantitative measures of variable
importance show that most survey data are not useful for estimating demand. These
results suggest that surveys should prioritize thorough inventories of prospective
customers’ currently-owned appliances instead of detailed demographic information or
self-reported habits and plans. Pairing shortened questionnaires with smart meter data
from preexisting minigrids can improve estimates of initial customer electricity demand
significantly compared to standard field practices.
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Introduction
Efforts to achieve universal electricity access by 2030 are projected to fall short by 650
million people (IEA et al., 2020). An estimated 90% of those without power would be
Africans, with many living in rural communities that are difficult to electrify via
conventional grid extension (IRENA, 2018). Minigrids are self-contained communityscale electricity systems that generate and distribute power to connected customers,
typically without interconnection to larger regional or national grids. They offer the
benefits of decentralized energy resources — off-grid suitability and a relatively small
initial investment for energy infrastructure projects — alongside the capacity to dispatch
power to larger commercial users (Williams et al., 2015). The World Bank’s Energy
Sector Management Assistance Program estimates that $28 billion of cumulative global
investment had connected 47 million people to 19,000 minigrids by 2019 (ESMAP,
2019). However, they also project that minigrids will need to serve ten times that many
people to achieve universal access by 2030.
While minigrids are often the least-cost solution for electrifying off-grid communities, the
Levelized-Cost-of-Electricity (LCOE) for a best-in-class project is approximately $0.60–
0.80 per kWh, and some sites approach $2.00 per kWh (Reber et al., 2018). Analysis by
RMI finds that improvements in system design, capacity utilization, financing, and the
regulatory environment could reduce LCOE to $0.25 per kWh (Agenbroad et al., 2018).
Today’s high costs are in part due to inaccurate expectations of the load the minigrid will
serve, which often must be forecast for populations that have never had access to
electricity.
Uncertain and inaccurate electricity demand predictions ripple through the minigrid
lifecycle, increasing costs all the way through. In a typical minigrid design process, the
developer selects a viable minigrid site, then estimates a representative load profile, and
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then sizes system components (e.g., solar panels, batteries, diesel generators) to
minimize the total cost of serving the expected load. A successful minigrid must be built
in a location where alternative electrification modalities (e.g., grid extension) are unlikely
to displace customers, and where potential electricity sales are high enough to justify a
minigrid’s substantial fixed costs (Carlin et al., 2017). Accurate electricity consumption
estimates are thus a critical input when choosing the most promising minigrid sites.
Once a site is selected, demand uncertainty also drives up the costs of financing the
project. Minigrid operators and investors who are unsure about the electricity demand of
a prospective minigrid site are by extension uncertain about their project’s revenue
(Williams et al., 2016). This revenue uncertainty raises investors’ perception of the
minigrid’s financial risk, which in turn raises the cost of capital and the LCOE (Schmidt,
2019). Quantitative estimates of load and revenue risk for new projects can decrease
investor uncertainty and bring down these high finance costs. Finally, initial demand
estimates affect system design and operation. Underestimating demand risks power
shortages and poor service quality. But projects that overestimate customer demand will
overspend on solar panels, batteries, and generators to serve loads that never
materialize, oftentimes resulting in a fatally low capacity utilization (AMDA, 2020;
Posner, 2020). Using data from seven Malawian minigrids, Louie and Dauenhauer
estimated that photovoltaic panel and battery array capital expenses increased $2.00 –
6.00 for every Wh of over-prediction of the expected daily load (Louie & Dauenhauer,
2016).
In summary, more accurate demand estimates for unelectrified customers can improve
minigrid economics by guiding minigrid site selection, lowering the cost of finance, and
sizing system components to provide adequate capacity while minimizing capital
investment.
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Recent research has modeled myriad aspects of minigrid design, control, and operation,
including optimal battery storage and renewable generation capacity, autonomous
control systems, day-ahead scheduling schemes, and life-cycle impact optimization
(Aberilla et al., 2020; Avilés A. et al., 2019; Dunham et al., 2020; Kobayakawa &
Kandpal, 2016; Moretti et al., 2019; Peña Balderrama et al., 2020). However, the models
in these studies bypass the electricity demand uncertainty experienced by minigrid
developers in the field by relying on exogenous assumptions of customers’ loads.
Researchers have proposed methods for improving load estimates which can be broadly
categorized as either top-down or bottom-up (Swan & Ugursal, 2009). Top-down
methods use aggregate customer data to inform prediction models. For example, Llanos
et al. (2017) used clustering algorithms to predict demand in unelectrified communities
from data describing similar electrified communities in Chile. Louw et al. (2008) used
data on electricity consumption in rural South Africa to correlate customer characteristics
and electricity consumption. However, Louw et al.’s data were for households with
preexisting electricity connections and stopped short of creating predictive models. Since
suitable aggregate customer data are often unavailable in off-grid contexts, many
practitioners use a bottom-up approach to load forecasting. Bottom-up load predictions
start by modeling the energy consumption of a customer archetype and then extrapolate
this modeled load profile to estimate the electricity demand of a community or region
(Bhattacharyya & Timilsina, 2010; Fabini et al., 2014). In the field, the baseline
consumption for each archetype is based on an inventory of appliances that customers
intend to use, their power ratings, and the duration for which customers predict they will
use these appliances (Blechinger et al., 2016). Several techniques for improved bottomup estimates have been proposed (Boait et al., 2015; Mandelli et al., 2016). For
instance, Mandelli et al.’s (2016) LoadProGen tool stochastically models load profiles
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using input data on prospective users and appliances. When no preexisting customer
data are available, bottom-up methods are the only way to provide some estimate of
customer demand. But when tested, bottom-up approaches often prove inaccurate. In a
case study, Hartvigsson and Ahlgren (2018) compared appliance survey estimates to
measured loads at a Tanzanian minigrid that had been operating for more than a
decade, finding that the surveys predicted 33% less systemwide energy demand than
was measured for a typical weekday. Blodgett et al. (2017) estimated daily customer
load for new electricity customers using an appliance inventory survey approach and
found a mean absolute error of 310%.
In this study, we test a data-driven approach to electricity demand prediction using
survey and smart meter data from 1,378 customers serviced by 14 minigrids in rural
Tanzania. We evaluate the accuracy of our predictions of daily electricity consumption
during the first year of minigrid electricity access for both individual customers and for
entire minigrid sites. We use cross-validation to test these techniques as would occur in
practice: using data from existing minigrids to make predictions about a prospective site.
This approach also allows us to quantify the uncertainty of our demand forecasts. We
employ quantitative variable importance metrics to identify which customer
characteristics are most useful for predicting electricity demand. Finally, we consider the
implications of our study for practitioners who would apply these methods in the field.

Data and modelling approach
In this paper, we show how minigrid customer data and machine learning models can be
used to estimate daily electricity demand for new customers. We present the results of
applying the method to real minigrid customer data and discuss the implications of these
results for those working in the minigrid sector today.
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We used customer survey and smart meter data for 1,378 customers at 14 minigrid sites
in rural Tanzania built and operated by PowerGen Renewable Energy. The PowerGen
team collected customer demographics data through an application survey deployed
after the communities were shortlisted for minigrid development but before building the
minigrids. Once the minigrids were built, load data were collected by smart meters
installed at each connection point to enable remote monitoring and prepaid billing.
Williams et al. (2017) used a subset of these data and includes more detailed
information about site selection, the customer application process, metering and billing,
and minigrid commissioning.
Figure 3.2.1 shows our modelling process, which simulates the uncertainty encountered
by minigrid developers as they assess a new site (which has customer survey data but
no smart meter data) using customer data from all preexisting sites (which have both
customer survey and smart meter data). To predict each customer’s expected daily
electricity consumption at a new site, we first used data from all other minigrid sites to
train machine learning models to relate customers’ pre-connection survey responses to
their post-connection daily electricity demand. Second, we used these trained models to
predict new customers’ electricity demand from their pre-connection survey data. Third,
we estimated the daily electricity demand for the entire community by summing up the
predicted daily demands of individual customers. We evaluated the accuracy of this
process by repeating it for each minigrid site using leave-one-group-out cross-validation
(LGOCV). Further detail on these data and methods is provided below.
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Figure 3.2.1. Overview of the modelling process used to predict the daily electricity demand of new
customers using preexisting minigrid customer data. This process was repeated 14 times to generate
predictions for all customers using only data from outside their community.

Smart meter and customer survey data
The dependent variable in the prediction models was the typical daily electricity
consumption for each customer during their first 365 days after connection to the
minigrid. A “customer” is a unique metered connection, and multiple household members
or employees may use each “customer” connection. Supplementary Note 1 (in the online
supplementary materials) provides further detail on the preprocessing used to prepare
the data for analysis.
Figure 3.2.2 summarizes the distribution of customers’ mean daily electricity
consumption, grouped by connection type. Observed consumption ranged widely, from
less than 10 Wh/day to nearly 5,000 Wh/day. 59% of customers averaged less than 100
Wh/day: a load commensurate with using a few compact fluorescent lights, phone
charging, and a small fan for just a few hours.
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Figure 3.2.2. Mean daily electricity use for all customers, grouped by connection type. The inset plot shows
the histogram in more detail for customers using <500 Wh/day on average. Both histograms use a bin width
of 25 Wh/day.

Customer survey data were collected for each of the 1,378 unique meter numbers
across 14 communities before minigrid installation. Table 3.2.1 lists the categorical
variables collected during customer application surveys and used in this study.
Supplementary Note 1 describes our categorical data preprocessing in further detail.
Numeric variables included the number of years the respondent has lived in the
community, total monthly energy expenditure, average hours studied per night by school
children, as well as counts of the number of people, children, schoolchildren, infants,
rooms, sleeping rooms, and employed persons per household. Customers were
classified as a home, business, a home with an adjoining business, or a public building
(e.g., school, clinic). The most common types of businesses were shops, restaurants,
bars, and guest houses.

103

Customers prepay for Watt-hours of power according to two different tariff structures.
The actual price points for these tariff structures are commercially sensitive and cannot
be published, but the average price paid per Watt-hour was nearly identical across both
tariff groups. Three sites (350 connections) employ a time-of-use (TOU) tariff structure in
which customers receive a lower off-peak rate for electricity consumed between 10 am
and 4 pm. The price for consumption during the peak period (the peak tariff) is double
the off-peak price. Within sites, the minigrid operator places customers on different TOU
prices according to the developer’s expectation of their level of electricity consumption
based on survey data. Higher-consuming customers are placed on lower tariffs, and
lower-consuming customers are placed on higher tariffs to help recover the cost of their
connection to the minigrid. After connection, some customers are shifted to different
price levels based on observed consumption. Due to the endogeneity of the price level
(which is determined in part by other model predictors), estimating a price effect for TOU
customers is not possible and we did not explicitly control for it. The other sites (1,028
connections) use a block tariff in which increased electricity use is incentivized by a
discount of 37.5% applied to electricity purchased in excess of three kWh/month. Tariff
structures were controlled for in the models with a dummy variable, which was not
selected as important by LASSO or random forest importance metrics.
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Table 3.2.1. A summary of categorical variables and levels included in model input data. Data were collected
with surveys before minigrid construction. The subscript h denotes data collected primarily from households
and b indicates data collected primarily from businesses and public buildings. Residences with businesses
were asked all survey questions.

Categorical Predictors
Single Response Questions

Categorical Predictors
Multiple Response Questions

Connection Type
Home, Business, Residence with Business,
Public Premises/Other

Energy Sources

Respondent Family Role
Father, Mother, Other
Respondent Genderh
Male, Female

Firewood Uses

Respondent Age Grouph
18-30, 30-45, 45-60, 60+

Firewood, Solar Home System, Other

Cooking, Other
Kerosene Uses
Lighting, Other
Gasoline Uses
Lighting, Electricity Supply, Other

Respondent Marital Status h
Married, Single, Other
Respondent Education Level h
Some Primary, Finished Primary, Secondary,
Finished Secondary, Finished University, Other

Diesel Uses

Respondent Employment Status h
Employed, Self-Employed Agriculture, SelfEmployed Non-Agriculture, Other

Battery Uses

Respondent Occupationh
Businessperson, Commercial Farmer, NonFarm Laborer, Subsistence Farmer, Teacher,
Other
Household Income Grouph
Low, Lower Middle, Upper Middle, High
Seasonal Income Fluctuationh
Yes, No
Bedtimeh
9pm, 10pm, 11pm, Other
timeh

Wake
5 am, 6 am, Other

Lighting, Electricity Supply, Other
LPG Uses
Cooking, Other

Lighting, Electricity Supply, Cell
Phone Charging, Radio, Television,
Other
Solar Home System Uses
Lighting, Electricity Supply, Cell
Phone Charging, Radio, Television,
Other
Other Energy Source Uses
Cooking, Lighting, Cell Phone
Charging, Radio, Television, Other
Cooking Fuels
Firewood, Other
Transportation Modes
Bicycle, Car, Motorcycle, Boat, Other
Appliance Owned Pre-Minigrid
None, Light Bulb, Phone Charger,
Radio, Low-Watt TV, High-Watt TV,
Satellite TV Decoder, CD/DVD Player,
Refrigerator, Speakers/Stereo, Other

Building Construction Material
Brick, Old/Crumbling Concrete, Well-Built
Concrete, Wood, Other

Planned Appliance Acquisitions

Building Ownership
Own, Rent, Other

Business Typeb

Light Bulbs, Phone Charger, Radio,
Low-Watt TV, CD/DVD Player,
Refrigerator, Speakers/Stereo,
Electric Iron, Other
Bar, Restaurant, Guesthouse/Hotel,
Shop, Other
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Model training and testing by leave-one-group-out cross-validation
Our modelling process simulates the uncertainty encountered by minigrid developers as
they assess a new site, using the relationship between customers’ survey responses
and electricity consumption observed at preexisting sites to inform expectations of new
customers’ loads based on their pre-connection survey responses (Figure 3.2.1). We
formally assessed the accuracy of this approach across all of our sites using leave-onegroup-out cross-validation (LGOCV) (Hastie et al., 2009). Per LGOCV, we split the
customer data into ‘folds’ by minigrid sites, with each training fold containing the data for
all but one of the sites. The site reserved from the training data is the test fold. In each
iteration of cross-validation, the regression model was trained on the data contained in
the training fold and then tested on the reserved (i.e., “out-of-sample”) minigrid customer
data. We repeated this process to generate a load prediction for each customer using
models trained on data from outside their community. The root mean square error
(RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) summarize the error of these out-of-sample
predictions according to the formulae below,
2
∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑦̂𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 )

𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √

𝑁

, 𝑀𝐴𝐸 =

∑𝑁
̂𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 |
𝑖=1 |𝑦
𝑁

where 𝑁 is the total number of customers in the sample, and 𝑦̂𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖 are the predicted
and observed mean daily loads for customer 𝑖, respectively.
Intercept-Only model
The Intercept-Only model calculates the average daily consumption over all preexisting
minigrid customers and assumes that all customers at the new minigrid site will have the
same average daily consumption. This approach does not incorporate customer survey
data into the prediction. We call this method the “Intercept-Only” model because it is
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equivalent to an ordinary least squares regression model with an intercept and no
predictors. To simulate the performance of this method, we performed leave-one-groupout cross-validation as described above and assigned the mean electricity consumption
of training fold customers as the daily electricity consumption of all test fold customers.
Though this method serves as a “baseline” against which to compare model
performance, it should be noted that many minigrid developers, especially those moving
into new regions, lack even this amount of data on previous customer use. This method
is representative of results that could be achieved by an organization with many minigrid
sites in an area, without incorporating additional customer information from surveys.
LASSO regression
We used the glmnet R package to perform LASSO regressions (Friedman et al., 2010;
Tibshirani, 1996). As shown in Figure 3.2.2, data describing customers’ mean daily
electricity use are strongly right-skewed, non-zero, and positive. We assumed that our
response variable follows a lognormal distribution and concluded that a log-transform of
the response variable is well-suited to glmnet’s Gaussian model. Supplementary Note 2
(in the online supplementary materials) includes a detailed explanation and justification
of this method and assumption. The predictions generated by this model were the
expectation of the mean of the response variable on the logarithmic scale (i.e.,
log(Wh/day)). We used the expectation of the median as our estimator of typical
customer electricity use (in Wh/day) for the LASSO model, obtained by reversing the
logarithmic transform on the predictions. The LASSO hyperparameter, 𝜆, was utilized to
tune the model as described below. As Figure S2 shows, incrementing λ drives
explanatory variable coefficients towards zero.

107

Random forest
We used the random forest algorithm as implemented in the randomForest package
(Liaw & Wiener, 2002). Random forests make predictions by taking the mean of
estimates across a “forest” of regression trees (Breiman, 2001). Random forests use two
hyperparameters to tune the model fit. One hyperparameter is the number of candidate
predictors for each node split, commonly abbreviated as mtry. We set mtry according to
the hyperparameter selection process discussed below and visualized in Figure S4. We
fixed the other hyperparameter, the number of trees in the random forest (ntree), to 500,
where the error reduction achieved by a marginal increase in the number of trees was
asymptotically low (Figure S5).
Hyperparameter selection
Both LASSO and random forest regressions utilize hyperparameters to tune the fit of the
model to the data. We tuned the LASSO λ and random forest mtry parameters to the
training data in each iteration of LGOCV. This procedure simulated the process of using
these models in the field: data from existing sites are used to train and tune the model,
and then to make a prediction given survey data for a prospective site. In each LGOCV
fold, the cv.glmnet function selected the value of λ that minimized MSE within the
training set. Similarly, for random forests, the tuneRF function selected the value of mtry
from a set of candidate values that minimized the MSE within each LGOCV fold. Once
selected, models using these hyperparameter values made the out-of-sample
predictions in the current iteration of cross-validation before being recalculated in the
next iteration. Figure S3 and Figure S4 show the effect of hyperparameter selection by
plotting hyperparameter values versus MSE for fits of the LASSO and random forest to
the full dataset, respectively.

108

Variable importance
In addition to predicting new customer loads, LASSO and random forest models can be
used to assess the importance of each explanatory variable in making these predictions.
In parametric linear models, the estimated coefficients indicate variable importance: all
else equal, variables with larger coefficient values have a larger marginal effect on the
response variable. The LASSO, a regularized regression model, performs inherent
feature selection as some regression coefficients are driven to zero. We generated the
LASSO coefficients presented in our variable importance results by training a descriptive
model with all available customer data using the log-scale response variable, and we
report the coefficients in this logarithmic scale.
In ensemble learning methods such as random forests, variable importance metrics are
often used to make models more interpretable and to determine which explanatory
variables are useful (Breiman, 2001). One measure is permutation importance, which
describes the increase in error caused by the removal of a given predictor from the
regression trees in the random forest. We employed the Boruta algorithm, a wrapper
method for feature selection on random forest models, to determine which features carry
information relevant for prediction (Kursa & Rudnicki, 2010). The Boruta method uses
randomly generated variables as controls against which to compare the permutation
importance of explanatory variables. In each iteration of the algorithm, a random forest
model is fit to the data and variables which are deemed by a two-sided equality test to
have lower permutation importance score than the control are removed (importance
rejected). We used a significance level of 0.01 in the equality test. After 10,000
repetitions, the variables that remain have either been judged significantly more
important than the control (importance confirmed) or have yet to produce a statistically
significant decision (importance tentative).
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Statistical analysis in R
We conducted this analysis in the R language within the RStudio environment (R Core
Team, 2020). We used the ggplot2 and dplyr packages for graphics and data
manipulation, respectively (Wickham, 2016; Wickham, François, et al., 2019). glmnet
was used for LASSO regression, and random forests were fit with the randomForest
package (Friedman et al., 2010; Liaw & Wiener, 2002). The Boruta package was used to
assess random forest variable importance (Kursa & Rudnicki, 2010).

Results & discussion
Predicting customer electricity use
We estimated daily electricity use (average Wh/day) for 1,378 customers using machine
learning models and a database of metered consumption and survey responses
describing customers’ historical energy sources and spending, daily habits, existing
appliances, planned purchases, and other attributes. We employed LASSO regression
and random forests to estimate customer loads. We also compare the results from these
models to an Intercept-Only model that assumes that the average consumption of new
customers will be the same as the average electricity consumption observed for current
customers. The LASSO and random forest methods make use of demographic survey
data describing each customer, which the Intercept-Only model ignores. We used leaveone-group-out cross-validation (LGOCV) to test the predictive performance of these
techniques as would occur in practice — using data on existing minigrids to make
predictions about a prospective site (Figure 3.2.1). All predictions and prediction errors
described in this paper are the out-of-sample LGOCV results.
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Figure 3.2.3. Model performance summary. a) violin plots showing the distribution of observed customer
loads across each minigrid site in logarithmic scale, ordered on the x-axis from lowest to highest overall site
load, with the color scale indicating the total number of connected customers served by each site b) boxplots
of out-of-sample prediction error for customers at each site. Leave-one-group-out cross-validation was used
for model training and predictions as shown in Figure 3.2.1.The prediction error is defined as the difference
between predicted and observed electricity consumption.

Figure 3.2.3a presents violin plots of the observed mean customer loads for each
minigrid site in the dataset. Sites ranged in size from 17 to 191 customers, and the
111

average daily loads of connected customers varied considerably across communities (60
to 430 mean Wh/customer/day). Figure 3.2.3b summarizes the out-of-sample prediction
error for individual customers across each regression method and minigrid site. The
models overpredicted the loads of most customers, but underpredicted the loads of each
site’s highest users. Because the highest users can consume an order of magnitude
more power than the lowest users (Figure 3.2.3a), these underpredictions were the most
extreme customer-level errors in our analysis.

Predicting minigrid site load
We estimated site-level loads by aggregating the predicted loads of individual customers
within each community in our dataset. Figure 3.2.4 quantifies the prediction error by
each regression method for each site, with sites ordered by average daily load for the
community. Similar to the prediction errors for individual-level predictions (Figure 3.2.3b),
community-level estimates tended to overpredict loads for communities where aggregate
loads were ultimately low and underpredict loads for communities where aggregate
loads were ultimately high. The LASSO, which used the conditional median as the
estimator of daily electricity use, was especially likely to underpredict the aggregate site
loads.
Table 3.2.2 summarizes model performance by each method at both the customer and
site level. Although the customer-level predictions have a high RMSE and MAE relative
to the central tendency of the observations (mean: 163 Wh/day; median: 76 Wh/day),
the aggregation of these predictions reduced the absolute percent error observed at the
community scale. The LASSO produced high RMSE but the lowest MAE at the customer
level. These error statistics reflect the fact that the LASSO tends to achieve low error for
most connections (small MAE), but it also produces some very large errors that are
especially influential when squared (high RMSE).
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Figure 3.2.4. Percent error for site-level load estimates. Site-level load predictions were generated by
aggregating out-of-sample customer-level predictions made by models during leave-one-group-out crossvalidation. Each group of horizontal bars corresponds to one minigrid site and is sorted by the mean
observed minigrid load (kWh/day). The number of connected customers (n) is also reported for each
community.

Despite access to a customer database that is exceptionally large and detailed for the
sector (n = 1,378, 137 survey fields), it was challenging to predict the electricity
consumption of a specific business or household. Compared to an Intercept-Only model
that made no use of customer survey data, LASSO and random forest models achieved
a lower median absolute percent prediction error at the customer level. However, no
model effectively predicted high-outlying users (Figure 3.2.3b). Aggregating customer
predictions into site-level load estimates improved model accuracy by leveraging the law
of large numbers to reduce overall model error across the community. The random
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forest and LASSO approaches achieved 45% and 37% median absolute error at the site
level, respectively. These errors are a significant improvement over the Intercept-Only
model, which demonstrates the value of collecting survey data prior to minigrid
implementation to improve load predictions.
Table 3.2.2. Summary of model prediction error at the customer and minigrid site level. We used leave-onegroup-out cross-validation to generate out-of-sample predictions for individual customers, which we then
aggregated to predict site-level loads. The Intercept-Only model relies only on the average consumption of
customers at training data sites to make predictions and does not use customer survey data as an input.
Data Used by Model
Customer Level

Site Level

(Y/N)
Prediction

Customer
Survey
Data

Model

InterceptOnly
LASSO
Random
Forest

Smart
Meter Data

RMSE
(Wh/day)

MAE
(Wh/day)

Median
Absolute

RMSE
(kWh/day)

MAE
(kWh/day)

Median
Absolute

(predictors)

(dependent
variable)

N

Y

285

153

111%

11.2

6.2

62%

Y

Y

284

123

66%

13.5

3.5

37%

Y

Y

273

144

84%

9.9

5.0

45%

% Error

% Error

Modelling 24-hour load profiles
While kilowatt-hour-per-day demand estimates are useful for anticipating the magnitude
of customer loads, minigrid designers must also consider how this aggregate load is
temporally distributed when choosing and sizing assets that will generate and store
energy. Therefore, an hourly expectation of electricity demand throughout the day (i.e., a
load profile) is an important design input — especially for minigrids incorporating variable
renewable generation resources. In this section, we show how our aggregate daily
demand estimates can be combined with load profiles from preexisting minigrid
customers to estimate an average load profile for a new minigrid site.
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A common way to describe the average shape of a load profile is a “unitized” daily load
profile, which depicts the percentage of total daily load that occurs at each hour of the
day. Figure 3.2.5 shows the unitized load curves for all minigrid sites in our dataset.
Unitizing all customers’ hourly loads (i.e., the blue line in Figure 3.2.5) shows that, on
average, the customers in our sample consume 45% of total daily electricity demand
between the hours of 5pm and 11pm.

Figure 3.2.5. Unitized load profiles showing, on average, the percentage of total daily load that occurs during
each hour of the day. To simulate the process of utilizing this technique in practice, we used a leave-onegroup-out approach similar to our regression cross validation. The grey lines in this plot show the observed
unitized load profiles for each individual minigrid site, and the blue line shows the profile observed when
aggregating across all 1,378 customers in our dataset.

Here, we demonstrate how our community-level demand predictions can be combined
with unitized load profiles from existing sites to estimate the average load profile of a
new minigrid site. Following the leave-one-group-out approach used for model fitting
(Figure 3.2.1), we calculated unitized load profiles from the sites in the training data (i.e.,
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the consumption patterns of all customers except those in the yet-to-be-built site). We
then used our daily demand estimate for the new site to scale this unitized load profile
into an estimate of the kWh of electricity demand expected at each hour of the day.
Figure 3.2.6 shows the results of applying this approach to estimate load profiles for
each of the sites in our dataset alongside the observed load profile for the site. The
shape of the predicted curves is often a reasonable approximation of the shape of the
observed load curve. The difference between the area under the observed load curves
and the area under the model-predicted load curves is equivalent to the site-level
demand prediction error summarized in Figure 3.2.4 and Table 3.2.2. Summary of model
prediction error at the customer and minigrid site level. We used leave-one-group-out
cross-validation to generate out-of-sample predictions for individual customers, which we
then aggregated to predict site-level loads. The Intercept-Only model relies only on the
average consumption of customers at training data sites to make predictions and does
not use customer survey data as an input.. These modeled load profiles could be used
directly with minigrid design tools such as HOMER.
An aggregate load profile summarizes the electricity use patterns present in a
population. A key assumption of our approach to load profile estimation is that these
electricity use habits and patterns persist across the minigrid communities in our sample.
As Figure 3.2.5 and Figure 3.2.6 show, the shape of the aggregate load profiles is fairly
well conserved across our sites: nearly all have minimal loads in morning hours, some
daytime load, and a dominant evening peak. However, our highest-consuming site does
show significantly more daytime load than the others, which may be indicative of more
daytime productive uses of power than observed at other sites. Importantly, this would
affect the proportion of total load that can be served directly by daytime solar production.
As data availability improves, it may be possible to quantitatively or qualitatively group
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sites according to their load profile shapes, presenting different templates which may be
chosen based on known characteristics of a new site (e.g., presence of a large daytime
anchor tenant).

Figure 3.2.6. Site load profile estimates obtained by combining our community-level demand predictions with
unitized load profiles from existing sites. The unitized load profiles were created with the same LGOCV
approach used for demand predictions: we generated a unitized load profile from training set data and
scaled this profile by our test site’s predicted daily electricity demand.

Importance of Survey Fields
Minigrid practitioners who are evaluating sites have an interest in which survey data
fields help improve load predictions, and which survey questions might be cut to reduce
costs. Table 3.2.3 presents variables selected as important by either LASSO
regularization or Boruta testing of random forest models, as described in Variable

117

Importance above. Although sets of variables deemed important by each method did not
perfectly overlap, some consensus emerges when variables are grouped by theme.
Both models emphasized the importance of an inventory of customers’ currently-owned
appliances, especially for devices capable of generating higher loads. Most possible
responses to the question regarding appliance ownership (“Which of the following
appliances are currently owned by the customer?”) were deemed important by at least
one of the two models. The magnitudes of these LASSO coefficients are roughly related
to the Wattage of the appliance: ownership of a high-Watt television is weighted much
higher than ownership of a phone charger. Both models also selected customers’ most
basic classification attributes (e.g., residence versus business, type of business), but did
not agree on the value of additional customer traits (e.g., income, occupation, building
construction material) for load prediction purposes.
Both methods mostly rejected attributes that assess customers’ plans for future
appliance purchases. This may suggest that customers’ aspirations are not predictive of
future electricity use, which is one of the challenges of bottom-up approaches to demand
prediction. Without data to calibrate assumptions about how prospective customers will
procure and utilize appliances, it is hard to anticipate how these customers’ plans will
translate into loads.
The use of batteries or liquid fuels to meet energy needs would also seem to be
predictive of customers’ future electricity demand. The Boruta method confirmed the
importance of solar home system or solar lantern use (reported by 45% of customers)
and petrol generator use (reported by <1% of customers) in random forest predictions of
electricity demand. The LASSO, however, did not retain these predictors during model
fitting.
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While these results give a first approximation of variable importance in the assessment
of customer electricity use, there are limitations to this approach. To the extent that there
are non-random factors affecting customer loads that our dataset or models do not
capture (e.g., family’s access to credit for appliance purchases) there is uncertainty
about the significance of the variable importance metrics we present. Additionally, both
variable importance methods consider each variable’s contribution to the model
accuracy, holding “all else equal”. In the case of highly correlated variables, it is difficult
to distinguish between the effect of one explanatory feature over the other. Likewise, for
categorical factors, the presence or absence of one attribute can imply the status of
another.
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Table 3.2.3. A summary of variables selected as important by LASSO regularization or Boruta testing of
random forests. LASSO coefficients were extracted from a descriptive model trained on the full dataset in
log(Wh/day) scale for the response variable. Non-zero LASSO coefficients indicate that the method’s
inherent feature selection retained the variable. Random forest variables confirmed by the Boruta method
had a permutation importance that was deemed higher than that of a control attribute by a two-sided
hypothesis test. Note that the difference between “Other” and “Other Responses” is that “Other” is a
response that respondents provided to a survey question and “Other Responses” contains responses to
categorical questions that represented less than 5% of responses and were grouped as described in
Supplementary Note 1.
Variable

Existing
Appliances

Energy Use
and Spending

Respondent
Type

Respondent
Building
Respondent
Traits

Planned
Appliance
Purchases

LASSO
Coefficient

EXIST APPLIANCES: Phone Charging
EXIST APPLIANCES: Radio
EXIST APPLIANCES: TV Low Watt
EXIST APPLIANCES: TV High Watt
EXIST APPLIANCES: CD/DVD Player System
EXIST APPLIANCES: Lightbulb
EXIST APPLIANCES: Other
EXIST APPLIANCES: Other Responses
TOTAL ENERGY EXPENDITURE
ENERGY SOURCES: Firewood
ENERGY SOURCES: Solar Home System
ENERGY SOURCES: Other Responses
FIREWOOD USE: Cooking
SOLAR HOME SYSTEM USE: Lighting
SOLAR HOME SYSTEM USE: Cell Phone
Charging
PETROL GENERATOR USE: Electricity Supply
CUSTOMER TYPE: Home
CUSTOMER TYPE: Business
BUSINESS TYPE: Bar
BUSINESS TYPE: Phone Charging
BUILDING MATERIAL: Wood
BUILDING MATERIAL: Brick
BUILDING OWNERSHIP: Renting
HOUSEHOLD INCOME: < 500,000 TSH (bottom
category)
HOUSEHOLD INCOME: >3 million TSH (top
category)
EDUCATION LEVEL: Did Not Finish Primary
School
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: Self Employed Agriculture
OCCUPATION: Subsistence Farmer
SEASONALLY FLUCTUATING INCOME: Yes
TRANSPORTATION MODE: Boat
TRANSPORTATION MODE: Bicycle
GENDER: Male
HOUSEHOLD ROLE: Father
HOUSEHOLD ROLE: Mother
MARITAL STATUS: Unmarried
PLANNED APPLIANCE: Electric Iron
PLANNED APPLIANCE: Radio
PLANNED APPLIANCE: TV Low Watt
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0.099
0
0.156
0.360
0.184
0
0.080
0.350
0
0
0
0.219
0
0

Random
Forest Boruta
Importance
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Rejected
Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed

0

Confirmed

0
-0.103
0.161
0.356
0.326
0.248
-0.083
0.067

Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected

-0.111

Rejected

0

Confirmed

-0.015

Rejected

-0.203

Rejected

-0.116
0
0.213
-0.197
0
0
-0.113
-0.044
-0.049
0
0

Rejected
Confirmed
Rejected
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed

Implications for minigrid practitioners
Predicting electricity demand
This study suggests that data-driven approaches to predicting daily electricity demand
for prospective minigrid customers can reduce error compared to the heuristic and
bottom-up approaches that predominate field practice today. At the individual customer
level, the LASSO model predicted daily consumption of individual customers with a
median absolute error of 66%. This is an improvement over, for example, the
approximately 300% error documented by Blodgett et al. (2017) and Louie and
Dauenhauer (2016) for individual demand predictions made by the bottom-up approach
for other customer populations. Customer-level predictions can help developers choose
which zones to prioritize for minigrid connection, and to roughly determine customers’
metering capacity needs ahead of system commissioning.
The site-level load predictions are a critical input to minigrid system site selection,
component sizing, and financial planning. Using only load data from previous minigrid
sites, the Intercept-Only model achieved a median absolute percent error of 62% at the
site level. LASSO and random forest models integrated survey data into their predictions
and reduced this error to 37% and 45%, respectively. In contrast, Blodgett et al. 2017
reported a site-level median absolute error of 375% when applying a survey-based
appliance inventory approach across eight Kenyan communities. We also show that
daily demand estimates can be used to create load profiles suitable for use with HOMER
or other minigrid design tools (Figure 3.2.6).
In addition to improving the accuracy of load predictions for the specific sites in our
dataset, our results quantify the degree of uncertainty that minigrid developers and
investors should expect under best practices. Uncertainty in minigrid revenues, which
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are closely tied to electricity consumption, are an important driver of investment risk in
the sector (Williams et al., 2019). Our cross-validation results suggest that data-driven
methods may approach +/- 30% accuracy in predicting demand, with a wide range of
possible error depending on data availability and inter-site comparability (the LASSO
error ranged -80% to +20% across our sites). As actors weigh risk during investment and
system design, they should expect significant uncertainty in customer demand even if
utilizing their best-available data and methods.
Our variable importance results suggest that surveys should focus on collecting basic
information to categorize the connection as a home or business (including the type of
business) and tailor detailed questions to assess the type and number of owned
appliances, as well as the energy sources currently used by the prospective customer.
General demographic information about the customer (e.g., gender, age, number of
children, et cetera) may be of other relevance to developers but are not likely to be
predictive of electricity consumption. The LASSO and Boruta importance methods both
rejected the importance of approximately 80% of explanatory variables. These results
suggest significant room to streamline demand assessment surveys.

The financial value of reducing system over-sizing
Louie and Dauenhauer (2016) estimated that each Wh of over-prediction of expected
daily load translated to a $2.00 – 6.00 USD increase in purchase costs for photovoltaic
panels and battery arrays in seven Malawian minigrids. Consider a portfolio of five
comparable minigrid sites, each with 100 connections that receive an average site load
of 10 kWh/day but were designed for 20 kWh/day (100% error) — a large error but lower
than Blodgett et al.’s (2017) 375% site-level error for the bottom-up method. According
to the low end of Louie and Dauenhauer’s estimated cost penalty for oversizing the
system, the expected capital cost increase for solar and battery assets alone is
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$100,000 across the portfolio. If this error rate can be reduced to an average of 50% —
performance surpassed by LASSO and random forest approaches in this paper — the
capital cost savings would be $50,000 across the five minigrids. A reduction of the error
to an average of 75% — performance surpassed by the Intercept-Only model in this
study — would save roughly $25,000. This hypothetical example puts the capital cost
savings of survey data at roughly $5,000 per site for small Malawian minigrids. Given
estimated customer survey costs of $200–1,000 per site (Louie & Dauenhauer, 2016),
the savings potential for improved site predictions is considerably higher than the survey
expense.

Expanding model generalizability and system flexibility
Several factors limit the generalizability of this paper’s results to other geographies and
contexts. For example, our load predictions relied on data derived from minigrid
customer surveys in rural Tanzania. Each survey reflects a person’s responses to
questions as filtered through her/his cultural and personal frame (Williams et al., 2019).
Asking the same survey questions in a different context may deliver different information
about the respondents.
Due to limitations in the number of sites included in our sample, we were not able to
incorporate site-level characteristics into our predictions. For example, we observed
significant heterogeneity in the number of customers and mean customer loads across
our sites (Figure 3.2.3b). These may be associated with characteristics such as distance
from a major city or population density that might improve our predictions or make them
more sensitive to geographical traits. However, we cannot generalize the effects of intersite variation from our sample size of 14 minigrids, so our demand predictions utilized
only customer-level data.
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Our one-year dataset also fails to distinguish between sites’ progression along the load
growth curve. A recent longitudinal study of newly-electrified Kenyan customers found
that loads tended to grow for roughly two years before steadying (Fobi et al., 2018). The
same study found that rural customers tended to flatten their load growth sooner after
connection than urban customers. More longitudinal data could enable prediction of
customers’ daily demand at several future points in time (e.g., one, two, or five years
after connection). In addition, a community’s progression along the load growth curve
could be an important inter-site feature for demand prediction models to consider, as
customers living in communities with higher average loads may be at a fundamentally
different stage in their progression of energy use than those at low-load sites. For
instance, in communities with a higher prevalence of household generators, customers
may look to a minigrid as an opportunity to lower the cost of powering existing AC
appliances. In this case the appliance inventory may be even more predictive of longterm energy use compared to communities where most members do not have
preexisting self-generation capacity.
While our results represent a step forward in accuracy from current practice, they also
demonstrate the challenge of predicting electricity demand for first-time customers. One
prerequisite for progress in forecasting demand for these customers is improved data:
more customers, longer time horizons, and diverse geographies. These will be key to
lowering model error, understanding load growth over time, and making predictions for
new places. Creating and accessing these datasets will require the standardization of
data collection in the sector and platforms for sharing information while respecting the
privacy of developers and customers.
Further, right-sizing minigrid assets to initial demand is only the first step in building
minigrids that serve growing customer loads at minimal cost throughout the project life.
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Today, most minigrids are “static” designs in which generation and storage capacity are
estimated prior to construction and are constant for the entire system lifespan. Modular
minigrid designs allow system capacity to grow alongside customer demand, thereby
limiting the risk of stranding system capacity due to over-sizing (Ehnberg et al., 2020).
However, the sector has yet to adopt modular minigrids in practice, and additional
research should study the techno-economic feasibility of these approaches. This paper
provides an empirical basis for understanding the prediction accuracy that can be
achieved using best-available data and methods, which will be a key input when
modeling the value of flexible minigrid designs.

Conclusion
Minigrids could be the lowest-cost solutions for providing electricity to millions of people
in rural sub-Saharan Africa, but the fledgling industry must significantly reduce costs if it
is to scale and play its part in universal electrification by 2030. Both the technical and
financial feasibility of minigrids rely on accurate predictions of customer electricity
demand. To improve estimates, we used machine learning techniques and a database
of survey and smart meter data from 1,378 Tanzanian minigrid customers. We found
that combining brief customer surveys with smart meter data and machine learning
models can reduce error in load predictions by an order of magnitude relative to
common field practices. The LASSO — our best-performing model — predicted daily
customer electricity demand with a median absolute error of 66% and 37% for individual
customers and minigrid sites, respectively.
However, despite access to a customer database that is exceptionally large and detailed
for the sector, it is still challenging to accurately predict the electricity consumption of a
specific business, household, or community. Even if utilizing best practices for predicting
electricity consumption, minigrid practitioners should anticipate a range of prediction
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errors (-80% to +20% across our sites for the LASSO) when designing their systems.
Flexible or “modular” system designs allow engineers to add or remove system capacity
to compensate for load growth or uncertainty in initial customer demand. Further studies
should examine the financial value of modular design given the level of demand
uncertainty observed in this paper.
The quality of the input dataset can be ensured by using smart meters to track
consumption and load growth for existing customers, and by targeting pre-build site
surveys to inventory preexisting appliances. Though our analysis focuses on initial daily
load, customer and community load growth are also important parameters that may be
even more affected by inter-site differences in development status. As more data
become available across the industry, demand prediction methodologies should adjust
to incorporate them, and explicitly account for community-specific characteristics.
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3.3 Agricultural Productive Use Stimulation in Nigeria: Value Chain
Analysis & Minigrid Feasibility Study
This chapter summarizes the author’s contributions to a public report published by the
United States Agency for International Development’s Nigeria Power Sector Program:
Santana, S., Allee, A., Meng, Z., Omonuwa, W., Sherwood, J., Balaji, M. K., & RosiSchumacher, K. (2020). Agricultural Productive Use Stimulation in Nigeria: Value
Chain & Minigrid Feasibility Study (Power Africa Nigeria Power Sector Program No.
720-674-18-F-00003; p. 203). Rocky Mountain Institute.
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00WQX4.pdf
Author contributions:
This study was funded by the United States Agency for International Development’s
Nigeria Power Sector Program and conducted by Rocky Mountain Institute. Andrew
Allee analyzed the value chains and authored Appendix A: In-Depth Value Chain
Assessments (pages 43–135 in the full report). To conduct this analysis, Allee designed
and digitized field interviews for Nigerian farmers, traders, and processors; analyzed
survey data; and conducted value chain assessments for twelve agricultural value
chains using field survey data, expert interviews, and literature review. Creation of the
full report was a team effort. Scarlett Santana developed commercial business models
and managed the project with James Sherwood. Zihe Meng conducted technoeconomic
modelling, and Wayne Omonuwa coordinated stakeholder outreach and conducted
appliance research. Sherwood, Santana, Allee, Meng and Omonuwa co-authored the
main text of the report with editorial support from Balaji MK and Kira Rosi-Schumacher
of Deloitte Consulting LLP. Sahel Consulting facilitated surveys of Nigerian value chain
actors.
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Abstract:
For the millions of people living without access to electricity or poor grid supply, the holy
grail of electrification is seamless integration of reliable power and income-generating
activities that propel communities forward. Solar hybrid minigrids can provide costcompetitive and reliable service with enough power to run productivity-enhancing
machinery. These “productive use” activities can ensure steady sales for the minigrid
company, allowing them to pay off their investment and then reinvest in bringing power
to more customers. Here, we study opportunities to integrate rural electrification with
processing in twelve crop value chains across Nigeria’s Kaduna and Cross River states.
Using more than 250 field interviews with farmers, processors, and traders in over 40
rural communities as well as extensive literature review and discussions with sector
experts, we identify: 1) the most promising processing steps to electrify, 2) how these
opportunities can be sustained through commercial business models, and 3) the
strategies stakeholders can use to overcome barriers to deployment. We find that
cassava grating, grain flour milling, and rice milling are primed for immediate
electrification and deployment in Nigerian minigrids. Each of these can be electrified at
scale in existing minigrids today, with little to no market development support. Further,
there is a clear business case for the electric equipment used for these activities,
allowing processors to recoup their investment within two years.
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Introduction
Millions of people who lack electricity access today can be served at low cost and high
reliability by solar-hybrid minigrids. The nascent Nigerian minigrid industry is growing,
connecting thousands of rural customers each year en route to an estimated $8 billon
annual revenue opportunity (Yakubu et al., 2018b). “Productive uses” of energy convert
energy access into goods and services that create financial or social value. These uses
are the links between energy access and economic development (Cabraal et al., 2005),
and the literature agrees that without a mechanism to translate newfound electricity
access into increased economic productivity or above-basic energy services, simply
providing a connection often fails to catalyze large gains in human development or
energy consumption (Bernard, 2012; ESMAP, 2008; K. Lee et al., 2020a, 2020b).
Providing larger loads to an electric utility also helps lower per-unit electricity costs and
increase affordability for all customers by spreading fixed costs over more sales volume
(McCall & Santana, 2018). Daytime electricity consumption is especially important to
solar-hybrid minigrid operators because higher utilization of daytime solar has zero
marginal cost, while batteries depreciate with each discharge and operating costs for
backup generators vary with volatile fuel prices (SEforALL, 2020b). Without daytime
productive use of electricity, most minigrids today have peak energy consumption during
evening hours (Blodgett et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017).
Despite decades of case studies on the productive use of electricity, minigrids built today
are still struggling to facilitate productive uses of energy in their communities (AMDA,
2020). The research literature on this topic has tended to either be very context specific
(e.g., E4I, 2020; Factor[e], 2020; FAO & GIZ, 2019; Lukuyu et al., 2020; Ngowi et al.,
2019) or very high-level (Cabraal et al., 2005; ESMAP, 2008; FAO, 2015). For instance,
a 2019 Energy 4 Impact study of the potential of productive uses of minigrid electricity in
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15 African counties provides an overview of possible productive use cases, but not
enough detail to determine which use cases should be prioritized in a given community,
and how they should be supported (E4I, 2019).
The report summarized in this thesis chapter investigates opportunities to use minigrid
electricity productively in Nigerian agricultural value chains. Using more than 250 field
interviews with farmers, processors, and traders in over 40 rural communities as well as
extensive literature review and discussions with sector experts, we identify: 1) the most
promising processing steps to electrify, 2) how these opportunities can be sustained
through commercial business models, and 3) the strategies stakeholders can use to
overcome barriers to deployment.

Study scope and methods
The study focuses on twelve prominent agricultural value chains in Nigeria’s Cross River
and Kaduna states. Table 3.3.1 shows the crops included along with the states in which
field surveys observed them. These crops were selected based on their prevalence in
rural Nigerian communities appropriate for minigrids, and the potential for steps in their
value chains to be electrified.
Table 3.3.1 Value chains included in this study and observed coverage between two target states

Value Chain
Aquaculture
Cashew
Cassava
Cocoa
Cotton
Cowpea
Maize
Milk
Rice
Shea Nut
Sorghum
Soybean

Kaduna

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
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Cross River
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

Cross River and Kaduna states were selected as focus geographies because they are
representative of Nigeria’s diverse agroecology. Figure 3.3.1 shows the location of
communities surveyed in these states, which cover Nigeria’s two most prevalent
agroecological zones: tropical semi-arid and tropical sub-humid environments
(HarvestChoice, 2015).iii The tropical semi-arid zone in Kaduna is naturally suited to
water-efficient, heat-tolerant crops like maize, sorghum and cowpea. Cross River’s
wetter climate enables less drought-tolerant plants such as cocoa to thrive. Rice can be
grown in both zones, especially when irrigation is available via fadama aquifers, natural
sources, or pumped groundwater (Frenken, 2005).

Figure 3.3.1. Map of Nigeria’s Tropical Agroecological Zones with communities surveyed in Kaduna and
Cross River (HarvestChoice, 2015)

iii

Each of these environments experience distinct wet and dry seasons, with most rain falling
roughly June through September. In Nigeria, annual rainfall decreases from south to north, from
over 2,000 mm/year on the tropical coast to 500 mm/year in the northeast (Frenken, 2005).
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Data collection approach
To provide actionable recommendations, this study performed a comprehensive data
collection exercise, both reviewing existing literature and collecting new data. Field
surveys were conducted in 41 communities in Kaduna and Cross River states from
November 2019 through January 2020. 264 field interviews were conducted by four local
agricultural enumerators utilizing the Survey Solutions tablet-based interviewing tool.iv
Table 3.3.2. Field survey interview tallies and sample questions

Respondent
n

Sample Questions

Type
Community
Champion
Agricultural
Processor
Farmer

Agricultural
Trader
Total

42

•

Which crops are produced by more than five farmers in this
community?
• In a typical day, which power sources do you use?
• Which processing activities are conducted in this community?
Which are mechanized?
50 For a given processing activity:
• What is the energy source and engine size, if applicable?
• What are the operating costs for this equipment?
• What is the gender of the operator?
115 For a given crop:
• What are seasonal yields?
• In what form, at what price, and to whom is the crop sold?
• What is the demand for mechanical threshing and drying?
57 For a given commodity:
• What is the quantity, price and point of sale?
• What are major points of post-harvest loss?

264

Second, an exhaustive review of available literature was performed, including 190
primary literature sources cited in the full report bibliography. Third, expert interviews
were conducted with staff at over 50 organizations across the energy and agriculture

iv

Survey Solutions is a free computer-assisted personal interviewing tool developed by the World
Bank. This platform was used to conduct, monitor, and analyze offline digital interviews with local
value chain actors.
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sectors, including private sector companies, non-governmental organizations,
development partners, financial institutions, and government agencies. The survey
questionnaire targeted four types of value chain actors: community champions, farmers,
agricultural processors, and agricultural traders.v Table 3.3.2 shows a count of the
interviews conducted and along with example questions for each respondent class.
These interviews were just under an hour in length per respondent, on average.

Productive use activity prioritization methodology
Across the 12 value chains included in this analysis, there are hundreds of possible
combinations of crops and value chain activities to consider for electrification. The task
of this study was to identify which of these activities are most promising for electrification
and should be prioritized in productive use stimulation programs in the near-term. We
used four criteria help rate productive use activities on a sliding scale from “deployment
ready” to “significant support required”. They include:
Local Capacity. Activities where local processors already possess the requisite
knowledge and skill will be easier to electrify. If electrification of a value chain step
requires significant deviation from typical processor practices then additional capacity
building may be required to help processors adapt. Deployment-ready activities integrate
into local processing operations without any significant re-training, and without risking
low customer adoption of new “best practices” from outside groups.
Offtake Market. Deployment-ready productive use activities have strong local markets
to sell the output of the value-add step. Because minigrid communities may be isolated
from peri-urban or urban markets, complex supply chain mechanisms are often required

v

Community champions are leaders or representatives of a community who know the community
well and can provide high-level information about their residents and economy
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to deliver products to buyers outside of nearby rural areas. Potential returns from some
value-add products may justify efforts to support market access but doing so requires
extra investment and success is not guaranteed. Immediate opportunities for productive
use are those that can sell their products to local community members or through preexisting trade networks.
Electric Equipment. Productive use opportunities for which there is a minigridcompatible appliance available on the Nigerian market today will be significantly easier
to quickly deploy than opportunities requiring equipment import or design. Using
preexisting equipment ensures that the equipment required to perform the processing is
feasible to electrify and avoids complicating implementation programs by potentially
costly development efforts. However, equipment piloting programs should be used to
confirm appliance functionality with minigrid infrastructure and ensure rural customer
satisfaction with its performance.
Scalability. An initial minigrid productive use program will seek to benefit many
communities over a broad geographical range. Productive use activities in value chains
that are widespread and high-volume can be scaled more efficiently than niche or
specialty products. Deployment-ready activities are likely to be replicable across
thousands of Nigerian minigrid sites. In contrast, activities that depend upon rare
preconditions for success—such as the offtake agreements with commercial dairy
processors required to warrant milk chilling operations, or preexisting clusters of shea
parklands to fulfill semi-mechanized shea butter production—will require significant
support to scale.
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Ranking activities by tiers
Applying the four prioritization criteria defined above allows prospective productive use
activities to be sorted into three tiers based on their readiness for electrification and
implementation (Figure 3.3.2).
Tier 1: Immediate. These activities are viable for immediate electrification in a minigrid
context with minimal programmatic support beyond appliance financing and
procurement. These activities begin with crops that are produced in high volumes and
which are already commonly mechanically processed before sale into robust local
markets. These are also the activities with the most robust appliance market, where
minigrid-compatible equipment is already available for purchase and pilot testing.
Integrating these activities would improve minigrid capacity utilization, and after fieldtesting equipment it is recommended to incorporate them alongside all new minigrid
projects in communities that cultivate these staple crops.
Tier 2: Medium-Term. These activities are not far from being viable for electrification
today but will require more program support than the immediate activities. Beyond just
appliance financing, these supports may include enabling offtake, developing suitable
appliances, or building local capacity. Tier 2 activities are not ready for immediate
deployment in rural minigrids but have significant potential given community acceptance
of new practices, minigrid-compatible electrical equipment, and robust market linkages
for processed products. Although these hurdles are surmountable with proper support,
the average minigrid developer would not be likely to address them alone. These
activities are recommended for consideration by larger electrification programs that can
include this support, or for local entrepreneurs and off takers with special sector
expertise.
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Tier 3: Long-Term. These activities may have long-term potential for electrification, but
significant support would be required to make minigrid deployment economic and
sustainable. This category includes the hundreds of latent agricultural processing
activities that could conceivably utilize electricity but would require considerable effort to
build adequate local capacity, market linkages, and supply of minigrid-compatible
equipment from the ground up. These are activities which are either rarely conducted in
rural communities or are primarily conducted manually. Though incorporation of these
activities into a minigrid deployment program is not recommended today, many may be
prime targets for study by agricultural development institutions or corporate actors
interested in developing their local supply chains

Figure 3.3.2. Illustration of tiers utilized to classify productive use activities by their readiness for
electrification with minigrids
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Summary of value chain analyses: cassava, maize, and rice
This thesis chapter excerpts detailed value chain analyses for the three value chains
analyzed by the study with highest gross national production value: cassava, maize, and
rice. Appendix A in the full study (pages 43–135) includes these analyses for all 12 of
the value chains listed in Table 3.3.1.

Cassava value chain analysis
•

Cassava is a critical staple food grown at high volumes throughout Nigeria.

•

Nearly all cassava is mechanically processed before consumption. Cassava
tubers are highly perishable in their raw form and must be processed within 24–
72 hours of harvest. In minigrid-suitable communities, there is substantial local
capacity to meet this processing demand.

•

Cassava grating is a leading candidate for electrification. Nearly all cassava
products require peeled roots to be grated into a soft mash amenable to further
processing, and nearly all grating is mechanical in Nigeria. The diesel lister
engine is the costliest part of the mechanical grinder, and there
is potential opportunity to displace fossil fuels while saving on fuel cost.

Crop background and market characteristics
A 2010 assessment by UNIDO rates cassava as the agricultural value chain with
greatest development potential in Nigeria (UNIDO, 2010). The tuber is a staple food crop
in the country, which leads the world in production at 55 million metric tons per year,
grown by 30 million farmers (FAO, 2019b). A cheap source of carbohydrates, cassava is
Nigeria’s top staple crop but is a poor source of other nutrients.
The plant performs well in sub-optimal soil and rainfall conditions and is a perennial with
a very wide harvesting window. Cassava is produced across virtually all of Nigeria's
137

agro-ecological zones, but the top ten producing states in the south and central belt
(Cross River, Kaduna, Kogi, Benue, Enugu, Imo, Ogun, Ondo, Taraba, Anambra, Oyo)
account for 63% of production (GIZ, 2014). In our survey, 93% of communities in Cross
River cultivated cassava, but communities visited in northern Kaduna did not.
Smallholder cassava yields are low relative to the global average — just 2.5 t/ha on a
dry mass basis compared to nearly 7 t/ha achieved in southeast Asia using best
practices (FAO, 2019b). Per-area production has not shown much improvement in the
past 50 years (De Souza et al., 2017), but Nigeria’s total cassava production has risen
steadily as production has spread to occupy increasing amounts of land (Figure 3.3.3).
Cassava has a highly flexible cultivation cycle: left unharvested, healthy plants will keep
growing tubers for years (McNulty & Oparinde, 2015).
Cassava farming is a nearly $10 billion dollar industry in Nigeria, which produces an
estimated 60 million metric tons of the tuber each year (FAO, 2019b). The Nigerian
cassava value chain is extremely complex and the crop can be processed into hundreds
of different final products (Hillocks et al., 2002). However, 85–90% of cassava goes to a
few processed foods: gari (a toasted granular meal), fufu/akpu/lafun (fermented pastes)
and cassava starch. These dishes are central to the Nigeria diet: one report claims that
four out of five rural Nigerians eat a cassava-based meal at least once per week
(Ezedinma et al., 2007).
The remaining 10–15% of Nigerian cassava is processed industrially, most often
chipped and integrated into animal feed. The International Institute of Tropical
Agriculture has also developed a process for converting cassava peels into a highquality livestock feed (IITA, 2018), but most cassava peelers we interviewed had not
monetized their peelings.
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There are nascent industrial markets for high-quality cassava flour and cassava fuel
ethanol, but prospective communities for off-grid minigrids are not commonly connected
to these supply chains. It is possible that local minigrid communities might supply
cassava chips to these industrial offtakers in the future, but today such opportunities are
rare. See Box 1 for further discussion.

Figure 3.3.3. Gross national production (left) and farm-gate value (right) of Nigerian cassava (FAO, 2019b)

Post-harvest losses
Cassava tubers are living organs. Once removed from the plant, the tubers continue to
metabolize and deteriorate quickly (Hillocks et al., 2002). This perishability limits shelf
life to less than three days, meaning that raw tubers must be quickly consumed or
processed into shelf-stable staples such as gari, which can be stored for 6 months or
more depending on storage conditions (UNIDO, 2010). The losses during this phase of
the value chain can be quite high, especially if bottlenecks in transport or local
processing capacity occur, leaving raw tubers to spoil in post-harvest storage.
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After cassava has been transformed into gari or starch, only 6–7% of the final product is
lost during storage (Oguntade, 2013). Because cassava food products have been
developed as methods to prolong shelf-life, these post-harvest losses are low relative to
other crops, such as maize, which can lose over 25% of the product during the
marketing stage. In general, the higher the processing capacity of local communities, the
lower the risk that cassava will spoil during its limited (~24 hour) window from harvest to
processing. This natural requirement for local processing makes the crop a strong
candidate for value chain electrification via minigrids.

Figure 3.3.4. Margaret Matiki peeling cassava in the shade in Egoja-Ndim community, Cross River state.

Value chain description
We focus our cassava value chain analysis on gari production, which is an important
food across all of Nigeria’s geographical regions (Phillips et al., 2004). Of the 40 cassava
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actors we interviewed in Kaduna and Cross River states, 80% were engaged primarily in
farming and processing cassava to produce gari, or in trading gari itself. Figure 3.3.5
describes each step in gari production.

Figure 3.3.5. Value chain summary from fresh cassava to gari
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Local cassava trade
Figure 3.3.6 summarizes the gari market flows as reported by local traders. Of the
communities we surveyed, gari was the only prominent marketed product. Traders buy
gari mainly from local processors, some of whom are farmers themselves. The gari is
then distributed roughly evenly between other traders who take the gari outside of the
community, and local households who consume it.

Figure 3.3.6. Summary of local trade flows reported in field surveys. Flow size is proportional to the
likelihood of the trade: about half of the time gari is sold to households as the final buyer.

These trade flows demonstrate a strong demand for locally produced gari, which
ensures an offtake market for local processors. If gari processing increases beyond the
community demand, we also observe market linkages to other traders beyond the
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community, giving confidence that increased gari production will not be stranded in
minigrid communities even if the local market is saturated. These trade dynamics are a
best-case scenario for local value-added products.
Opportunities for electrification in cassava processing
Analyzing key considerations for cassava production activities finds both Tier 1 (cassava
grating) and Tier 3 (mechanical cassava peeling and cassava chipping) opportunities.
These analyses are below.

TIER 1
Cassava Grating
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
cassava-producing communities surveyed had at least
● All
one mechanized gari processor within the town.
Offtake Market
and related products are staples with strong local
● Gari
markets.
Electric
Electric cassava graters are available in Nigeria, and old
●
Equipment
graters can be retrofit with new electric motors. After a quality
control pilot, these pieces of equipment are ready to deploy
at scale.
Scalability
cassava market is widespread throughout the South and
● The
Middle Belt of Nigeria and most cassava products require a
grating step.
Nearly all cassava products require peeled roots to be grated into a soft mash amenable
to further processing, and nearly all grating is mechanical in Nigeria. Mechanical
cassava grating was present in most cassava-producing communities included in the
field survey, all powered by petrol or diesel motors. Mechanical cassava graters use a
motor and pulley system to spin a grating drum. The peeled tubers are loaded into a
hopper and a stick or other prod is sometimes used to maintain contact between the
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material and grating surface. Cassava grating can be readily electrified through new
electrical graters or electric motor retrofits.vi
The diesel lister engine is the costliest part of the mechanical grinder, and there
is potential opportunity to displace fossil fuels while saving on fuel cost. A separate
survey of cassava machinery in Oyo state found that at the grid edge, both diesel and
electric graters were available, and electric graters were more likely to be operated by
women than diesel graters (Davies et al., 2008). Appendix C.2 in the full report presents
technoeconomic analysis for a gari business using an electric cassava grater.
Interview respondents speculated that less cassava would spoil post-harvest if new
graters were to raise local cassava grating capacity.

Figure 3.3.7. Isaac Ibuogbeche with his diesel cassava grater in Woda community, Cross River state.
Customers bring peeled tubers that are processed into gari. He would like to upgrade his old machine, which
costs 2000 N/month ($5.50/month) to service, but he cannot access credit to make the purchase.

vi

Bennie Agro Limited (NG) sells an electric cassava grater with 3300 kg/hr capacity, powered by
a 7.5kW three-phase motor for N700,000 (~$1,930).
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TIER 3
Mechanical Cassava Peeling
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
a quarter of respondents had ever seen a mechanical
◑ Only
cassava peeler.
Offtake Market
is a critical step for all cassava products marketed in
◕ Peeling
Nigeria.
Electric
Today’s small-scale peeling machinesvii have not been
◔
Equipment
widely adopted because they are neither proficient at the
task nor cost effective.
Scalability
to processors or communities who process enough
◑ Limited
cassava to maintain high utilization of mechanical peeling.
Mechanical cassava peeling could improve efficiency of workers but is not preferred by
cassava processors. Manual cassava peeling is extremely labor intensive, accounting
for an estimated 35% of labor hours in cassava processing operations (Westby, 2002).
However, only one in four cassava value chain actors surveyed had seen mechanical
peeling in action, and the process has proven difficult to mechanize. Peeling machines
struggle to peel irregularly shaped tubers completely, requiring a manual peeler to follow
the machine in many cases. Additionally, small tubers can be completely lost in the
process as they are scraped down to nothing before larger tubers are finished. For these
reasons, even some equipment manufacturers don’t endorse their peelers for most
customers (CassavaTech, 2020). If an appropriately sized electric cassava peeler were
able to ensure quality, and available in Nigeria, mechanical peeling may become a more
attractive candidate for productive use. However, this would require significant
innovation to improve the efficacy and reduce the cost of the machine itself.

vii

Goodway (CN) sells an electric cassava peeler with 3300 kg/hr capacity, powered by a 3 kW
three-phase motor.
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Box 1. Domestic industrial cassava processing could provide large offtake
markets, but potential for local electrification is low.
There is a strong case to be made for Nigerian production of cassava starch, highquality cassava flour, cassava fuel ethanol, and other highly-processed products
(Phillips et al., 2004). However, industrial processing capacity is currently low and
concentrated in large facilities that source from their own plantations or buy raw tubers
from outgrower schemes.
To ensure quality of their final products, industrial processors only purchase fresh, raw
tubers from aggregators who can sell in bulk. They do not source cassava in any
intermediate form, which limits the role of electrification in minigrid contexts. Additionally,
the time sensitivity of raw cassava post-harvest as well as the expense of transporting
undried tubers makes it difficult for large processors to source from remote communities
(O Coulibaly et al., 2014).
Attempts to localize industrial processing have not been successful. For example, in the
early 2000s, the IITA/USAID/Thresh Cassava Enterprise Development Project aimed to
establish local cassava flour producers in the Niger Delta region, 90% of these
operations had failed by 2011 as the local producers struggled to keep cost low enough
to compete with imports and industrial-scale producers (Daniels et al., 2011).
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Cassava Chipping
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
not a primary business in the surveyed communities, it
◕ While
is common practice to chip and dry leftover or irregular
cassava tubers that are not utilized for food production.
Offtake Market
demand for cassava chips is low, but there are
◔ Local
potentially large industrial domestic and international markets.
Electric
◕ Chipping machines are common and simple to manufacture.
Equipment
Scalability
today’s market environment, commercialization of cassava
◔ In
chipping requires a rare combination of factors: a critical mass
of cassava production, an aggregator with a transport network
to local farms and quality control capacity, and a final offtaker.

Cassava that is not utilized for local food products may be chipped, dried, and utilized as
a carbohydrate source for fuel ethanol or animal feed production (Taiwo, 2006). Electric
cassava chipping machines are simple to manufacture and widely available, viii and local
drying practices are usually sufficient to achieve the 15% moisture content requirement.
China imports $1 billion of dried cassava per year, accounting for 65% of global imports
(Tridge, 2020). Nigeria, however, is not a player in the cassava export market. Southeast
Asia — namely Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam — account for nearly all global exports
(Bentley, 2016).
The near-term viability of electrified cassava chipping is limited by market bottlenecks.
Local demand for cassava chips is low, but there are large potential domestic markets
and international markets. For example, if Nigerian cassava processors could aggregate
cassava chip production to a scale on the order of 1,000 tons per month, it is likely that a
foreign ethanol producer could be interested in entering an offtake agreement. ix
However, this level of production is commensurate with aggregation of roughly 200

viii

NCAM Limited (NG) sells an electric combined grater and Chipping machine with 600 kg/hr
capacity, powered by a 3.7kW three-phase motor.
ix
Interview: Ayodeji Balogun, CEO, AFEX Commodities Exchange Limited, February 2020.
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smallholders producing 3 t/ha on 2 hectares. These farmers may represent a significant
segment of the staple food supply in the remote communities in which they live, and
without a smooth transition to other market sources of food, these communities may risk
acute local food shortages and price spikes. Such coordination between large groups,
smallholders, and foreign actors is not within the purview of an initial productive use
stimulation program but given the correct stakeholders and offtaker the electrification of
cassava chipping could have potential as a new value stream for minigrids and local
entrepreneurs.
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Maize value chain analysis
•

Maize is widely grown and consumed in Nigeria. 10 million metric tons of
production per year flow roughly equally to human consumption and animal feed.

•

Local markets for maize are strong. Nigerian households directly purchase an
estimated 2.5 million tons of maize grain each year and process it themselves or
at fee-for-service mills.

•

Maize flour milling is a Tier 1 opportunity. Most existing small-scale processers
are millers who produce corn meals and flours. Most maize milling is already
mechanized, and electric motors may replace the diesel prime movers in existing
mills.

•

Minigrid-run maize threshing may provide a revenue stream for developers.
Maize is typically mechanically threshed by businesses based outside minigrid
communities, but customers show a willingness to utilize a local fee-for-service
thresher in the community center.

Crop background and market characteristics
The Nigerian maize sector leads sub-Saharan Africa in gross production (10 million
metric tons), number of farmers (9 million households), and land area (5.7 million
hectares) (BMGF, 2015). Maize offtake markets are split roughly evenly between human
consumption and animal feed (Beillard & Nzeka, 2019). Households use maize meal for
many traditional dishes including pap, tuwo, gwate, donkunu, massam, and guraza. 20%
of Nigerian households consume these maize-derived products at least once per week,
each of which requires maize to be ground into flour meal (Cadoni & Angelucci, 2013). In
total, Nigerian households directly purchase an estimated 2.5 million tons of maize grain
each year to then process themselves or at fee-for-service mills (BMGF, 2015).
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Roughly 15% of domestic maize is processed into consumer food products such as
cereal or beer. The processed animal feed market consumes 50–60% of domestic maize
production, with poultry and aquaculture feed driving demand increases over time
(BMGF, 2015). As local incomes increase, so does demand for chicken, fish, and eggs,
and thus the maize feed markets have shown strong correlation with Nigerian economic
growth (UNIDO, 2010). From 2003 to 2015, the volume of feed used in Nigeria
increased 600%, largely driven by investment in poultry feed (Liverpool-Tasie et al.,
2016). Maize is by far the greatest contributor to animal feed in Nigeria, with sorghum,
cassava and wheat as distant runners-up (Beillard & Nzeka, 2019).
Maize was the most widespread crop across the two states studied, cultivated in 70%
and 100% of communities in Cross River and Kaduna states, respectively. Maize can
thrive under the high solar radiation and seasonal rainfall that characterize Nigeria’s
middle belt (BMGF, 2014). However, Nigerian farmers lag other African producers in
yield: averaging just 2 t/ha versus 3.8 t/ha average in South Africa and potential yields of
nearly 5 t/ha (FAO, 2019b; Foli, 2012). These lower yields have been largely attributed
to inadequate soil nutrient management and water supply shortages in drought years,
though experts warn that over-application of fertilizers in response to these challenges
could endanger soil and water resources in the long term (Lopez et al., 2019; Morris et
al., 2007). Though all maize farmers surveyed stated interest in expanding their maize
production to increase dry grain sales, other studies find that market conditions do not
incentivize farmers to intensify production through investing in their farms, as low grain
prices and high transport costs limit profit margins (Liverpool-Tasie, Omonona, et al.,
2017). As with several other crops in this analysis, climate change poses an ongoing risk
to maize farmers as erratic rainfall, floods and drought degrade soil fertility and crop
output (T. Abdoulaye et al., 2019). For now, Nigeria leads Africa in total production by
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keeping very large amounts of land under maize — 626,000 hectares are dedicated to
maize in Kaduna state alone (BMGF, 2015).
Nigerian maize production has grown steadily in volume and value since the 1980s
despite interannual disruptions due to regional conflicts, pestilence, and drought (Figure
3.3.8). Almost all production is consumed domestically, with less than 1% formally
exported (Cadoni & Angelucci, 2013). Imports play a limited role as domestic maize
dominates local food retail volume in small towns and big cities alike (Liverpool-Tasie,
Reardon, et al., 2017). Trade flows generally move dried maize grain from production
zones in the central belt and northern states and towards feed processing centers in
Ibadan, Lagos, Warri and Enugu in the south (FEWS & USGS, 2008). Some informal
trade occurs across the border and into neighboring countries.

Figure 3.3.8. Gross national production (left) and farm-gate value (right) of Nigerian maize harvested for dry
grain (FAO, 2019b)
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Post-harvest losses
Most smallholder maize is dried on the stalk, harvested, sun-dried once more, threshed,
and then sold as dry grain. Once properly dried, maize is relatively shelf-stable and can
be stored for about three months with limited risk of spoilage (Oguntade, 2013).
However, improperly handled maize often spoils. Offtakers report losses of 3–10% of
maize grain at the local aggregator level due to improper storage and drying. x Likewise,
50% of maize marketers and 80% of maize feed millers report losses due to spoilage
(Oguntade, 2013).
Aflatoxins are a primary source of contamination for stored maize grains. The toxins are
byproducts from Aspergillus fungi that grow in grain with >14% moisture content that is
stored in warm environments. Peanuts and other grains, like sorghum, can also be
affected by aflatoxins (Apeh et al., 2016). The Standards Organization of Nigeria
imposes limits on aflatoxins in packaged foods, although the strength of enforcement by
the Nigerian Agency for Food and Drug Administration is perceived to be low (Ademola
et al., 2017). Compared to industrially processed maize, locally produced food products
are much more likely to be incompletely dried, improperly stored, and contaminated by
aflatoxins. This is one important barrier to integration of local maize grains or maize
products into industrial food markets.
Common ground-drying techniques exacerbate risk of aflatoxin accumulation, as does
storage of grain at more than 14% moisture content or in humid environments that
stimulate mold growth (Tefera, 2012). The solution to these losses is to store properly
dried grain in improved bags or metal silos (Kimenju & De Groote, 2010). Access to
improved storage is solvable with access to capital and extension services. However, as

x

Interviews with Nestle Nigeria, Diageo, January 2020.
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climate change continues to make seasonal rains less predictable, traditional sun-drying
practices will become increasingly unreliable means for producing safe, dry maize grain.
Low-cost mechanical grain drying may reduce post-harvest losses, but there are
significant barriers to adoption in a minigrid context (Appendix A.3.3 in full report).
Commercial field treatments such as Aflasafe have been developed to prevent growth of
aflatoxin-producing fungal strains on crops at a cost of 12–20 USD/hectare, but these
treatments have yet to be widely adopted in the areas we surveyed. xi
Value chain description
Nearly 100% of maize in Nigeria is harvested for dry grain. In this value chain, all maize
is left in the field until partially dry, then de-husked, dried further, threshed, and
winnowed. 50–60% of this maize is then bagged and ultimately processed into animal
feed. Of the maize production that goes to human food, nearly 100% is milled into a
meal or flour before consumption. We observed mechanical maize flour mills in most
maize-producing communities we surveyed. We present the value chain for maize flour
here because it includes most local processing steps (Figure 3.3.9).

xi

https://aflasafe.com/
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Figure 3.3.9. The maize value chain from harvested cobs to maize flour
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Local trade
In the minigrid-suitable communities surveyed, maize was primarily traded as dried grain
(Figure 3.3.10). Most local traders sourced from local farmers and sold to a mixture of
local household and small processors. About one third of traders primarily sold this grain
on to other traders beyond the community. These trade patterns are evidence of strong
local markets for maize grain, including a large portion that is milled into flour by small
processors, or by households at fee-for-service mills.

Figure 3.3.10. Local trade flows for dried maize grain. Flow size is proportional to the likelihood of the trade
from source to final buyer.

155

Opportunities for Electrification in Maize Flour Production
Analyzing key considerations for maize flour production activities finds Tier 1 (maize
flour milling), Tier 2 (threshing and winnowing), and Tier 3 (mechanical grain drying)
opportunities. These analyses are included below.

TIER 1
Maize Flour Milling
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
maize-producing communities surveyed had at least
● Most
one mechanized maize miller within the town.
Offtake Market
Maize meals are staples with strong local markets.

●

Electric
Equipment

●

Scalability

●

Electric maize mills are available in Nigeria, and old mills
can be retrofit with new electric motors.xii After a quality
control pilot, these pieces of equipment are ready to deploy
at scale.
Maize has the broadest geographical coverage of the crops
studied and local mills account for about a quarter of
domestic processing.

Nearly all maize staples are made from a maize meal or flour, which is typically
produced from a fossil-powered mill. In Nigeria, the textured, coarse flour of a plate mill
is preferred to the fine powder of a hammer mill (B. Clarke & Rottger, 2006). During flour
milling, oversized petrol or diesel motors turn a mill drive shaft to perform the grinding
motion of the equipment. Processor interviews confirm that these mills tend to have high
operation and upkeep costs, and the combustion motors that drive them are old, noisy,
and unreliable.
A recent pilot by the Efficiency for Access Coalition introduced standalone PV-batterycoupled and plug-in electric maize mills to operators in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda
(E4I, 2020). Although the standalone devices allowed the mill to function off-grid,
xii

Bennie Agro (NG) sells an electric multipurpose miller with 2000 kg/hr capacity, powered by an
18.6kW three-phase motor
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operators and customers found the 33 kg/hour throughput to be far below the acceptable
capacity, leading to long wait times for fee-for-service customers. To increase this
throughput, manufacturers would need to increase PV and battery capacity, thus raising
the equipment price. Unlike standalone solar setups, minigrid-connected mills can draw
on plentiful three-phase power to match diesel motor throughput.
There are a range of electric models on the market today that claim 250 to 2000 kg/hour
capacities with 3 to 18 kW induction motors.
Mill economics can be further improved if the same appliance can process other
commodities such as cowpea, sorghum, rice, and soybean (B. Clarke & Rottger, 2006).

TIER 2
Maize Threshing
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
threshing is common among maize farmers,
◑ Mechanical
though mobile mechanical threshers are often brought in
from outside communities.
Offtake Market
traders, households, and processors provide a
● Local
strong market within minigrid-suitable communities.
Electric
Electric maize threshers are available in Nigeriaxiii and old
◕
Equipment
threshers can be retrofit with new electric motors.
Scalability
all maize grain is shelled from the cob before sale
● Nearly
or processing, and all maize farmers report interest in a
mechanical threshing option for the right price.

Manual maize threshing (also called “shelling”) is a very slow process, at most
processing 25 kg of maize grain per person per hour (Mejía, 2003). As a result, nearly
90% of maize farmers pay to speed things up either by hiring manual labor or a
mechanical thresher. Of the crops targeted by this study, maize was most likely to be

xiii

Unic and sons (NG) sells a mechanical thresher with 400kg/hr capacity, powered by a 1.8kW
single-phase motor while Bennie Agro (NG) sells a mechanical thresher with 2000kg/hr capacity,
powered by 14KW three-phase motor.
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mechanically threshed, with only 30% of farmers reporting that they predominately
utilized manual threshing.
However, there were no local threshing machines reported to be located within the
minigrid-suitable communities surveyed. During harvest season, local entrepreneurs
travel between communities to offer mobile threshing services to remote farmers, as
shown in the photo below. An electrified version of this mobile business model would
require a battery-powered threshing system, which has not been developed to date.
However, plug-in electric threshers are available in Nigeria and could be centrally
located in minigrid powered communities. This centralized threshing model would
require harvested crops to be transported from the farm to a stationary machine, which
poses a transportation problem for many. Survey enumerators observed that some
farmer cooperatives are bridging the infrastructure gap between rural communities and
centralized threshing sites by collecting the produce in rural communities and
transporting it back to centralized threshing sites.
If the transportation problem could be solved, 87% of interviewed maize farmers said
they would be willing to transport their maize harvest to a central threshing area.
However, customer willingness to pay for this service, after accounting for transport
costs, is unknown. Comments from field enumerators indicate that even if mechanical
threshing is available, farmers will typically choose the cheaper of the two options
between manual and mechanical threshing. In addition, the seasonality of the maize
harvest and interannual fluctuations in production make it difficult to anticipate the
capacity utilization of this equipment over its life.
Minigrid threshing pilots can further test the business model for stationary electric maize
threshers, to ensure customers are willing to pay fees that can justify the cost of owning
and operating the equipment. Minigrids that own and operate threshers may be able to
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use excess peak solar power to keep operating costs close to zero, improving the
likelihood that customers can be served at a reasonable fee.
Nonetheless, success requires either development of a battery-powered appliance or
additional due diligence to ensure off-grid uptake of a centralized threshing model. Thus,
we classify maize threshing as a Tier 2 activity.

Figure 3.3.11. A petrol maize thresher operating in a peri-urban zone outside Abuja.
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TIER 3
Mechanical Maize Grain Drying
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
all maize grain is sun-dried. Introduction of a
◔ Nearly
mechanical option would require capacity building.
Offtake Market
may offer higher prices for improved grain quality
◑ Offtakers
with uniform moisture content, but only through aggregators
who can ensure scale and quality.
Electric
grain dryers commonly use fossil fuel as a heat
◔ Mechanical
Equipment
source. All-electric options are available in Nigeria but will
likely be cost-prohibitive to run at minigrid electricity prices.xiv
Scalability
maize grain must be dried: an appropriate drying
◕ All
technology combined with a market to value precise moisture
content control could achieve scale.
As described above, maize grain suffers from aflatoxin contamination primarily because
of prevalent sun-drying techniques that expose the grain to contaminants and fail to
reduce the moisture content below 14% before storage. Industrial offtakers acknowledge
this problem and have expressed interest in paying premiums for quality, dry grain if an
aggregator could conduct the transaction at a large scale. However, the exact price
increase that a farmer or entrepreneur would experience is dependent upon the
negotiated contract price between the aggregator and offtaker, and it is unclear whether
the operating costs of local mechanical drying can be sustained by the marginal price
increase of selling premium quality grain.
One third of maize farmers interviewed experienced difficulties in sun-drying maize at
least once per season, and it is likely that many more are failing to dry to safe moisture
levels without detecting the problem (Ademola et al., 2017). However, mechanical drying
practices remain untested in minigrid-suitable communities and it is unclear if provision
of minigrid electricity will improve the prospects of the practice. Crop dryers in developed
contexts typically use natural gas, liquefied petroleum, or biomass fuel as a heat source,

xiv

Some members of the Agricultural Machineries & Equipment Fabricator Association of Nigeria
(AMEFAN) sell electric dryers.
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as resistive electrical heating is cost prohibitive. Solar dryers or hybrid solar-fossil dryers
utilize solar radiation to heat their contents directly, thus reducing fuel costs
(Vijayavenkataraman et al., 2012). Others utilize ultrasound, infrared and/or micro
electromagnetic waves to dry crops using electricity, and at a higher degree of energy
efficiency (Kumar et al., 2014). These alternatives to conventional drying are better
suited to electrification. However, our review of appliances available in Nigeria did not
find models of these low-energy alternatives, and it is likely that further equipment and
market development would be required to prove and scale the technologies. Despite all
the appliance options, passive solar heating devices — perhaps as simple as a
corrugated metal roof and concrete slab — may provide the simplest, cheapest boost to
sun-drying.

Figure 3.3.12. Maize drying prior to shelling in Takalafiya community, Kaduna state after an October harvest.
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Rice value chain analysis
•

Domestic rice production and processing is smallholder-led, substantial
and growing. Consumer preferences, government policies, and agricultural
development efforts provide strong tailwinds for Nigerian rice.

•

Domestic rice struggles to beat imports on quality and price. Imported rice is
cheaper, higher quality and typically delivered directly to population centers.

•

Rice milling is a top opportunity for electrification. 80% of Nigerian rice is
processed by small-scale millers, most of whom operate outdated equipment.
Replacing old one-stage diesel rice mills with new two-stage electric mills can
reduce process losses and operating costs and improve quality by better
separating by-products and reducing breakage

•

Wood-fired parboilers are prevalent, smoky, and predominantly operated
by women, but difficult to electrify. Though there is much room to improve
parboiling efficiency and reduce indoor air pollution impacts, it is unlikely that
minigrid electricity could cost-effectively serve the need.

•

Irrigation is necessary for optimal yields but unlikely to be electrified by
minigrids. Today, rice fields — and the irrigation pumps that serve them — are
located far from community centers. For electric irrigation pumps to be profitable
to serve with a minigrid, the cost of building distribution to the rice fields must be
balanced by electricity sales to pumps that are not run continuously throughout
the year.

Crop background and market characteristics
Rice is the third most valuable Nigerian crop after cassava and maize, with an annual
market value around $3 billion per year (FAO, 2019b). Nigerians consume an average
32 kg of rice per capita per year, which translates to roughly 1% of 2019 per-capita gross
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domestic product (PwC, 2018). The share of rice in the Nigerian diet has increased by
12x since the 1970s, and demand for rice is expected to continue as customers
substitute rice for traditional staples that are more time-intensive to cook (GyimahBrempong et al., 2016). Smallholder farmers account for 80% of Nigerian rice production
(PwC, 2018). Rice was reported to be cultivated by five or more farmers in 75% and
46% of communities surveyed in Cross River and Kaduna states, respectively.
Despite sizeable domestic production, Nigeria is consistently among the world’s top
three rice importers. Consumers prefer cheaper imports from Thailand and India: in
some markets roughly five bags of imported rice are sold for every bag of local rice
(Beillard & Nzeka, 2019). Imports are also driven by growing customer appetites for
polished, contaminant-free, high-quality rice (Emodi, 2012).The Nigerian government
has attempted to impose a 70% tariff on rice imports arriving by sea and in 2019
imposed an outright ban on all overland trade (Beillard & Nzeka, 2019). Under these
policies, some foreign rice still enters Nigeria illegally by way of neighboring countries
with lower import tariffs and permeable borders but several sector stakeholders report an
uptake in demand for local rice in response to the border closings (Kassa & Zeufack,
2020).
The poor competitiveness of domestic rice production is driven largely by low ability to
pay for mechanization and inputs in primary production: the national average
mechanization rate is estimated at 0.3 hp/ha, compared to an FAO-recommended
minimum of 1.5 hp/ha (Sims et al., 2016).
Nigerian rice yields are just 50% of the global average (FAO, 2019b).This is due to a
variety of factors including a lack of access to improved seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation
(Tinsley, 2012).Rice grains are the seeds of a grass plant that flourishes under irrigated
conditions. Since most Nigerian rice is produced by smallholder farmers, good crop
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yields require disparate smallholders to seasonally irrigate their paddies. Access to
irrigation depends on a variety of factors across Nigeria’s agroecological zones, but only
15% of rice-growing area is estimated to be irrigated nationally (Beillard & Nzeka, 2019;
FAO, 2016). Small-scale irrigation could double rice yields under certain conditions,
though the financial benefit to farmers will depend on irrigation cost, the fertilizer
application rate, and farmers’ risk tolerance (Xie et al., 2017). In addition, the farmers we
surveyed report that their fields are typically far from the town center: 92% say it takes
longer than 15 minutes to walk there, and 25% report a commute longer than 45
minutes. Assuming a 4 mile-per-hour walking speed, this puts average farms more than
a mile from the city center, which is beyond the service territory for most minigrids.

Figure 3.3.13. Gross national production (left) and farm-gate value (right) of Nigerian paddy rice (FAO,
2019b)
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Post-harvest losses
Post-harvest losses in Nigerian rice may be as high as 20–40% (Oguntade et al., 2014).
Losses typically occur through harvest, processing, and market stages, with minimal
spoilage occurring at the consumer level (Danbaba et al., 2019). Storage losses are not
a major concern. Losses due to spillage from containers and mishandling during the
marketing process cannot be resolved through modern, electrified equipment. However,
traditional threshing, and parboiling processes each lose about 5–6% of incoming paddy
rice. At the milling stage, traditional mills also waste paddy components by failing to
adequately separate waste streams from milled paddy and from each other, as
discussed below.
Value chain description
Figure 3.3.14 shows the rice value chain from harvest to milled head rice, focusing on
parboiled rice production which represents over 90% of the local rice consumed in
Nigeria (Danbaba et al., 2019).
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Figure 3.3.14. Rice value chain from harvested rice plants to milled head rice
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Local trade
Local rice traders predominantly source threshed paddy rice from local farmers (Figure
3.3.15). Half of local traders report that they sell primarily to other traders outside the
community, with the other half staying among local households and small processors.
The portion of the rice that stays within the community will typically be parboiled and
milled by local entrepreneurs and households. These trade flows are evidence of very
strong local offtake markets for rice milled in minigrid communities.

Figure 3.3.15. Local trade flows for paddy rice. Flow size is proportional to the likelihood of the trade from
source to final buyer.
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Opportunities for electrification in milled rice production
Analyzing key considerations for milled rice production activities finds Tier 1 (rice milling)
and Tier 3 (threshing, mechanical grain drying) opportunities. These analyses are
included below.

TIER 1
Rice Milling
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
rice mills were observed in 100% of the rice-producing,
● Local
minigrid-suitable communities surveyed.
Offtake Market
demand for locally milled rice by households and
● Strong
markets.
Electric
Electric rice mills are available, and two-stage rice millsxv
●
Equipment
offer strong value proposition over outdated one-stage mills.
Scalability
of domestic rice is milled by small-scale local
● 80%
processors.

Rice milling is a top-tier opportunity for electrification with minigrids, and there is strong
national demand for the service. An estimated 80% of domestic rice consumed in
Nigeria is milled at the local level by processors with <500 kg/hour milling capacity
(Johnson & Masias, 2016). These smaller mills cannot serve the market demand: circa
2014, the annual demand for milled rice was 1.9 million tons greater than annual
production (Oguntade et al., 2014). At the same time, an estimated 80% of industrial rice
mills are running at less than 25% capacity as they struggle to source sufficient local rice
to sustain their operations (Nzeka & Taylor, 2017). Local small-scale rice mills have
ready access to paddy rice produced nearby, pushing their capacity utilization up to 50%
(Lançon et al., 2003). But smaller players struggle to reduce operational costs enough to
compete with imports on price (Beillard & Nzeka, 2019). Most small rice mills operating

xv

NCAM (NG) sells a two-stage rice mill with 800kg/hr capacity, powered by 10.4KW three-phase
motor.
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in Nigeria today are old, expensive to run, and produce a low rice yield at suboptimal
quality. One study found that the average rice mill in operation was 18 years old
(Adeyemi et al., 2017). Most of these old mills are single-pass one-stage ‘Engelberg’ rice
mills that produce a basic milled rice and a mixed waste residue that contains broken
grain, rice bran, and rice husks. Modern two-stage mills reduce grain breakage and
better separate these byproducts, resulting in better quality milled rice. High quality rice
grains can be sold at a 50% price premium (170 N/kg vs 115 N/kg) (Oguntade et al.,
2014). The separation of rice bran and rice husk allows processors to sell these waste
streams as an animal feed input or a biomass fuel for parboiling, respectively (id).
Energy costs are 65–80% of operating costs for fee-for-service rice mills, and it is
estimated that a 1% increase in diesel price can drive a 10% increase in cost of
production over the lifetime of the mill (Adeyemi et al., 2017). Efficient, three-phase
electric motors can vastly reduce millers’ exposure to fuel price risk.

TIER 3
Rice Threshing
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
is typically threshed manually in minigrid-suitable
◔ Rice
communities. If a fossil-powered mechanical thresher is
used, it operates where the harvest occurs: in fields that may
be far from community centers.
Offtake Market
demand for paddy rice by local households,
● Strong
processors, and traders.
Electric
rice threshers are available but would need to be
◑ Electric
Equipment
situated in a central area to be powered by a minigrid,
requiring actors to change their practices.xvi Standalone solar
or battery-powered threshers could enable mobility but have
yet to be developed.
Scalability
is a critical step in all rice harvests in Nigeria, and
● Threshing
the task must be done at the local level. Demand for a costcompetitive mechanical threshing option would be
widespread.

xvi

Alaral Tech Engineering Design & Fabrication, member of AMEFAN sells electric rice
threshers.

169

Threshing removes the dense rice grains from the bulky grass on which it grows. This
step increases the density of the material and enables efficient transport and handling
throughout the rest of the value chain. Therefore, rice value chain actors strongly prefer
early threshing at the farm site over transportation of the crop to a centralized threshing
location. Mechanical rice threshers are typically mobile equipment that can be easily
transported by light vehicle or by hand. An added benefit of in-field threshing is that it
allows the excess rice plant material to be returned to the soil, which helps prevent
depletion of soil carbon (Ghimire et al., 2017).These mobile threshers have proven to be
good investments, achieving an estimated 50% IRR (Danbaba et al., 2019).
Electrification of rice threshing would require either 1) a change in value chain practices
to transport rice to centralized threshing locations, or 2) development of a mobile electric
rice thresher. Because transporting whole rice plants is suboptimal, as discussed above,
a grid-independent thresher is the most likely solution. If a minigrid is present, a battery
system could be paired with an existing thresher design, although further investigation
would be required to determine if the power and size requirements of this power supply
can be met at a price point that does not render the battery thresher uncompetitive with
fossil options.
During manual threshing, an estimated 5% of rice is broken or scattered on the ground
as the grains are beat from the grass. Additionally, manual threshing practices are more
likely to introduce stones and other small debris into the paddy, raising the non-rice
content (i.e., “add mixture”), and lowering the sale price. Compared to manual threshing,
mechanical threshers increase output capacity from roughly 30 to 150 kg/hour (Lançon
et al., 2003). Taken together, electrical threshing could make processing five times faster
while reducing post-harvest losses and slightly increasing the sale price.
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If the correct device can be designed and successfully piloted, there is likely to be a
strong offtake market and high potential for scale across the country. Nearly all rice
farmers report that they would be interested in utilizing mechanical threshing if it is costcompetitive with hiring laborers for manual processing. But only 18% report that they
would “definitely be willing” to transport their harvested rice to a centralized threshing
location served by a minigrid. For the rest, the success of mechanized threshing
depends on the price of the service as well as its ability to accommodate the preferences
and habits of value chain actors.

Rice Parboiling
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
milled rice is parboiled in minigrid-suitable
◑ Locally
communities, typically using a pot or oil drum heated over a
wood fire. Operation of more efficient parboiling vessels
would require capacity building to change practices.
Offtake Market
demand for parboiled rice by local households,
● Strong
processors and traders.
Electric
are no electric parboilers on the market. In theory, a
◔ There
Equipment
very energy-efficient electric parboiling vessel may be costcompetitive with wood at minigrid, but such a device has yet
to be designed.
Scalability
is a critical step for domestic Nigerian rice and is
● Parboiling
typically done at the local level.

Parboiling gelatinizes the starch in paddy rice grains which toughens them and reduces
breakage during milling (Buggenhout et al., 2014). It also moves nutrients from the bran
(which is removed during milling) into the inner portion of the grain, improving nutrition of
the otherwise starch-heavy grain that remains after milling (Heinemann et al.,
2005).Finally, parboiled rice is simply easier to cook. Because of these benefits and
consumer taste preferences, 90–95% of Nigerian paddy rice is parboiled (Danbaba et
al., 2019).
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The parboiling process varies according to consumer tastes and traditions, but typically
entails 4–8 hours of soaking in hot water (initially 60–70° C), followed by 10–20 minutes
of steaming (100–110° C) (Balbinoti et al., 2018). During steaming, some quantity of
water is heated to a boil in the pot and the rice is added directly into the boiling water to
partially cook. After parboiling, the paddy rice is air-dried, ideally to the ~14% moisture
content preferred by millers.
Traditional parboiling practices
Traditional parboiling techniques are time-consuming, energy inefficient, and
inconsistent in quality (Usman et al., 2014). Most parboilers use open pots or oil drums
heated by wood fires, as shown to the right. These heating systems are inefficient,
imparting heat from the firewood to the surroundings as well as to the water and rice in
the pot. Hard-earned heat also escapes as steam through the top of the lidless container
rather than staying in the parboiling rice mixture. These inefficiencies mean that
traditional parboilers are using around seven times more energy than required, which
translates to extra fuelwood and longer periods of time spent tending smoky fires
(Kwofie et al., 2016).
Women bear the burden of the parboiling process, including the time requirement and
long-term health hazards of smoke inhalation (Tinsley, 2012). 100% of the participants
asked about the gender balance of parboiling reported that the activity was always
performed by women.
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Figure 3.3.16. A traditional parboiling arrangement in Dawan Malam community, Kaduna state.

Improved parboiling practices
These problems have made parboiling a strong target for development intervention.
Programs have introduced of a variety of improved parboiling vessels, as well as
capacity building. The RIPMAPP program introduced simple false-bottom pots that heat
only the minimum amount of water required for steaming, and use a lid to contain the
steam within the pot (RIPMAPP, 2016b).This configuration reduces energy requirements
and evenly steams the rice as the steam equally heats each grain throughout the pot,
which reduces inconsistencies in quality in the batch. In 2018, RIPMAPP reported a 10–
20% price improvement due to adoption of these improved practices by over 14,000
parboilers. AfricaRice’s larger GEM Parboiler utilizes a pot with a specialized steaming
basket to ensure even heating and an improved wood stove to improve heat transfer
from the fire to the parboiler contents (Ndindeng et al., 2015). In both cases, significant
capacity building was required to ensure proper operation of these improved parboiling
methods.
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Figure 3.3.17 AfricaRice’s GEM parboiling unit for medium-scale operations. Photo excerpted from
Ndindeng et al. (2015)

In addition to improving energy efficiency, parboiling operations may be improved by
using alternative heat sources. Simply burning rice husk waste from nearby mills may
reduce the time and money spent on wood fuel by up to 35%, one study finds (Kwofie et
al., 2016). Purpose-built rice husk stoves may further improve combustion efficiency and
reduce energy costs but are not mass produced (Kwofie et al., 2017). Other agricultural
residues such as maize stalks were occasionally used as a wood substitute by our
survey respondents. Minigrid electricity could in theory serve parboiling heat demand,
but in practice this is unlikely to be economically infeasible without significant
improvement in energy efficiency and purpose-built electric heating parboilers. Box 2
analyzes the cost of electrifying parboiling under various efficiency scenarios, showing
that electric heating at today’s minigrid tariff fails to compete with fuelwood heating on
cost even given a 15-fold reduction in the energy required to parboil a kilogram of rice.
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Box 2 Electrification of rice parboiling is not cost competitive with fuelwood
even if significant efficiency improvements and minigrid tariff reductions are
achieved.

Figure 3.3.18. Cost of parboiling one kilogram of paddy rice using different energy sources, at varying
levels of energy efficiency. References: a Kwofie, 2017; b Ndindeng, 2015; c Usman, 2014.

Today in Nigeria, it is much cheaper to parboil with wood than with electricity. The
above plot shows the costs of parboiling one kilogram of paddy rice using fuelwood
and using electricity at two different minigrid tariffs. Dotted vertical lines demarcate the
energy requirements (in MJ/kg rice) of three different operations: a large-scale
commercial parboiler in India, a small-scale GEM parboiler developed by AfricaRice,
and small-scale traditional parboiler. For reference, consider that one kilogram of
milled rice is worth roughly $0.70-1.00 in local markets. At $0.60/kWh — a minigrid
tariff reflective of today’s prices — even industrial efficiencies do not reduce the
parboiling energy costs below $0.20/kg. At $0.20/kWh — an aspirational tariff for the
minigrid sector — it is possible for highly efficient operations to approach $0.5-0.10/kg
for parboiling energy expenditure. But such efficiency improvements will require
purpose-built electric parboiling vessels, likely using induction heating and wellinsulated container walls.
For the foreseeable future, direct fire heating of parboiling vessels will continue to be
the norm in Nigeria. Moving away from wood fires may pose benefits to the local
women who tend them, and who gather the wood. For these reasons, electricity may
not need to reach precise cost parity with traditional practices. But such a transition
will require significant electricity cost reductions, efficiency improvements, and local
capacity building, all of which are beyond the scope of early productive use
interventions by the minigrid sector.
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Mechanical Rice Drying
Support Required: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant
Local Capacity
Nigerian smallholders typically sun-dry grains, including rice.

◔

Offtake Market

◑

Electric
Equipment
Scalability

◔
◕

Though mechanically dried rice can certainly be sold into
existing local markets, these buyers may not value the
improved quality due to lack of consistent grading standards.
Some mechanical dryers are manufactured in-country but
rely on fossil fuels as primary heat input.
All harvested rice must be dried before sale. If widespread
quality standards increase the sensitivity of the market to rice
moisture content, the scale of the activity is potentially large.

Before reaching the local market, Nigerian parboiled rice is dried twice: first after
threshing and then following parboiling. The target moisture content is 12.5–14% by
mass (RIPMAPP, 2016b). Paddy rice stored with a higher moisture content risks molding
during storage or reduced milling yields.
Most Nigerians sun-dry rice in the open air, and all survey respondents in the rice value
chain used this method at least some of the time. Possible drying surfaces included bare
ground, tarpaulins, roads, roofs, and purpose-built concrete platforms. These practices
are typically adequate: only one in four rice farmers surveyed experienced drying
problems during the harvest season. However, many cereal grain experts we
interviewed expect that climate change will continue to make seasonal rains less
predictable, and thus increase the proportion of farmers who are having trouble sundrying their crops.
The Standards Organization of Nigeria has specified a grading standards for paddy rice,
and a variety of international milled rice standards are available (RIPMAPP, 2016a).
Despite the existence of these standards, most smallholder rice is not consistently
graded for quality at the paddy or milled rice stage. As a result, incremental
improvements in dryness or quality are not consistently valued by local markets.
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Mechanical dryers exist and are prominent in more developed markets with stricter
tolerances for rice dryness and quality. These include some rice dryers that require input
air to be heated (usually by fossil fuels), and other low-temperature units that require
much less energy input (IRRI, 2020). Introduction of the latter may allow drying of rice
using minigrid power without reliance on other energy sources, but implementation of
such an intervention would require significant capacity building.
Although there are drawbacks to sun-drying of rice, many NGO-led efforts to introduce
mechanical drying at the smallholder have failed (Tinsley, 2012). Simply sun-drying on a
raised concrete surface rather than the ground or a tarpaulin may significantly improve
results, and plastic greenhouse-style solar dryers offer more control at zero energy cost
(Imoudu & Olufayo, 2000; Puello-Mendez et al., 2017).
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Summary of Study Findings
This section summarizes the findings of the full report, which included additional
technoeconomic analysis and business model development in addition to detailed value
chain studies for nine more target crops not included in this thesis chapter (Figure
3.3.19).
SUPPORT REQUIRED: ● Deployment-Ready – ◕ Minimal – ◑ Moderate – ◔ Significant

TIER 1

Activity

Value
Chain

Local
Capacity

Grating
Flour Milling

Cassava
Maize
Sorghum
Cowpea
Soybean
Rice

●
●
◕
●
◕
●

Maize
Sorghum
Cowpea
Soybean
Aquaculture
Rice
Rice
Shea Nuts
Maize
Sorghum
Cowpea
Soybean
Rice
Cocoa
Aquaculture
Milk (chilling)
Cassava
Cassava
Aquaculture
Cashew

Rice Milling

TIER 2

Threshing

Water Pumping

TIER 3

Threshing
Parboiling
Shea Butter
Drying

Cold Storage
Peeling
Chipping
Fish Smoking
Kernel Production

Offtake
Market

Electric
Equipment

Scalability

●
●
◕
●
◕
●

●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
◕
●
◕
●

◑
◑
◑
◑
◑

●
◕
●
◕
●

◕
◕
◕
◑
◕

●
◑
◕
◑
◔

◔
◑
◑
◔
◔
◔
◔
◔
◔
◑
◔
◑
◕
◑
◔

●
●
◔
◑
◑
◑
◑
◑
◑
◔
◑
◕
◔
◕
◔

◑
◔
◑
◔
◔
◔
◔
◔
◑
●
◕
◔
◕
◔
◑

●
●
◔
◕
◔
◕
◑
◕
◔
◔
◔
◑
◔
◕
◑

Figure 3.3.19. Summary of evaluations for all crop and value chain activity pairs analyzed

This study applied a productive use lens to post-harvest activities for 12 target value
chains, focusing on opportunities for minigrid electricity to improve the efficiency of the
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processing steps between the farm gate and locally marketed products. After applying
our prioritization framework (Figure 3.3.2), we found immediate opportunities to electrify
fossil-fueled and manually-performed processing activities for several key crops widely
cultivated in rural Nigeria.
There are three clear Tier 1 activities across six crops primed for immediate
electrification and implementation in Nigeria. Cassava grating, rice milling, and flour
milling (across several grains) all have strong fundamental characteristics indicating that
electrifying them can be straightforward and successful. Each of these opportunities
requires little to no market development support in order to be implemented today and at
large scale. For flour milling, this potential is further strengthened by the opportunity to
use multi-crop milling equipment to broaden the local processor’s business opportunity
and reduce market risk. Section 4 in the full report explores whether these opportunities
are commercially viable for processors and beneficial to minigrid economics.
Tier 2 crops have medium-term potential if provided with support to overcome one or
more barriers to deployment, particularly regarding the capacity of local actors and
economies to adjust to mechanization. Value chain actors may need to change behavior
to adapt to the requirements of mechanized processing. For example, adoption of a
centralized multi-crop thresher depends on farmers’ ability and willingness to transport
their dried cereals to the town center, rather than hiring labor to thresh grains in the field.
These adaptations are conceivable but require additional effort.
Tier 3 activities have longer-term potential if extensive barriers are addressed. For
example, cassava chipping is simple to mechanize but minigrid-suitable communities are
not connected to the industrial markets where the chips are sold. The viability of cassava
chipping as a productive use activity thus depends upon the ability of other actors to
support access to an industrial offtake market where orders are demarcated in
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thousands of tons per year. Today, ensuring this access would require coordination of
disparate cassava growers and chippers, aggregation and quality control, and purchase
agreements with large corporations. For other activities, electric appliances do not exist,
and may be challenging to develop. For example, electric parboilers could conceivably
be built but would probably be cost-prohibitive to operate under a minigrid tariff (Box 2).
Others need a rare combination of enabling conditions: milk chilling operations require
collocation of dairy-producing communities and industrial dairy processors.

Figure 3.3.20. Comparison of cash flow analyses for electrification of Tier 1 processing activities under
conservative financing assumptions: a 15-year loan tenor at 30% weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Graphic created by Zihe Meng.

Deploying Tier 1 activities in minigrids in Kaduna and Cross River states would reduce
local processors’ fuel costs and improve minigrid capacity utilization per technoeconomic
analysis in Appendix C in the full report. Figure 3.3.20 shows the net present value of
investments in all Tier 1 equipment under two different sales modalities: a buy-and-sell
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model (BnS) where the processor purchases raw materials and then sells the valueadded product, and a fee-for-service model (FFS) in which the processor charges a flat
fee to mill or grate the raw material for others.
Most of the configurations analyzed had a positive net-present value under financing
assumptions considered realistic by the Nigerian financial institutions we interviewed.
The exception is the FFS rice milling: we made the conservative assumption that the
fee-for-service charge for the new, electric two-stage rice mill would be the same as the
service charge for the old mill. Under this assumption, the miller does not receive the
50% price premium (170 N/kg vs 115 N/kg) for the higher quality of milled rice that
her/his new equipment produces, nor is the miller compensated for the improved paddy
rice yields (less breakage and loss of grain) enabled by the new mill. In this case, the
fuel cost savings alone are not enough to justify the $1,800 investment in an electric rice
mill. However, it is plausible that a fee-for-service processor could internalize the
customer benefits of the new mill by raising the service fee to reflect the higher quality
product, or by charging for milling services per kilogram of milled rice output (rather than
per kilogram of paddy input). Either of these business model changes would improve the
economic case for FFS rice milling significantly.
Our technical analysis also shows that adding productive use loads to a minigrid system
can raise daytime electricity sales and improve minigrid economics for both customers
and operators. Figure 3.3.21 shows the effect of adding loads from Tier 1 activities to a
minigrid powering a typical rural Nigerian community (77 kW peak solar minigrid with
battery storage and diesel backup). We used load data from existing Nigerian minigrid
customers to define the BASE case load and then introduced modeled loads for
productive use activities commensurate with our survey results for similarly sized
communities cultivating cassava, maize, and rice: nine cassava graters, five rice mills,
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and 12 small flour mills. In the BASE+All scenario, an optimized minigrid design calls for
an additional 10 kW of PV capacity, equally sized genset, and 40 kWh more battery
storage compared to the BASE scenario. Further modelling documentation is provided in
Appendix C of the full report.
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Figure 3.3.21. The effect of productive use loads on typical 24-hour minigrid load curves. Created by Zihe
Meng.

Modelling results show that adding these productive use loads can significantly increase
utilization of daytime solar generation and reduce the tariff required to achieve a 15%
internal rate of return from $0.60/kWh to $0.49/kWh.
While this analysis provides initial insight into the potential economic impacts of
electrifying these specific productive uses in a rural minigrid context, additional study is
warranted. The limited scope of this study does not provide for a broader analysis of all
potential agricultural productive uses and did not allow for specific site studies. In our
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models, we assume that productive loads are consistent throughout the year per reports
by surveyed processors. Other agricultural processing activities, however, can be highly
seasonal and activity level might vary with the harvest cycle. For example, if rice millers
are only active for eight months of the year, our expected tariff reduction from the BASE
case to BASE+All would be only 7% instead of 12%, as revenue decreases while system
maintenance costs remain mostly constant. If seasonal productive loads are to be
served by minigrid, the seasonality should be more carefully considered when optimizing
the system design.
In addition, for rural processors in minigrid-powered communities to adopt productive
use equipment, they must know a suitable appliance exists and have the credit to
purchase it, the reliable electricity to power it, and the markets required to sell its
produce. In the full report, appendices D and E present commercial business models
that can support appliance procurement, and a deployment strategy to initiate and scale
the process, respectively.
The Tier 1 activities identified in this study are a natural proving ground for the potential
of productive use of minigrid electricity in agricultural value chains. We conclude that
these activities can be electrified to the benefit of rural processors and electricity
providers. Pilot projects that test and debug these use cases are critical inputs to the
development of a larger scale deployment strategy, which can bridge credit, education,
and market access gaps to improve profitability of processing, reduce electricity prices,
and take thousands of fossil fueled mills and graters out of circulation.
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4 Energy, Agriculture, and Rural Livelihoods

A woman making maize flour with a fossil-powered mill in Odogbolu, Nigeria. Photo from RMI site visit.

The work in this section draws from my experience across the energy and agriculture
sectors, obtained while completing the previous research contributions in this thesis.
Section 4.1 is an ongoing writing project that aims to convince agriculture and energy
stakeholders of the fundamental interdependence of these two sectors in rural
development, and to guide efforts to respond to the missed opportunity at their nexus. I
would like to gratefully acknowledge several colleagues for ongoing input on the piece:
Stephen Doig, James Sherwood, Nathan Williams, Daniel Affsprung, and June Lukuyu. I
offer a special thanks to Lee Lynd for his encouragement to take on the complex topic,
and for his continued mentorship during the writing process.
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4.1 Leveraging the agriculture-energy nexus for multiplicative human
development benefits

Introduction
While many people enjoy the highest standards of living in human history, rampant
inequality divides the lucky from the unlucky as billions are projected to fall short of the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 (UN, 2019). 789 million
do not have access to electricity (IEA et al., 2020), one in two people cook with firewood
or other traditional fuels (ESMAP, 2020b), and over 700 million live on less than $1.90
per day (World Bank, 2020).
Inequalities exist everywhere, but extreme poverty is disproportionately sub-Saharan
African and rural. Extreme poverty is three times higher in rural areas than urbans areas
(UN, 2019), and 83% of multidimensionally poor people live in sub-Saharan Africa or
South Asia (OPHI & UNDP, 2019). Of those without electricity access, 70% are subSaharan African and 85% live in a rural place (IEA et al., 2020).
Achieving such interconnected goals as eliminating poverty and hunger (SDGs 1 and 2),
enabling access to affordable clean energy (SDG 7), steadying the climate (SDG 13),
and realizing gender equality (SDG 5) will require solutions that bypass incremental
progress in one goal in favor of exponential gains across multiple goals (Sethi et al.,
2017; UN, 2019). These whole systems solutions are characterized by multiplicative
returns, wringing out two or four times the benefit for every unit of investment than
investing in each sector alone (Hawken et al., 2000).
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) advocates for paradigm-shifting
interventions that increase incomes and expand the capabilities that allow people to
realize their full potential while stabilizing the planetary systems we rely upon (UNDP,
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2019, Chapter 7, 2020). The UNDP is informed by the capabilities approach to
understanding welfare, which focuses on a person’s substantial freedom to choose what
to be and do, rather than the person’s accrual of resources (i.e., resourcism) or some
measure of happiness (i.e., utilitarianism) (Nussbaum, 2000; A. Sen, 1992). Disparities
in capability are at the heart of disparities in human development because they
fundamentally limit a person’s control over their life (i.e., what to “do” and “be”) (A. Sen,
1992). While this understanding of poverty goes beyond income poverty, it does
acknowledge that progress fundamentally includes the capacity to generate income and
use it.
The intersection of agriculture and energy has long been acknowledged as fertile ground
for generating multiplicative human development benefits (Cabraal et al., 2005; Greeley,
1987; Newell et al., 2019; Stout, 1979). Yet, many agricultural workers still grow and
process their crops by hand or with expensive fossil fuels (FAO, 2015). In parallel, many
energy access investments such as minigrids struggle as residential loads start out low
and productive uses of electricity in the surrounding economy are slow to materialize
(AMDA, 2020; Booth et al., 2018; Lukuyu et al., 2021). A renaissance of interest and
investment is responding to this missed opportunity. Investments to increase energy use
in agriculture are a key component of Sustainable Energy for All’s COVID-19 recovery
spending recommendations (SEforALL, 2020a). The Nigeria Electrification Project — a
$550 million effort to increase electricity access to off-grid households and businesses
— includes a component that seeks to synergize the deployment of solar home systems
and minigrids with income-generating uses of energy (REA, 2018).
Although there is strong interest in pulling the complementary levers of energy and
agriculture for human benefit, there is limited shared understanding of how this nexus
functions today in rural communities and how it can produce desired outcomes. This
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chapter shows how a whole systems approach can leverage the complementary
strengths of each sector: expanding capabilities with energy access, raising incomes in
agricultural value chains, and solving pressing agricultural problems with new energy
resources. We adopt the capabilities approach to human development, and we explicitly
consider the context of rural communities with low rural electricity access, high
employment in agriculture, and high poverty rates. This includes many of the
communities facing extreme poverty and low energy access today: 80% of those living
on less than $1.90 per day live in rural areas and 65% work in agriculture (Castañeda et
al., 2018).
With a shared mental model, stakeholders can work together across the energy and
agriculture sectors to support virtuous cycles of human development and lower the risk
of ineffective interventions and unintended consequences. In the following sections, we
articulate such a model for the agriculture-energy nexus, learn from historical
experiences at the nexus, and derive principles for successful interventions.

Energy and agriculture are complementary development levers,
and investment in either sector alone is inherently incomplete
Our first argument is that there is a fundamental interdependence between the energy
and agriculture sectors in the low-income, low-energy-access, agrarian communities we
consider here. As described in Figure 4.1.1, there are high-level benefits to investing in
agriculture, which has strong ties to local livelihoods, and in energy, which is a basic
enabler of human capability expansion. In addition to this general complementarity, there
is an opportunity to use energy to solve agricultural problems, which we define as the
agriculture-energy nexus.
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Figure 4.1.1. The agriculture-energy nexus can drive a virtuous cycle of human development by expanding
capabilities and increasing incomes.

Agricultural development has exceptional leverage on local livelihoods, but
less leverage on capability expansion
Agriculture is the economic mainstay of agrarian communities, where farming,
shepherding, fishing, and related activities are the means of production and
employment, and the backdrop of everyday life. This gives growth in the agricultural
sector outsized influence on incomes among the poorest compared to other sectors
(Valdés & Foster, 2010; World Bank, 2007). As development economist Michael Lipton
writes, there are “virtually no examples of mass dollar poverty reduction since 1700 that
did not start with sharp rises in employment and self-employment income due to higher
productivity in small family farms” (Lipton, 2005, p. viii). Several recent meta-studies of
agricultural development interventions that enhance crop or livestock value generation
and market conditions find that these programs have exceptional leverage on rural
incomes (Bernstein et al., 2019). For example, farmer field schools and agricultural input
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subsidies can significantly improve crop yields and farmer earnings (Hemming et al.,
2018; Waddington et al., 2014).
However, increasing agricultural productivity, on its own, cannot enable the fullest
expansion of human development per the capabilities approach: the freedom to choose
what to be and do. Consider, for instance, that 80% of global landholders own less than
two hectares (HLPE, 2013). For these farmers, the size of their field imposes a ceiling on
their income. A Malawian farmer with two hectares may increase her capabilities to
match the average United States maize yield of about 11 metric tons per hectare (FAO,
2020d). But selling this produce at $265xvii per metric ton still gives her just $5,830 for
selling the whole harvest, which translates to $16/day for the year if it is her only income
source.
Historically, extreme rural poverty has decreased alongside structural economic
transformation that increases worker productivity, shifts farming from subsistence to
diversified, market-oriented production systems; and creates off-the-farm jobs (FAO,
2017, 2019a). For the Malawian famer with two hectares of maize, these broader
changes may empower her to switch to higher-value crops, or open her to stable
markets, or help her create value-added products from her maize, or enable her to begin
an off-farm career (Gill et al., 2016; World Bank, 2005). Increasing energy consumption
invariably accompanies these broader transformations, powering productivity increases,
job creation, and new capabilities at home (Moss et al., 2020). Although energy is just
one component of development-enabling infrastructure that includes transportation,

xvii

Representative of crowdsourced 2020 farmgate maize prices in Malawi, where the modal price
reported by farmers was 200 MWK per kilogram, and during which time the exchange rate was
roughly 750 MWK to 1 USD (Ochieng & Baulch, 2020).
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water, sanitation, and information technology, among others (FAO, 2019a), each other
component fundamentally requires energy to function.xviii

Energy is a prerequisite to many capabilities, but energy access alone is
often insufficient to grow incomes
The energy sector can directly support this broader economic transformation in addition
to increasing earnings for actors throughout agricultural value chains. Energy services
are indispensable to modern life, and provision of these services buoys the aspirations
of people previously living in the dark (ESMAP, 2015; Parikh et al., 2012). Access to
electricity is consistently among individuals’ top development priorities. In a recent
survey of 1,200 Africans across 34 countries, 90% of respondents indicated that
expansion of rural electrification should be a high priority for their governments
(Afrobarometer, 2018).
Yet, energy access alone does not enable the expansion of capabilities or incomes (K.
Lee et al., 2020b; World Bank, 2008). Of the few studies using randomized experiments
and statistical significance tests to assess the household-level impact of electricity
access, only half find a positive impact on assessed outcomes (Bayer et al., 2020). A
recent randomized control trial of over 2,000 Kenyan households found no statistically
significant impacts of electrification 32 months after receiving a subsidized connection to
the central grid, but no additional supports beyond a light bulb socket and power outlets
(K. Lee et al., 2020a). Today, grid extension and distributed energy resources are
supplying reliable electricity to millions of previously un- or under-served households
(ESMAP, 2020a). But newly-connected customers often struggle to use energy access

xviii

Inclusive economic growth also relies on non-physical institutional foundations, including
democratic accountability, anti-corruption measures, social safety nets, adequate education, et
cetera (Lustig et al., 2016; Manning, 2020; K. Sen, 2014).
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to increase productivity, incomes, and electricity consumption (AMDA, 2020; Bernard,
2012; Burlig & Preonas, 2016; Contejean & Verin, 2017; Taneja, 2018). This is
especially true for those in the lowest income strata, who have the least resources to
acquire the appliances that make use of newfound power (Khandker et al., 2014).
The problem is that energy has no value in and of itself: it is a material prerequisite to
creating valued capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000). The capabilities approach appropriately
shifts the focus from how much energy people have to what energy can allow them to
do. Day, Walker, and Simcock (2016) conceptualize the relationship between energy
sources, services and end uses as a flow from energy sources to basic capabilities. xix
For example, an energy source (e.g., ethanol fuel supply) is converted into an energy
service (e.g., burned by a stove for cooking), which provides a specific secondary
capability (e.g., preparing healthy food), which supports a more generic basic capability
(e.g., bodily health). The aim of energy investment in poor rural communities, then, is to
enable the use of energy resources to expand capabilities, which includes the ability to
be more productive and generate more income.

Coordinating energy and agriculture investments can pull complementary
development levers
In impoverished agrarian communities with low energy access, coordinated investments
in agriculture and energy can spur multiplicative human development gains that siloed
investments in either sector will miss. Investing exclusively in agricultural value chains
can boost local incomes but fail to foster foundational infrastructure required for modern
life. On the other hand, rural energy access is a vital input to increasing human

Smith and Seward (2009) distinguish between ‘basic’ and ‘secondary’ capabilities to separate
the fundamental dimensions of human well-being (i.e., basic capabilities) from the more specific
capabilities that may be actualized to help achieve a basic capability (i.e., secondary capabilities).
xix
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productivity and capabilities. Yet, energy access alone does not stimulate human
development when it is deployed without supporting its use in the local economy. A
whole systems approach can leverage the complementary strengths of each sector:
expanding capabilities with energy access, raising incomes in agricultural value chains,
and directly using energy services to solve pressing agricultural problems.
As shown in Figure 4.1.1, using energy to perform agricultural tasks can drive a virtuous
cycle that expands incomes and capabilities. A lack of suitable energy resources
encumbers cultivation, processing, transportation, storage, and marketing along
agricultural value chains, inflating production costs, raising post-harvest losses, and
precluding value addition (FAO, 2015). From the perspective of a single farmer, this
energy poverty manifests as spoilage of the tomato harvest without adequate storage
options (Sibomana et al., 2016), or an outdated diesel-powered flour mill that runs on
overpriced ‘black market’ fuel and is perpetually down for repairs (B. Clarke & Rottger,
2006; Lam et al., 2019).
Productively using energy in agriculture can also ensure market demand for new energy
service providers, thereby strengthening the economics of energy production and
utilization. Consider rural electrification. One fundamental technoeconomic challenge to
serving rural customers are the large upfront costs required to build lengthy distribution
lines to connect widely-spaced households who tend to have low loads relative to
urbanites, and who are more likely to live in poverty (NELA, 1913; World Bank, 2008;
Zomers, 2003). Robust rural electricity loads allow the fixed costs of connecting low-use
customers to be spread over more kilowatt-hours of electricity sales, improving the
business case for connecting them and recouping infrastructure investments at more
affordable electricity prices (McCall & Santana, 2018). In previous successful rural

192

electrification efforts, a large portion of this rural load growth has come from agricultural
uses, as we discuss in a following section.

Figure 4.1.2. The processes by which the agriculture-energy nexus supports human development. There are
positive feedbacks created by working in both sectors in parallel (outer feedback loop), and by using energy
services to improve agricultural activities (agriculture-energy nexus).

Figure 4.1.2 presents a model in which energy and agriculture sectors intersect and
drive human development. As described by Day, Walker, and Simcock (2016), the
energy sector expands capabilities when appropriate energy supply (e.g., ethanol
cooking fuel) is translated into energy services (e.g., clean cooking), which ultimately
produce income and/or enhance capabilities (e.g., ability to be in good health). In
parallel, agricultural activities (e.g., production, processing, storing trading) translate raw
agricultural resources (e.g., land, inputs, farmer knowledge, and farmer ability) into
products, which labor and offtake markets translate into income and/or capabilities (e.g.,
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ability to buy food and avoid hunger). There are two virtuous cycles at play. First,
improved livelihood outputs from either sector can create income and expanded
capabilities that positively feed back into both sectors. For example, if clean cooking
services become available, time spent collecting firewood can be shifted to other uses
including leisure, education, or increasing agricultural productivity among many others.
Second, energy can be used directly at the agriculture-energy nexus to boost
productivity and decrease costs. The energy consumed by productive uses steadies
demand for energy services sold by providers.

Today’s investments in the energy and agriculture sectors are
largely uncoordinated
Despite the promise of coordinated energy and agriculture investments, recent
development spending on these two sectors has been largely siloed. Figure 4.1.3
summarizes human development activity and spending reported in the International Aid
Transparency Initiative (IATI) database from 2010 to 2020. 9,953 activities have either
an energy or agriculture sector focus, with reported spending of $55 billion.xx However,
only 52 activities (0.5%) report working in both energy and agriculture, accounting for
$2.1 billion of reported spending.
Electricity access investments in particular have prioritized spending on supplying
electricity (i.e., increasing the number of households connected and megawatts of
capacity installed), leaving new customers to figure out how to use newfound power on
their own (McCall & Santana, 2018). For example, from 2000 to 2008 the World Bank

Authors’ calculations from the International Aid Transparency Initiative database, which tracks
international development spending (https://iatistandard.org/). We include all reported activities
that have reported sector information, that have been completed or are in implementation or
finalization; and which report a lower middle income, low income, or least developed recipient
country.
xx
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invested over 50 times more in electricity supply than in demand-side supports in Africa
(Barnes et al., 2010). Without demand-side support, rural customers struggle to use their
newfound energy access for more than basic lighting and residential uses, even when a
minigrid offers robust, reliable service suitable for productivity-enhancing equipment
(AMDA, 2020; Posner, 2020).

Figure 4.1.3. Development spending reported in the IATI database for 2010 to 2020. Participation in the
database is voluntary and not all development activities and spending are included in these data. For scale,
consider that a separate report calculated that $243 billion was spent in philanthropy and official
development assistance in 2018 alone across 47 countries with available data (Osili et al., 2020).

Although these facts do not definitively prove that no energy or agriculture activities have
unreported overlaps, these trends resonate with a widely-recognized division between
actors in these sectors, which are often siloed and managed by separate groups of
people within governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs (Liu et al., 2018). This
siloed, supply-centric approach is in stark contrast with previous successful rural
electrification efforts in the US, Europe, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, which relied on
extensive cross-sectoral coordination to increase electricity use on the farm and enable
payback of infrastructure investments (Nordhaus et al., 2019).
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Going forward by looking backward: lessons from previous
success at the energy-agriculture nexus
Previous successful efforts to spur human development in rural areas have leveraged
the fundamental complementarity of energy and agriculture. We examine the United
States case in detail, where these levers helped raise rural electricity access from 10%
of farms in 1935 to nearly 90% by 1950 (Nye, 1992). From analyzing this case, we
observe three drivers of success. First, partnerships between energy and agriculture
actors formed a supportive ecosystem that coordinated investment, shared expertise,
and directly served farmers who wanted to use energy in their work. Second, pilot
projects identified and tested energy solutions to agricultural problems. Third, low-cost
financing was used to support both energy supply and demand, funding transmission
and distribution as well as home wiring and equipment purchases for agricultural actors.

The role of cross-sectoral partnerships, effective pilots, and low-cost
financing in electrifying rural America
Compared to urban customers who were rapidly connecting to the grid, American
farmers in the early 20th century faced both the technoeconomic headwinds of rural
electrification and the condescension of some utility managers who regarded them as
“backward, unmodern, and unsophisticated” (Hirsh, 2018, p. 304). Stimulating on-farm
electricity use was the key to overcoming objective challenges to financially sustainable
grid extension, and to disproving the subjective belief that farmers could not modernize
and become reliable electricity consumers.
A supportive ecosystem of partners identified promising uses of electricity on the farm,
developed and marketed appropriate equipment, and offered low-cost loans and
extension programs that facilitated deployment of these equipment in practice. A 1923
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extension service bulletin from the University of Wisconsin observed there was “not
enough electrical machinery developed at the present time which the farmer [could] use
profitably to make it possible for him to become a large consumer [of power]” (Duffee &
Palmer, 1923, p. 29). The Committee on the Relation of Electricity to Agriculture (CREA)
— a body financed by the national trade group of electric utilities — supported pioneers
who discovered and tested these uses (Hirsh, 2018). The CREA convened cohorts of
public and private stakeholders to do the work, including power companies, government
agencies (e.g., US Department of Agriculture), trade groups (e.g., American Farm
Bureau Federation), equipment manufacturers (e.g., General Electric), and agricultural
engineers and extension agents from land grant universities (REA, 1960). These
partners supported agricultural engineers who applied their academic training and
extensive on-farm experience to investigate hundreds of potential electricity use cases
on test farms (Duffee & Palmer, 1923). The systematic study of electricity uses by CREA
and others separated the profitable electricity uses (e.g., irrigation, egg incubation) from
the fanciful (e.g., moth deterrence, electric plowing) and set the table for widespread
integration of electricity and agriculture (Hirsh, 2018; NELA, 1913).
To fund the distribution lines and home wiring required to power these end uses, the US
Rural Electrification Administration (REA) lent immense amounts of money (equivalent to
0.3% of gross domestic product from 1935–1939) to electric cooperatives, private
utilities, and households at half the prevailing market rate for most loans at the time
(Kitchens & Fishback, 2015; Slattery, 1940). By 1943, REA loans had funded 380,000
miles of power lines and connected over a million rural customers (REA, 1960). To help
customers procure new equipment, the federal Electric Home and Farm Authority
provided installment financing on generous terms and collaborated with manufacturers
to reduce sticker prices (Coppock, 1940). A mosaic of educational programs, marketing
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campaigns, and live demonstrations by local, state and federal actors conveyed the
benefits of putting electricity to work in agriculture, and helped farmers adapt (Cebul,
2018; REA, 1936; Wolfe, 2000). Figure 4.1.4 shows an infographic included in a guide
for REA cooperative members illustrating the many uses of electricity on the farm.
With all of these supports in place, farmers were able to grow their electricity use by
home appliances and productivity-enhancing equipment. For every dollar invested in
providing rural electricity access, households spent an estimated $3–4 more for home
wiring, electric appliances and equipment, and plumbing (REA, 1960). In addition to
providing the benefits of in-home electricity, the REA supports ultimately helped raise
overall crop output and production value, and increased the value of land and buildings
on farms (Kitchens & Fishback, 2015).
Rural electrification in other countries has also proceeded alongside agricultural
investment, particularly in activities that would increase daytime consumption, improving
utility cost recovery while linking electricity access to economic growth (Nordhaus et al.,
2019). For example, a cornerstone of the Thai Provincial Electricity Authority’s (PEA)
rural electrification program were “load-building teams” that identified suitable productive
end-uses of electricity in local value chains (e.g., irrigation pumping, rice milling), offered
low-cost finance from the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, and
provided customer service to support adoption (Tuntivate & Barnes, 2010). Thai rural
electricity access rose from 7% in the early 1970’s to 97% by 2000 (R. M. Shrestha et
al., 2004), and economic growth mirrored electricity demand growth (Greacen &
Greacen, 2004).

198

Figure 4.1.4. An infographic depicting uses of electricity on the farm from a 1939 guide for REA cooperative
members (REA, 1939, p. 23)

Distinguishing between the historical case and present day
Countries striving to complete rural electrification today do so under their own context
conditions. The US REA’s success came alongside the New Deal, which was the most
ambitious peacetime reform and stimulus in United States history (Fishback & Wallis,
2012). Agriculture also accounted for 7.7% of US GDP and 22% of employment in 1930,
so there were ready opportunities to tie new energy uses to the means of income
generation, especially in rural areas (Dimitri et al., 2005). Some countries with low rates
of electricity access today have significantly different starting conditions. For example,
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the GDP per capita at the start of the US REA’s efforts was $9,644 in 2017 dollars,
which is around eight times higher than the GDP per capita in Kenya and India at the
start of their electrification programs (K. Lee et al., 2020b).
Importantly, modern technologies also offer capabilities for expanding rural power that
are greatly improved compared to 1930: low-cost solar photovoltaics and battery
storage, autonomous control systems allowing distributed energy resources to manage
themselves, much-improved appliance efficiency, et cetera. Self-sufficient minigrids —
usually powered by renewables — can provide electric power at costs competitive with
personal fossil fuel generators, and costs are falling (Agenbroad et al., 2018; Lam et al.,
2019). Importantly, minigrids can provide both electricity generation and distribution to a
community at a fraction of the per-project capital cost of a large conventional power plant
(Williams, 2017). Connecting customers to these clean and resilient systems can skip
predominately-fossil-fueled generation systems and reduce GHG emissions significantly
compared to an alternative where these loads are instead served by diesel generators
(Moner-Girona et al., 2018). Today’s vastly more efficient appliances also allow users to
squeeze more benefits out of the first few watts of energy access that may be provided
by low-cost standalone solar systems (Alstone et al., 2015). LEDs brighten homes and
businesses at an order of magnitude better efficiency than incandescent bulbs (and four
orders of magnitude more lumens per watt than an open flame) (I. L. Azevedo et al.,
2009). Exponential gains in the electrical efficiency of computing have yielded
remarkable information technology advances, including mobile phones that can be
charged with minimal energy access and which provide a gateway to information,
banking, and communications services (Calderon et al., 2019; Koomey et al., 2011).
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How to leverage the agriculture-energy nexus for multiplicative
human development benefits
Drawing from the understanding of the agriculture-energy nexus we have established
and lessons from historical experiences at the nexus, we conclude by providing three
pillars of successful coordination of agriculture and energy investment for human
development (Figure 4.1.5). First, cross-sectoral partnerships must create a supportive
ecosystem for energy and agriculture actors to coordinate investments and share
expertise. Second, pilot projects should iterate on nexus solutions, starting with an
agricultural imperative and matching the right energy source and equipment to local
needs. Third, low-cost financing on the supply and demand side can simultaneously
lower the cost of energy supply and support productive use of this energy.

Figure 4.1.5. Three components of effective agriculture-energy programs.
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Create a supportive ecosystem for coordinated energy and agriculture
interventions through cross-sectoral partnerships
Despite their inherent interdependence, investments in energy and agriculture today are
much more likely to be siloed than coordinated (Figure 4.1.3). Cross-sectoral
partnerships are key to unlocking the benefits of synchronization, which include both the
high-level benefits stemming from the complementarity of these sectors (Figure 4.1.2),
and the specific virtuous cycle at the energy-agriculture nexus (Figure 4.1.1).
In previous successful rural electrification campaigns, convening bodies such as the US
CREA and the Thai PEA formed supportive ecosystems that enabled farmers to
leverage new energy resources to expand their capabilities and incomes while
strengthening the economics of rural utilities. They built partnerships connecting the
efforts of actors across sectors. In the U.S. CREA case, this included agricultural
engineers who worked with farmers to identify promising uses of energy on the farm,
equipment manufacturers who built the devices to solve the problem, marketers and
extension agents who familiarized farmers with new solutions, and government agencies
that subsidized both infrastructure deployment (i.e., the “supply side”) and families’
equipment purchases (i.e., the “demand side”).
To form these partnerships today, each country or region needs to identify their specific
unmet needs and unrealized opportunities at the intersection of these sectors. Figure
4.1.2 shows the components, links and feedbacks that must be functional to maximize
nexus benefits. Oftentimes a break in one of these components implies a partnership
that needs to be formed. For example, efforts to enhance value-addition in rice
production with new electric rice mills will be undermined by a rice crop that is
unpredictable for lack of irrigation or other agricultural inputs. Partnerships between

202

agricultural agencies who are supporting sustainable rice cultivation and the energy-side
actors who are introducing the rice mills can help both achieve their goals.

Use pilots to develop reliable energy solutions to pressing problems in
agricultural value chains
The best agriculture-energy nexus solutions will start with a pressing agricultural
problem and then use the right energy resource and equipment to solve it (Factor[e],
2020). For the partners who comprise a supportive agriculture-energy ecosystem, this
requires detailed knowledge of the agricultural imperative for an energy service, the
needs of prospective customers, and the on-ground realities that will determine project
success.
For instance, a recent study of twelve Nigerian agricultural value chains found clear
opportunity to use minigrid-powered equipment to reduce costs and improve earnings in
cassava grating, grain flour milling, and rice milling (Santana et al., 2020). Each of these
agriculture-energy use cases are readily deployable at existing minigrid sites because
they intake common agricultural commodities, perform processing steps which are now
mechanically processed by expensive fossil-powered equipment, and produce products
which are locally sold and consumed. Electric mills and graters can be cheaper and
more reliable than fossil-powered incumbent equipment and can also improve endproduct yield and quality. However, even in these cases, “off-the-shelf” electrical
replacements may flounder in the face of on-the-ground challenges. For example, a new
electric flour mill may fail to attract customers because its milling is too slow, or its
product too coarse (E4I, 2020). Or the resilience of the milling business may be undercut
by crop production systems that are prone to poor yields in dry years which may become
more frequent or severe as the climate changes (Diedhiou et al., 2018; Sultan et al.,
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2019). Navigating the upsides and downsides of the energy and agriculture aspects of
these nexus challenges will require iterating on the solution design and business model
through direct engagement with the target end user.
There is thus no substitute for field pilots when fine tuning agriculture-energy solutions.
There are many use cases to test — one report found more than 100 along the milk,
rice, and horticulture value chains alone (FAO, 2015) — and there is a growing body of
individual case studies. A systematic review of these studies would be a useful
contribution to this topic but is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we do find
some common themes emerging across several pilots.
First, despite an overwhelming interest in using electricity (usually from photovoltaics) to
perform agricultural functions, not all agriculture-energy nexus challenges are best
solved by this energy source. The potential for productive uses of electricity to improve
minigrid capacity utilization has motivated several recent studies that intentionally focus
on the use of minigrid electricity in value chains (Avila et al., 2020; Booth et al., 2018;
E4I, 2019; Santana et al., 2020). Self-sufficient PV-battery (i.e., “standalone”) systems
have their own strengths and weaknesses compared to grid-connected equipment. For
example, relatively mature standalone solar irrigation pumps can provide irrigation at
lower cost than fossil-powered pumps, and can serve fields far from electrified town
centers (Efficiency for Access Coalition, 2019). In contrast, early pilots of standalone PVbattery grain mills struggle to balance high up-front capital costs and lower throughput
compared to diesel alternatives (E4I, 2020). There is considerably less attention given to
other energy resources, such as bioenergy and solar heat, which may be better suited to
some agricultural problems. For example, solar dryers that directly use heat from the sun
to dry crops may often be more thermodynamically sensible (and more cost-effective)
than applications that would first generate PV electricity and then use it to run an electric
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heating element (R. Shrestha, 2017). Bioenergy-based solutions can provide energy
services (e.g., clean cooking with ethanol or biogas, milk chilling with biogas, rice
parboiling with waste rice husks) in addition to bio-based side-products with on-farm
uses (e.g., soil amendments and fertilizer). For example, a farm with two cows can use
an anerobic digester to produce enough biogas for 2–4 hours of cooking per day in
addition to 80 liters of liquid organic fertilizer per day (IDB, 2016). One head-to-head
comparison of milk chillers powered by biogas and solar in Kenya finds a much higher
IRR and higher direct job creation for the biogas option, which utilizes locally available
feedstocks to meet milk chilling needs at much lower unit capital costs than standalone
solar options (FAO & GIZ, 2019, sec. 3.1.3).
Second, most of these agriculture-energy case studies do not explicitly consider the
sustainability or resilience of the agricultural production systems upon which their target
value chain relies. Partnerships should leverage agricultural stakeholders’ decades of
experience on these considerations, rather than leaving energy sector actors to navigate
the complex processes underlying agricultural resilience.
Third, every case study we cite considers the upfront cost of acquiring new equipment to
be a major barrier to adoption of agriculture-energy solutions. This challenge aligns with
a pervasive lack of access to credit and financial inclusion among the world’s rural poor
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018), and it motivates our third pillar of successful agricultureenergy interventions: support of equipment purchases via low-cost loans.

Use low-cost loans to support the “last mile” of nexus solutions while
prioritizing individual agency to choose which problems to solve
Affordable, accessible equipment loans can support the “last mile” of agriculture-energy
solution adoption while prioritizing individuals’ right to choose which problems to solve.
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Agricultural equipment can have sticker prices in the thousands of US dollars, which is
prohibitive for many would-be equipment owners and operators who have little access to
credit or savings. Experience from both historical rural electrification programs and
recent agricultural equipment pilots prove the importance of “demand side” supports that
help customers overcome this barrier. The US Electric Home and Farm Authority and
the Thai Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives used below-market-rate loans
to successfully support customers on the “demand side” of rural electrification.
Low-cost financing gives people the agency to choose their own pathway to expanding
their incomes and capabilities. This tool fits with the capabilities approach to human
development, which prioritizes agency through which an individual can “effectively shape
their own destiny” (A. Sen, 1999, p. 11) and be an “active participant in change, rather
than … a passive and docile recipient of instructions or dispensed assistance” (A. Sen,
1999, p. 281). In the spirit of this approach, affordable loans maximize a person’s
options, leaving them free to translate capabilities into the life they want to live.
Equipment financing can be successfully implemented as the capstone of a supportive
agriculture-energy ecosystem that has identified, tested, and debugged agricultureenergy use cases. In the historical case, farmers were presented with suitable
equipment by via manufacturer catalogs, extension programs, and demonstration
“roadshows”. These equipment were designed to meet specific agricultural needs
through iteration with agricultural engineers on real test farms. Finally, low-cost capital
was applied to both the supply and demand side, supporting both the provision and use
of energy.
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Conclusion
In the rural, agrarian communities where much of the world’s most extreme poverty
persists, coordinated investment in energy and agriculture sectors can generate
multiplicative gains in human development. These investments can leverage the
complementary characteristics of each sector, as more profitable and resilient
agricultural value chains increase income, while energy services expand capabilities
prerequisite to modern life. Further, new energy resources can be directly used to solve
pressing agricultural problems and drive a virtuous cycle of productivity gains at the
agriculture-energy nexus. The agriculture-energy nexus was a core part of previous
success in rural development, and today’s technologies are poised to use these
synergies for still more human benefit — and faster. To proceed, we must apply the
lessons of the past to the realities of each rural community today. Cross-sectoral
partnerships are essential to coordinating investments in both energy and agriculture to
ensure that —at minimum — complementary interventions are deployed close enough in
time and place to create beneficial spillovers. These partnerships can bring
multidisciplinary expertise and resources to bear in a supportive ecosystem that unlocks
the full potential of the agriculture-energy nexus. The best nexus solutions will utilize
energy resources and equipment to solve pressing agricultural problems, and on-ground
pilots will be essential to iteratively test and improve these solutions within the context in
which they will be deployed. Last, with these partnerships and vetted solutions in place,
low-cost financing on both the energy supply and demand sides can unleash the
agriculture-energy nexus at scale. Once energy supply is in place, affordable equipment
loans are vital to helping farmers overcome the upfront cost barrier to acquiring new
equipment that solves the agricultural problems they want to solve.
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5 Conclusion & Future Work
This dissertation studied the opportunity to leverage sustainable energy for human
development through the lens of two technologies: bioenergy and miniature solar-hybrid
electricity grids (i.e., “minigrids”). Both technologies will be key components of
successful climate stabilization. Bioenergy comprises a large fraction of renewable
energy used today and will be required in increasing amounts to reduce the emissions
intensity of transport and industry, among other sectors (Section 2.1.1). For
communities lacking reliable and affordable electricity, distributed energy resources such
as standalone solar systems and minigrids can offer clean electricity access more
cheaply than extending the centralized grid (Section 3.1), and at significantly lower
climate impact than personal fossil-powered generators or connection to a fossil-heavy
centralized grid (ESMAP, 2019; Lam et al., 2019).
Alongside clear climate benefits to sustainable bioenergy and clean rural electrification,
there are tremendous opportunities for these technologies to accelerate progress across
several Sustainable Development Goals. Bioenergy’s natural interconnection with local
infrastructure gives it strong leverage on jobs and income in agrarian communities
(Section 2.1.2). Decentralized energy resources can provide reliable electricity access
upon which most modern necessities and industries rely (Section 3.1).
This thesis does not seek to catalog the climate benefits of bioenergy and minigrids, or
to analyze which deployment approaches would have more or less favorable emissions
outcomes. The enormous emissions reduction potential of these technologies is already
thoroughly documented in the literature, yet the pace of deployment today falls far below
the rates necessary to reach climate goals. Instead of reiterating climate arguments to
speed progress, this body of work addresses specific barriers that impede wider
deployment of these technologies for human benefit. This framing aims to resonate with
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the practitioners, donors, and governments who will ultimately determine which solutions
are prioritized and realized.

Bioenergy
Bioenergy requires land to produce biomass feedstock, which inextricably connects it to
the surrounding environment, agricultural livelihoods, and food security (Sections 2.1.2–
2.1.4). The research contributions in Section 2 studied the potential to use extant global
pasture lands more effectively — perhaps freeing land for bioenergy feedstock
production — and then analyzed the drivers of national food security, which may be
affected by such changes in agricultural land use or productivity.
Section 2.2 provided the first global assessment of yield gaps on grazed pasture land,
which is the largest use of land by humans and of interest as a land stock with potential
to produce more food and bioenergy feedstock. For all subcategories of grazed-only
permanent pasture assessed, we found potential to increase productivity several-fold.
However, because productivity of grazed pasture systems is generally low, even large
relative increases in yield translated to small absolute gains in global protein production.
These results highlight the potential of extensive grazing lands to be put to better use,
perhaps by converting existing pasture into mixed crop-livestock systems that produce
both bioenergy feedstock and animal products.
Future work can translate these global-scale estimates of intensification potential into
actionable intensification strategies on the ground. There is a wide array of potential
interventions, including raising stocking density of livestock, introducing rotational
grazing, and growing appropriate crops alongside livestock, among others. The optimal
approach for each pastoralist depends on idiosyncratic economic and ecological
constraints. Our high-level analysis indicates regions where yield gaps are large, and
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where there is strong potential for ground-level data and farmer engagement to identify
pasture management improvements that raise incomes, increase land use efficiency,
and, perhaps, provide a land source for bioenergy crop cultivation.
Section 2.3 studied cross-national differences in food security to clarify the relative
strengths of potential drivers (e.g., quantity and quality of agricultural land, agricultural
productivity, household spending), many of which may be influenced by large-scale
bioenergy deployment. Household spending, as measured by per-capita household final
consumption expenditure, consistently explained more variance in national food security
scores than other drivers. The quantity and quality of a nation’s agricultural land were
not predictive of either food security metric. The results of this cross-national analysis
support a causal mechanism where, in the absence of exceptional local factors, an
increase in income drives increase in food security. This understanding of food security
challenges an oft-made assumption of the “food versus fuel” critique of bioenergy: that
reallocation of land and agricultural resources to bioenergy production necessarily
disrupts food security.
Future work can build upon these results to consider how bioenergy projects may be
designed to positively affect food security. We showed that rising household incomes
have singular leverage on food security, suggesting that bioenergy projects that raise
local economic prospects may be expected to positively influence food security even if
they displace some incumbent agricultural production. Of course, these positive impacts
on food security would be dependent upon good governance of programs that engage
local people fairly (e.g., outgrower schemes, see Section 2.1.2). Further high-level study
of food security drivers is unlikely to advance this discussion. Rather, the effects of
bioenergy on food security should be studied in a specific place in time, using case
studies that record context conditions (see Robledo‐Abad et al., 2017) and test the
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hypothesis that local employment from bioenergy production operations can raise
incomes, and thus food security.

Minigrids
Solar-diesel hybrid minigrids are a promising energy access solution that can provide
reliable power sufficient for productivity-enhancing machinery, but the nascent industry is
still in the process of reducing costs and attracting private sector investment (Agenbroad
et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2015). Minigrid projects live or die on customer electricity
consumption, which is often their sole source of revenue. The research contributions in
Section 3 tested a new approach to predicting this customer electricity demand more
accurately and studied options for raising demand by using it in agricultural processing.
Section 3.2 tested a data-driven approach to improving demand predictions using
survey and smart meter data from 1,378 Tanzanian electricity customers served by 14
minigrids. Our best-performing model combined smart meter data, customer survey
data, and machine learning models to out-perform standard field practice by an order of
magnitude, emphasizing the importance of collecting and using customer data across a
growing minigrid portfolio. However, despite access to a customer database that is
exceptionally large and detailed for the sector, it was still challenging to accurately
predict the electricity consumption of a specific business, household, or community.
Even if utilizing best practices for predicting electricity consumption, minigrid
practitioners should anticipate a range of prediction errors (-80% to +20% across our
sites for our best-performing model) when designing their systems.
Further studies should examine the financial value of flexible, or “modular”, designs
given the level of demand uncertainty we observed. Modular system designs allow
engineers to add or remove system capacity to compensate for load growth or
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uncertainty in initial customer demand. There is a growing consensus among industry
stakeholders that modular designs — used in combination with more accurate initial load
predictions — can help address the demand uncertainty problem. However, minigrid
developers do not have guidance on how to pursue a modular design, and the expected
payoff for this new approach has not been analyzed. It would be useful to model the
economic value of a modular system (which is flexible but requires overhead to assess
and modify minigrid capacity) versus a bespoke system (which is inflexible but only
requires one design step) under varying levels of customer load uncertainty. The same
technoeconomic minigrid model could also be used to determine a “minimum viable
scale”: the smallest customer loads that can be served by a solar-hybrid minigrid while
still overcoming the high fixed costs of project development and paying back investors
over the project life. In practice, this minimum viable scale benchmark could help
determine whether a modular minigrid would be cost-competitive with standalone solar
systems for a given community.
Section 3.3 summarizes a feasibility study that evaluated opportunities to raise minigrid
loads and direct electricity access towards human development. We identified several
near-term opportunities to use minigrid electricity for income-generating activities across
12 Nigerian agricultural value chains. These included three clear “Tier 1” activities
primed for immediate electrification at Nigerian minigrid sites: cassava grating, rice
milling, and grain flour milling. These activities all have strong fundamental
characteristics indicating that electrifying them can be straightforward and successful.
Despite their promise, none of these productive uses are commonly deployed at
Nigerian minigrids today. Widespread adoption will require a concerted effort to pilot,
debug, and scale the electric equipment that performs these activities.
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Although our study included a deep review of the literature for the 12 Nigerian value
chains within our scope, there is a clear need for a broader review of the global literature
for agriculture-energy applications. Today, there are hundreds of published case studies
of various crop-activity combinations (e.g., electric flour milling, efficient biomass rice
parboiling, biogas milk chilling), but there is no systematic review of these disparate
analyses. A review paper that synthesizes the findings from this literature — much of
which has been published as reports or white papers outside of traditional academic fora
— would be an important contribution to the growing international community with
interest at the energy-agriculture nexus. Such a review could separate the promising
applications from the fanciful and prevent redundant studies by an international
development community that is new to the energy-agriculture nexus and often unaware
of previous work in this area.

The agriculture-energy nexus
The fundamental complementarity between energy and agriculture in rural development
is a common thread through all the research contributions in Sections 2 and 3. Energy
projects in agrarian communities are inextricably tied to the fates of farmers, and to the
agricultural sector that employs them. Likewise, efforts to increase crop yields or create
higher value products or decrease post-harvest losses do so under the limitations posed
by the energy supply. Section 4 concludes the thesis by explaining this complementarity
and showing how to leverage it for multiplicative human development benefits. Unlocking
the potential of the agriculture-energy nexus will require cross-sectoral collaboration,
targeted pilot projects that test solutions to pressing agricultural problems, and
affordable equipment financing for the energy supplier and end user. The next step is to
put these recommendations into practice. The Nigerian Rural Electrification Agency’s
Energizing Agriculture program, for instance, could use an accelerator model to learn by
213

doing, convening cross-sectoral teams to advance agriculture-energy nexus solutions.
The next phase of progress on this topic should be led by the needs of stakeholders who
are working in full view of the complex challenges facing farmers, processors, and
traders. Further academic research will be most useful if it responds directly to the
questions and concerns raised by those on the ground, and least useful if it fails to
meaningfully engage with local context.
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